Brown v. Baldwin
| Decision Date | 13 March 1894 |
| Citation | 25 S.W. 858,121 Mo. 106 |
| Parties | Brown et al., Appellants, v. Baldwin et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court. -- Hon. James D. Fox, Judge.
Affirmed.
M. R Smith and Wm. Carter for appellants.
(1) Appellants maintain that under the petition and subsequent pleadings in this cause the court should have re-examined the title to the land described in petition, if for no other purpose than to rightly determine the question of good faith on the part of appellants in making the improvements for which they are asking compensation. Under this point will be found the authorities in support of a liberal interpretation of the statute relating to compensation for improvements made in good faith by occupying claimant; also the authorities showing the equitable nature of the statute and its real origin. 2 Story's Eq. Juris., sec. 1237 and note 4; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478; Green v Biddle, 8 Wheat. 77; 2 Cent. Law Journal, 98; Stump v. Hornback, 109 Mo. 280; Townsend v. Shipp's Heirs, Cooke (Tenn.) 293; Sedgwick and Wait on Trial of Titles, etc., sec. 693 and note 3; sec. 694 and note 1; Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N.Y. 382. (2) Appellants maintain that they made the improvements on the land described in their petition in good faith, believing that they had the right and privilege to do so. There is no question of equitable notice in the case, for the reason that defendant Carrie Baldwin, nee Pool, while claiming title to the premises, encouraged the making of said improvements when and where made. 1 Wash. on Real Prop. [4 Ed.], star page 3 and top p. 6, note 4; Rerick v. Kern, 2 Amer. Lead. Cases [3 Ed.], 682, note p. 693; Baker v. Railroad, 57 Mo. 270, 273; Kanada v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 213, et seq; Story on Agency, secs. 90, 253, 260; 1 Wait's Actions and Def., sec. 12, p. 232; Allen v Mansfield, 82 Mo. 695; Desloge v. Pearce, 38 Mo. 601; Doty v. Gorham, 5 Pick. 487; Avery v. Railroad, 113 Mo. 566; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., sec. 594 and secs. 601, 602; 2 Sugden on Vendors, secs. 27-30. (3) Appellants maintain that immaterial and irrelevant testimony was admitted by the court to fasten notice on appellants to the effect that they had notice of the Pool title at the time of making the improvements. Wade on Notice, sec. 29; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., secs. 602, 597; Sedg. & Wait on Trial of Titles, sec. 696 and note 1 on p. 471; Learned v. Carley, 43 Miss. 687; Vaughn v. Tracy, 22 Mo. 418. (4) Appellants maintain that the trial court should have determined the issue as to the kind of property the machinery was, whether fixtures or not, in avoidance of further litigation, if for no other purpose. R. S. 1889, sec. 2216; Rush v. Brown, 101 Mo. 592; Kerr v. Simmons, 82 Mo. 275; Hicks v. Jackson, 85 Mo. 294. (5) Appellants maintain that to permit respondents to take the land in question by virtue of a change in the county boundary lines would be in conflict with the plain provisions of the federal and state constitutions as to taking property without due process of law. 15 amend. Constitution U. S; State Constitution, art. 2, sec. 30; Cooley on Const. Lim. [3 Ed.], chap. 40, (star pages) 358, 362 and 363; Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 574 et seq; 22 Cent. Law Journal, 277; 27 Law Reg. 693; 30 Law Reg. 199; Barlemeyer v. Iowa, 13 Law Reg. 221. (6) Appellants maintain that to hold that Stoddard county had fee simple title to the land described in appellants' petition, and that by changing the boundary line of that county, to thereby divest the title (a fee) out of that county, and to vest it in Bollinger county, would operate to impair the obligation of the contract between the county and state, as well as between the purchaser of the county and the county. Federal Const., art. 1, sec. 10; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 113; McCracken v. Haywood, 2 How. 612; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259; 107 U.S. 769; 96 U.S. 595; Cooley on Const. Lim., star pages, 285 et seq. and notes.
B. B. Cahoon for respondent.
(1) The title to this real estate is res adjudicata, and under the facts can not be relitigated by appellants against appellees in this or any other suit. (2) The plea of no notice given prior to the passage of the act of March 14, 1859, which first placed this real estate in Bollinger County, might have been made as well in Pool v. Brown as now. Not having been so made it can not be raised now. 74 Mo. 561; 76 Mo. 38; 63 Mo. 515. It could not even be raised now in coram nobis. Halford v. Alexander, 46 Am. Dec. 253 and note; Sanders v. State, 16 Central L. Jour. 473-475; Freeman on Judg. 475. (3) The long acquiescence by the Cape Girardeau & Bloomfield Macadamized & Gravel Road Company in the act of March 14, 1859, and in the revision of 1865 (Revised Statutes, Missouri, 1865, sec. 50, p. 195), which placed these lands in Bollinger county estop it and its alleged grantees from questioning the validity of that change now. Burgess v. Railroad, 99 Mo. 496; Landrum v. Bank, 63 Mo. 48; Bliss v. Pritchard, 67 Mo. 181; Sullivan v. Railroad, 94 U.S. 806; Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 591; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 94; Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 230; Kitchen v. Railroad, 59 Mo. 514; Adams' Equity, 227. (4) An action for improvements under the statute, necessarily concedes the title to the real estate is in appellees. Revised Statutes, Missouri, 1889, secs. 4645-4654; Stump v. Hornbeck, 15 Mo.App. 372; S. C., 94 Mo. 26; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251-255; Russell v. Defrance, 39 Mo. 506. (5) The improvements were all made by Wm. Brown et al., with full and detailed knowledge and notice of appellees' title to the real estate before any of them were placed on the real estate. Therefore, appellants are not entitled to compensation on account of any of said improvements. Revised Statutes, 1889, secs. 4645-4654; Revised Statutes, 1855, sec. 20, p. 694; Lee v. Brown, 55 Mo. 400-403; Stump v. Hornbeck, 15 Mo.App. 372; S. C., 94 Mo. 26; Valle v. Fleming, 29 Mo. 152; McQueen v. Choteau, 20 Mo. 228; Russell v. Defrance, 39 Mo. 512; 35 Mo. 251-255. As to what is good faith and notice. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (U.S.); 1 Sedgwick & Wait on Trial of Titles to Land, pp. 461-487; Ibid, secs. 684-694, 716. One who knows the facts of the adverse title is to be charged with its legal effect. Dart v. Hercules, 57 Ill. 446; Woodhull v. Rosenthall, 61 N.Y. 395. One who knows the adverse title will not be allowed to say he believed it bad. Levison v. Harris, 14 S.W. 343; Holmes v. McGee, 8 S.W. 169; State Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 68; Powell v. Rogers, 11 Ill.App.Ct. 102; 85 Ill. 132. (6) This is not a case of improvements made between landlord and tenant, but of improvements made willfully by a trespasser, or at least by a stranger to the true title, and made against the will and wish of the owner, and in defiance of the true owner's title to the land.
This is a proceeding under the statute of this state for the value of improvements by the losing parties in an action of ejectment, decided in this court in Pool v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675, 11 S.W. 743. The improvements consist of a large stave factory, including the machinery used in manufacturing staves, the engines, boilers, kilns, buildings, etc., estimated to be worth $ 35,000 or $ 40,000. A temporary injunction was granted which was dissolved on final hearing and judgment rendered in favor of the defendants herein, the plaintiffs in the ejectment suit.
There are three main questions presented for decision, namely: Whether the title can be reinvestigated in a proceeding of this nature. What constitutes notice and good faith, and whether appellants acted in good faith. Also, whether the machinery of all kinds used in the manufacturing staves constitutes fixtures or chattels. The other questions are but corollaries of the foregoing. The trial court declined to reinvestigate the title, claiming the statute did not authorize it. It also held that appellants had notice of respondents' claim of title before making the improvements, and that such notice was in no ways neutralized, or waived by the conduct of appellants' agent in the ejectment suit. And further held that the question as to whether such machinery was fixtures or chattels was not involved.
Appellants allege in their petition the history of their title, showing first, that the land was patented to Stoddard county July 24, 1857, by B. F. Massey, secretary of state. They allege that the land in dispute was never selected as swamp land for Bollinger county, but was selected as such for Stoddard county; allege the sale and conveyance of the same by Stoddard county to the Cape Girardeau and Bloomfield Macadamized and Gravel Road Company; allege the sale and conveyance thereof by mesne conveyance to the appellants; allege that they and their grantors bought the same in good faith, believing at the time that they were acquiring a valid title thereto, and aver that they now and yet have the title, notwithstanding the judgment in favor of respondent Carrie Pool, now Carrie Baldwin, in the ejectment suit; allege the erection of a large stave factory on the land in controversy and the equipping it with all kinds of machinery used in the manufacturing of staves; allege that said machinery, engines, boilers, etc., are chattels; allege that respondent, Carrie Pool, now Mrs. Baldwin, knew of the erection of said stave factory and of all of the improvements made by appellants or their grantors; that she encouraged and acquiesced in the same; allege the understanding that after the title to said land had been settled, the same should be sold to William Brown by Carrie Pool for the sum of $ 5 per acre; allege that the acts changing the boundary lines between Stoddard and Bollinger counties, whereby territory was detached from Stoddard and...
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