Broward Builders Exchange, Inc. v. Goehring

• Decision Date: 28 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 38746,38746
• Citation: 231 So.2d 513
• Parties: BROWARD BUILDERS EXCHANGE, INC., Petitioner, v. Lily GOEHRING, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 513

231 So.2d 513

BROWARD BUILDERS EXCHANGE, INC., Petitioner, v. Lily GOEHRING, Respondent.

No. 38746.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 28, 1970.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1970.

Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., of Rogers, Morris & Ziegler, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Ronald Fitzgerald, of Fleming, O'Bryan & Fleming, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

On certiorari to the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District. Respondent (Plaintiff) brought suit in the trial court to recover the balance of monies which she claims is owed her under an employment contract. Petitioner (Defendant) allegedly breached said contract by wrongful discharge of Plaintiff before the expiration of the term of employment. The monies sought are the unpaid balance of her agreed yearly salary. Defendant interposed the defense of the Statute of Limitations, F.S. § 95.11(7)(b), and moved for dismissal. The trial court, relying on Buenger v. Kennedy, Fla.App., 151 So.2d 463, dismissed respondent's complaint with prejudice, holding that the cause was barred by the one year limitation on suits for wages contained in F.S. § 95.11(7)(b). Respondent appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District. Said court reversed the lower court, Goehring v. Broward Builders Exchange, Fla.App., 222 So.2d 801, holding that the provisions of F.S. § 95.11(7)(b) did 'not apply to actions for the recovery of wages accruing Under a contract' (emphasis in the original), and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Petitioner (Defendant) seeks certiorari under this court's conflict jurisdiction.

At the outset it should be noted that there is a simple proposition of law upon which this cause could have been decided. In her complaint, Plaintiff has contended that she is seeking the balance of a 'yearly salary' owed her under a contract for employment as an executive. While some jurisdictions have held that, at least in certain contexts, 'salary' and 'wages' are synonymous, the cases are legion in which a distinction is made between the two, in the following terms:

'Courts usually restrict the term 'wages' to sums paid as hire to domestic or menial servants and those employed in the various manual occupations. On the other hand, the term 'salary' usually has reference to the compensation of clerks, salesmen, bookkeepers, other employees of like class and performing like services and supervisory personnel and officers of corporations, as well as public officers.' (Norman v. Goldman, Del.Super., 4 Storey 45, 173 A.2d 607, 1961, and cases cited therein; Speilberger Bros. v. Brandes, 3 Ala.App. 590, 58 So. 75, 1912; Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352, 88 N.E. 152, 28 L.R.A. (NS) 1108, 1909; Matter of Stryker, 158 N.Y. 528, 53 N.E. 525, 1899, all to the same effect.) 'The word 'salary' imports a specific contract for a specific sum for a specified period of time, while 'wages' are compensation for services by the day or week.' (Blick v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 113 Md. 487, 77 A. 844, 1910). 'The term 'wages' as distinct from 'salaries' has, especially in recent years, acquired a specific meaning. Webster defines 'salary' as follows: 'The recompense or consideration paid, or stipulated to be paid, to a person at regular intervals for services, especially to holders of official, executive, or clerical positions; fixed compensation regularly paid, as by the year, quarter, month or week; stipend--now often distinguished from wages.' Any wages are said to be, 'Pay given for labor, usually manual or mechanical, at short stated intervals, as distinguished from salaries or fees. '' (State v. Ash, 53 Ariz. 197, 87 P.2d 270, 1939; In re Riebs' Estate, 8 Wis.2d 110, 98 N.W.2d 453, 1959, to the same effect.)

Although the distinction seems not to have been considered heretofore in Florida, we are of the opinion that in the present context of the statute of limitations it is a valid one. Without passing upon the question of what the two terms mean in connection with other statutes or in other contexts, we hold that an action seeking recovery of a salary allegedly withheld does not fall within the terms 'suit for wages' within the intent of F.S. § 95.11(7)(b).

However, our jurisdiction in this case is based upon a clear conflict between the second and fourth District Court of Appeal as to the proper interpretation of F.S. § 95.11(7)(b). This conflict should be resolved, the more so since, when this case is tried, the evidence may show, despite the allegations of the complaint upon which of course the motion to dismiss was decided, that Plaintiff was employed in a lesser capacity and working for a wage.

We recognize, as did the District Court, that the wording of § 95.11(7)(b) is susceptible, at first glance, of more than one interpretation. The District Court of Appeal held that to apply this statute to wage claims accruing under a contract would do violence to the statutory scheme of F.S. § 95.11. But it is difficult to conceive of a claim for wages which does not in some manner arise from a contract expressed or implied.

Respondent has argued that the proper interpretation is that the words 'accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime' modifies the words 'wages' and 'overtime' as well as 'damages and penalties' and that an expanded version of the statute would read, 'Suits for the...