Brown v. Earp, S91G0419
| Decision Date | 05 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. S91G0419,S91G0419 |
| Parties | BROWN v. EARP, Commissioner. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
P. Gerald Cody, Jr., Douglas W. McDonald Law Offices, Cornelia, for Brown.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Daryl A. Robinson, Patsy A. Austin, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for Earp.
We are called upon in this appeal to decide whether the 180-day period of limitation in OCGA § 40-13-33(a) applies to all collateral attacks on misdemeanor traffic convictions or only to attacks by petition for habeas corpus relief. The question arose in Brown's appeal to superior court from the decision of the Department of Public Safety declaring him a habitual violator and revoking his driver's license. The superior court ruled that Brown's effort in that appeal to make a collateral attack on some of the convictions on which his designation as a habitual violator was based was barred because more than 180 days had passed since the convictions. Brown's application to the Court of Appeals for a discretionary appeal from the superior court's ruling was denied in an unpublished order 1 which relied on this court's holding in Earp v. Brown, 260 Ga. 215, 391 S.E.2d 396 (1990). We granted certiorari to consider the scope of the limitation established in OCGA § 40-13-33(a).
Brown's attack on his previous convictions was based on his contention that they were void. 2 In Earp v. Brown, supra, at 216, 391 S.E.2d 396, this court discussed the impact of OCGA § 40-13-33 on collateral attacks on void judgments:
This statute creates a limited and procedural exception to the general rule of law codified at OCGA § 17-9-4 that a defendant can collaterally attack void judgments at any time. It limits such attacks to within the first 180 days after the conviction has been finally adjudicated, even if a habeas petition could be brought and would be successful.
Based on that language, the Court of Appeals held in its order in the present case that the period of limitation in the statute applies to any challenge which could be brought by means of a petition for habeas corpus, regardless of whether the challenge was actually made by that procedure. We agree with that interpretation of our holding in Earp v. Brown, supra, and find it controlling in this case. The challenge in this case was not by habeas corpus, but it could have been. Hardison v. Martin, 254 Ga. 719(1), 334 S.E.2d 161 (1985). Accordingly, it was subject to the 180-day limitation in OCGA § 40-13-33(a), and the superior court was correct in rejecting the challenge.
Appellant argues that use of § 40-13-33(a) to bar his collateral attack on previous convictions is inappropriate for two reasons: it is a misinterpretation of the statute; and if it is not, this interpretation of the statute may only be applied prospectively. The first argument is based largely on the title of the Code section as it appears in the Code: "Limitation on habeas corpus challenge of misdemeanor traffic conviction." According to OCGA § 1-1-7, the descriptive heading preceding the Code section does not constitute part of the law and does not limit or expand construction of the Code section. A better source for determining the intent of the legislature in enacting § 40-13-33 would be the preamble of the act creating the Code section:
To amend Article 2 of Chapter 13 of Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to arrests, trials, and appeals of traffic offenses, so as to provide that all challenges to final convictions for traffic offenses must be filed within 180 days of the date the conviction becomes final; ... and for other purposes. [Ga.Laws 1986, p. 444.]
We find it clear from the legislature's expression of its intent and...
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Harper v. State
...subsequent unrelated proceedings where the validity of a previous conviction might be called into question. See Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522, 407 S.E.2d 737 (1991). While it is true that the statute would allow a collateral attack on a void conviction in a subsequent action wherein a party at......
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Munye v. Brickhouse, A17A1188 A17A1189 A17A1190.
...period contained in OCGA § 40–13–33 (a) does not apply "only to attacks by petition for habeas corpus relief." Brown v. Earp , 261 Ga. 522, 522, 407 S.E.2d 737 (1991). Rather, the limitation period applies broadly to any challenge to a misdemeanor traffic conviction that could have been bro......
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Allen v. State
...period contained in OCGA § 40-13-33(a) does not apply "only to attacks by petition for habeas corpus relief." Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522, 407 S.E.2d 737 (1991). Rather, it "applies to any challenge which could be brought by means of a petition for habeas corpus, regardless of whether the ch......
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Legum v. Crouch
...a part of such statute and is not controlling regarding the construction or interpretation thereof. OCGA § 1-1-7; compare Brown v. Earp, 261 Ga. 522, 407 S.E.2d 737; Walker v. State, 199 Ga.App. 701, 405 S.E.2d 887. Moreover, Lazenby, supra, and State Farm, etc. Co. v. Pace, 176 Ga.App. 737......
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"garbage In, Garbage Out": the Litigation Implosion Over the Unconstitutional Organization and Jurisdiction of the City Court of Atlanta - Edward C. Brewer Iii
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