Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 25 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12 C 01112.,12 C 01112.
• Citation: 973 F.Supp.2d 870
• Parties: Lincoln BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION; Barbara Byrd–Bennett, in her official capacity as Chief Executive Officer of Chicago Public Schools; and Gregory Mason, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

973 F.Supp.2d 870

Lincoln BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION; Barbara Byrd–Bennett, in her official capacity as Chief Executive Officer of Chicago Public Schools; and Gregory Mason, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. 12 C 01112.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

Sept. 25, 2013.

William F. Spielberger, William F. Spielberger & Associates, P.C., Terence Edward Flynn, Law Office of Terence E. Flynn, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Linda Hogan, Cheryl J. Colston, Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Department of Law, Lucille A. Blackburn, Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Susan Margaret O'Keefe, Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

EDMOND E. CHANG, District Judge.

Plaintiff Lincoln Brown, a middle-school teacher at Murray Language Academy, brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Chicago Board of Education, CEO Barbara Byrd–Bennett of the Chicago Public Schools, ¹ and Principal Gregory Mason of Murray Language Academy, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights.² As detailed below, Brown alleges that he led a discussion, in his sixth-grade grammar class, on one of the most offensive words in the English language—“nigger.” Brown says that he was suspended without pay for leading that discussion, and claims that the suspension violated his right to free speech and his right to due process.³ Brown sues Byrd–Bennett in her official capacity as the CEO of the Board, and Mason both in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as the principal of Murray. Defendants move to dismiss all claims [R. 16], arguing that the complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For reasons explained more fully below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). Lincoln Brown is a middle-school teacher at Murray Language Academy and an employee of the Chicago Board of Education. R. 11, Compl. at 1. On October 4, 2011, at the beginning of a grammar exercise in Brown's sixth-grade class, Brown noticed some of his students arguing over a note, which the students were passing around, containing offensive rap lyrics. Id. ¶ 5. Brown collected the note and read a part of it aloud to demonstrate the bullying nature of the words. R. 11–1, Pl.'s Exh. A at 1. He then explained to the students that, although he listened to rap music, he did not listen to the type of rap that contained offensive and inappropriate language, including racial stereotypes and the degradation of women. Id.

When students asked what he meant, Brown decided to defuse the situation by explaining the controversial use of the “N” word in rap music and society at large. Id. Brown explained that the word “nigger” was distasteful and historically offensive to African Americans, and that the use of that word by some African Americans is viewed with disgust by others. Id. at 1–2. The discussion eventually touched on the racial profiling of Chicago cab drivers. Id. at 2. After class, Brown approached the two students involved in the initial dispute, and Brown resolved any lingering issues between the two students. See id. Certain parts of the classroom discussion were witnessed by Gregory Mason, the principal of Murray Language Academy, who had stopped in during Brown's class. R. 11–3, Pl.'s Exh. C at 1–2.

Around two weeks after the incident, on October 17, Principal Mason delivered a “Notice of Pre–Discipline Hearing” to Brown. Compl. ¶ 6. The Notice stated that Brown had violated sections 3–3 and 3–17 of the Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Section 3–3 prohibited the use of “verbally abusive language to or in front of [a] student.” Id. ¶ 7; R. 11–3, Pl.'s Exh. C at 1. Section 3–17 prohibited teachers from:

[v]iolating School rules, Board rules, policies or procedures that result in behaviors that disrupt the orderly educational process in the classroom, in the school, and may occur on or off the school grounds or assigned work location. Any cruel, immoral, negligent, or criminal conduct or communication to a student, that caused psychological or physical harm or injury to a student.

Compl. ¶ 8. Included in the Notice was Principal Mason's description of his memory of the events, his first-hand account of Brown's use of the word “nigger,” and Mason's subsequent conversations with students who had witnessed the exchange. Id. ¶ 9; Pl.'s Exh. C at 1–2.

Brown's disciplinary hearing took place around a week later, on October 25. Compl. ¶ 11. Then, around two weeks after the hearing, on November 10, Brown received a Notice of Disciplinary Action that concluded that Brown had violated Section 3–3 by “[u]sing verbally abusive language to or in front of students.” Id. ¶ 12; R. 11–5, Pl.'s Exh. E at 1.⁴ The Notice of Disciplinary Action imposed a five-day suspension without pay, and included the following instruction: “Do not use the word “N––––––” with students at Murray at any time; whether a ‘teachable moment’ or not; the word is not appropriate for this age group.” Compl. ¶ 12; Pl.'s Exh. E at 1.

Within a week, Brown filed an appeal of the suspension. Compl. ¶ 15. The appeal was filed with the Director of Employee Relations. Id. After a hearing with the Office of Employee Relations, the appeal was denied in February 2012. Id. ¶ 16–17. Brown brought this federal lawsuit to overturn the five-day suspension, which was without pay.

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.2009). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Analysis

A. Official Capacity Claims Against Byrd–Bennett and Mason

Defendants first argue that Brown's claims against Byrd–Bennett and Mason in their official capacities should be dismissed as redundant, because Brown is already separately suing the Board of Education. R. 16, Def.'s Mot. Dismiss at 2–3. Defendants are right: by naming Byrd–Bennett and Mason in their official capacities ⁵ and also naming the Board, the complaint is really suing the Board of Education thrice over. This is true because an action brought against an individual in his official capacity “is tantamount to a claim against the government entity itself.” Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Wolf–Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 870 (7th Cir.1983)). When both a local governmental entity and an individual is sued in his official capacity, the suit against the officials is redundant and should be dismissed. See Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir.1987). So the official-capacity claims against Byrd–Bennett and Mason are dismissed.

B. First Amendment Claim

Brown argues that, by punishing him for teaching about the word “nigger,” the Board violated Brown's right to free speech under the First Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 19–25. When it comes to government regulation of a government employee's speech, the general principle has (like many legal principles) an exception, and the exception itself might have an exception. The general principle is that the “government is entitled to restrict speech that addresses a matter of public concern ‘if it can prove that the interest of the employee as a citizen in commenting on the matter is outweighed by the interest of the government employer in promoting effective and efficient public service.’ ” Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 675–76 (7th Cir.2004), and citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)). In evaluating this balance of interests, courts examine any relevant facts, like whether the speech disrupted relationships with co-workers; whether the speech got in the way of the employee-speaker's performance of job duties; and the time, place, and manner of the speech. McGreal, 368 F.3d at 676 (citation omitted); Wright v. Ill. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1502 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted).

But none of this matters if the public employee's speech is made pursuant to his or her official duties, that is, if “the employee is simply performing his or her job duties.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). “[W...