Brookins v. State, Nos. 46454

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Citation: 499 S.W.2d 320
• Docket Number: 46455,Nos. 46454
• Parties: Ira Lee BROOKINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 25 September 1973

Page 320

499 S.W.2d 320 Ira Lee BROOKINS, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee. Nos. 46454, 46455. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. Sept. 25, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 1973.

Robert B. Maloney, Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., John E. Rapier, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

JACKSON, Commissioner.

These appeals emanate from a consolidated trial before a jury in which appellant was convicted of the forcible rape of a woman and the statutory rape of her 14 year old daughter. Punishment was assessed by the jury at life in both cases.

By his first two grounds of error, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a statement given by him to the police. This statement, he alleges, was inadmissible since there was insufficient evidence that it was voluntarily given and since it was taken without counsel being present and without a showing by the State of a waiver of the right to counsel by appellant.

Appellant moved to suppress the confession, and the trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury in compliance with Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Subsequently, the court ruled that the confession had been voluntarily given, and the jury was appropriately charged on the voluntariness issue. Appellant testified at this hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether his statement was voluntarily given. He did not testify during the trial before the jury.

Appellant's testimony was that after his arrest by the Terrell police he was transferred to the Garland jail by Officers Rogers and Alexander. He further testified that at the jail he was not informed of his rights nor permitted to use the telephone to call a lawyer. In regard to his confession, appellant stated that approximately one and one-half hours after he arrived at the Garland jail Officer Alexander came to his call and there kicked and beat him until he agreed to sign a statement. Appellant then displayed to the court certain scars on his chest which he stated were a result of the beating. A shirt which appellant had been wearing on that evening was also introduced into evidence. The shirt bore stains on it corresponding to the scars. Appellant stated these were blood stains though this was uncorroborated. However, a nurse from the Dallas County jail did testify that appellant was treated for injuries to his side.

Officer Rogers of the Garland police testified that he, along with Officer Alexander, transported appellant from Terrell to Garland on the evening of appellant's arrest arriving at the Garland jail at approximately 12:00 midnight and that he did not abuse appellant nor did he see anyone else do so. Rogers further stated that Alexander was no longer employed by the Garland Police Department. Officer Alexander did not testify at the hearing or at the trial.

Officer Carlock of the Garland Police testified that he had been assigned to investigate the rapes in question and that he first saw the appellant at approximately 10:30 A.M. on September 13, 1969, the morning after appellant's arrest. That at that time, he read appellant his rights from his blue Miranda card. This card was read in open court and complies with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Officer Carlock further stated that appellant acknowledged that he understood his rights but that he did not ask for a lawyer. Immediately thereafter, appellant gave Officer Carlock an oral statement admitting his involvement in the crime. At Officer Carlock's request, appellant then retold the story as Carlock

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typed it on a form used by the Garland police for such purposes. This form meets the requirements of Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., with respect to the warnings that must be given to the person making the statement. In addition, it contained a waiver of these rights. Appellant signed this statement in the presence of a witness and Officer Carlock.

Officer John Cullins of the Plano Police Department testified that on the date of appellant's arrest he was the jailer for the Garland Police Department. He recounted that on that evening he placed appellant in jail sometime after midnight and further, in contravention of appellant's assertions, that it would have been impossible for anyone to get into appellant's cell since he (Cullins) had the only key and that no one used that key during the time that appellant alleged he was beaten.

From the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the confession into evidence. The testimony of Officers Rogers, Carlock and Cullins, though controverted by appellant, supports the court's finding that appellant was not coerced or mistreated in order to obtain the confession. Further, testimony of Officer Carlock also indicated that appellant was, on at least two occasions, advised of his constitutional rights in compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. On the question of whether or not appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights to counsel, we are cognizant of the fact that the printed waiver in the confession is not determinative. Encina v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 471 S.W.2d 384; McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636. Waiver is to be determined from the 'totality of the circumstances.' Nash v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W.2d 557; Thomas v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 458 S.W.2d 817; Easley v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 448 S.W.2d 490. Appellant testified that he had gone through the eighth grade in school and there was no evidence adduced at the trial indicating that the appellant was laboring under any mental deficiency, nor was there any claim that the appellant was incompetent to stand trial. See Nash v. State, supra. As previously mentioned, there is substantial evidence that appellant was more than once informed of his right to counsel but that at no time did he request such.

Considering the 'totality of the circumstances,' we are unable to agree with appellant's claim that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at the time he confessed to the crimes involved.

Appellant's first two grounds of error are overruled.

Appellant, pro se, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to connect him with the crime. Specifically, he charges that the only affirmatively link between...