Brown and Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal

• Decision Date: 09 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17920.,17920.
• Citation: 288 Conn. 646,954 A.2d 816
• Parties: BROWN AND BROWN, INC. v. Richard BLUMENTHAL, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General v. Brown and Brown, Inc.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

954 A.2d 816

288 Conn. 646

BROWN AND BROWN, INC. v. Richard BLUMENTHAL, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General v. Brown and Brown, Inc.

No. 17920.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 15, 2008.

Decided September 9, 2008.

Michelle H. Seagull, with whom were William M. Rubenstein and Kelly A. Burns, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff in the first case, defendant in the second case).

Matthew J. Budzik, assistant attorney general, with whom were Arnold B. Feigin, assistant attorney general, and, on the

brief, Michael E. Cole, chief of the antitrust department, for the appellee (defendant in the first case, plaintiff in the second case).

James Sicilian, Jason S. Weathers, Hartford, Ben Robbins, Martin J. Newhouse and Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan filed a brief for the New England Legal Foundation as amicus curiae.

Dennis F. Kerrigan, Jr., Michael Menapace and Emily A. Gianquinto, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, Inc., et al., as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

This appeal arises from an action seeking injunctive, declaratory and equitable relief brought by the plaintiff, Brown and Brown, Inc., against the defendant, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, in connection with a subpoena duces tecum and interrogatories issued by the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 35-42¹ as part of an investigation of potential antitrust violations in the insurance industry.² The plaintiff, an independent insurance intermediary that provides insurance and reinsurance products and services to various types of professional, corporate and individual clientele, appeals³ from the trial court's decision denying its motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly denied its motion for summary judgment, which had sought a declaration that the defendant may not disclose any documents or information provided by the plaintiff in response to the subpoena and interrogatories issued pursuant to § 35-42, except in two limited circumstances. Because we conclude that the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was not a final judgment, we dismiss the plaintiff's appeal.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The defendant is conducting an ongoing investigation into certain practices in the insurance industry that may be in violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-24 et seq. In furtherance of this investigation, the defendant issued interrogatories and a subpoena duces tecum to the plaintiff pursuant to § 35-42. The plaintiff partially responded to the defendant's requests, producing more than 12,000 pages of documents.

During the course of the plaintiff's production of documents, it became evident that the plaintiff and the defendant disagreed about the ability of the defendant to disclose information produced pursuant to § 35-42 to individuals outside of the defendant's office. As a result, the plaintiff did not complete its response to the defendant, and instead filed the present action in the Superior Court. The plaintiff's claims are set forth in a five count complaint, which seeks: a declaration of the scope of the confidentiality protection provided by § 35-42; temporary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from disclosing the responsive material and information in violation of the provisions of § 35-42; a writ of mandamus requiring the defendant to protect the confidentiality of the responsive material and information by not disclosing it in violation of § 35-42; an order quashing or modifying the subpoena so as to ensure appropriate safeguards to protect the disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential commercial and financial information; and a protective order preventing the disclosure by the defendant of the plaintiff's trade secrets and other confidential commercial and financial information. The defendant subsequently filed a separate action for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to comply with the subpoena duces tecum and the interrogatories. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a "declaration from the court that pursuant to [§ ] 35-42, the [defendant] may not disclose any of [the plaintiff's] documents or information provided pursuant to a subpoena or interrogatories issued pursuant to § 35-42 to any person outside the [defendant's office] except to the extent (1) a court permits — after notice to the [plaintiff] and an opportunity to be heard—during the course of a litigation that arises from the [defendant's] antitrust investigation; or (2) provided to an official of another state or the federal government pursuant to § 35-42(g) where such official will maintain the same degree of confidentiality provided by [§ ] 35-42(c) and (e)."⁴ The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, rejecting the plaintiff's claims, including its interpretation of § 35-42. This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review. "The lack of a final judgment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear an appeal. A determination regarding ... subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law [over which we exercise plenary review]. ... Pritchard v. Pritchard, 281 Conn. 262, 270, 914 A.2d 1025 (2007).

"We commence the discussion of our appellate jurisdiction by recognizing that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. E.g., Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 449, 451, 208 A.2d 337 (1965); State v. Figueroa, 22 Conn. App. 73, 75, 576 A.2d 553 (1990), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 814, 576 A.2d 544 (1990). Article fifth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides for a Supreme Court, a Superior Court and such lower courts as the [G]eneral [A]ssembly shall ... ordain and establish, and that [t]he powers and jurisdiction of these courts shall be defined by law. ... To consider the [plaintiff's] claims, we must apply the law governing our appellate jurisdiction, which is statutory. State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). The legislature has enacted General Statutes § 52-263,⁵ which limits the right of appeal to those appeals filed by aggrieved parties on issues of law from final judgments. Unless a specific right to appeal otherwise has been provided by statute, we must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from a final judgment before considering the merits of the claim. ... Rivera v. Veterans Memorial Medical Center, 262 Conn. 730, 733-34, 818 A.2d 731 (2003); see also State v. Curcio, supra, at 30, 463 A.2d 566 (right of appeal is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met). Further, we have recognized that limiting appeals to final judgments serves the important public policy of minimizing interference with and delay in the resolution of trial court proceedings. ... Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ace American Reinsurance Co., 279 Conn. 220, 225, 901 A.2d 1164 (2006)." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Palmer v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 285 Conn. 462, 466-67, 940 A.2d 742 (2008).

In the present case, the plaintiff appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The denial of a motion for summary judgment does not result in a judgment, however, and no judgment therefore was rendered. "As a general rule, an interlocutory ruling may not be appealed pending the final disposition of a case. See, e.g., Doublewal Corp. v. Toffolon, 195 Conn. 384, 388, 488 A.2d 444 (1985); see also State v. Curcio, [supra, 191 Conn. at 30, 463 A.2d 566] (right of appeal is purely statutory and is limited to appeals by aggrieved parties from final judgments). The denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily is an interlocutory ruling and, accordingly, not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 34, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). We previously have determined [however] that certain interlocutory orders have the attributes of a final judgment and consequently are appealable under ... § 52-263. ... In State v. Curcio, [supra, at 31, 463 A.2d 566], we explicated two situations in which a party can appeal an otherwise interlocutory order: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them. ... Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 345-46 n. 13, 844 A.2d 211 (2004)."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 784-85, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005).

At oral argument in this court, the parties asserted that the present case is reviewable under the second prong of State v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. at 31, 463 A.2d 566. Specifically, the parties claimed that the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment constituted a rejection of the plaintiff's interpretation of the confidentiality requirements of § 35-42, and because each of the plaintiff's claims sought confidentiality of documents disclosed pursuant to § 35-42, the court's denial of summary judgment so concluded the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them. We disagree.

We begin by noting that the parties' agreement on the existence of a final judgment does not confer jurisdiction on this court. "The lack of a final judgment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear an appeal. ... The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even on [their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear. ... Neither the parties nor the trial court,...