Brown v. Hanford Elementary School Bd.

• Citation: 69 Cal.Rptr. 154,263 Cal.App.2d 170
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 14 June 1968
• Parties: Alex Edward BROWN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. HANFORD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL BOARD et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 902.

Page 154

69 Cal.Rptr. 154

263 Cal.App.2d 170

Alex Edward BROWN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. HANFORD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL BOARD et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 902.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

June 14, 1968.

Hearing Denied Aug. 8, 1968.

[263 Cal.App.2d 171] Alex Edward Brown, in pro. per.

John G. O'Rourke, Dist. Atty., Hanford, Frank M. Finn, Deputy Dist. Atty., for defendants-respondents.

OPINION

CONLEY, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying a writ of mandate to compel the board of trustees of Hanford Elementary School District to restore in salary to each of two school teachers the sum of $200 per annum in addition to the pay already provided by contract for the school year 1964--65. These teachers are Billie Bartlow and Mary McNeel Brown (wife of Alex Edward Brown); while they testified at the hearing below in favor of the issuance of the writ, neither of them is a party to the proceedings. The petitioner is not an attorney at law; he justifies his request for a writ of mandate on the ground that he is a resident and taxpayer of Kings County and entitled to ask for this relief as a citizen who fears that if his request is not granted the standing of the educational institutions in the community will suffer and the educational system of Kings County will be vitally injured. While it is doubtful, in the circumstances, whether he has the right to prosecute this proceeding in such guise, we shall pass over that question inasmuch as a demurrer to the petition was overruled; the district attorney has stipulated that petitioner is properly in court and the trial judge has found that he has the standing to ask for the relief which he seeks.

Counsel have agreed upon a settled statement in lieu of transcripts on appeal (rule 6 of Cal.Rules of Court). This condensed statement shows that the board of trustees of the Hanford elementary schools, in fixing the salaries of the two teachers involved for the school year 1956--57, ordered that each of them be paid $200 per year in addition to the salary for teachers in general elementary grades on recognizing that they each held a valid credential to teach mentally retarded pupils issued by the department of education pursuant to section 13152 of the Education Code, and also that such an annual contract for similarly increased salary was executed in each succeeding year up to and including 1963--64; it is alleged, however, that in the contract for the 1964--65 year, the board eliminated the extra $200 formerly paid to each of these teachers. Incidentally, the two teachers were nevertheless given additional compensation for the work to be performed by them during that year in conformity with pay increases given to other teachers; Billie Bartlow received a raise in pay of $250.04 per year after deletion of the $200 bonus, previously received and Mary McNeel Brown was afforded a raise in pay of $275.08 per year after the elimination of her $200 given in previous years for the purpose of teaching mentally retarded pupils. Each of the teachers signed a contract with the school board for the new pay schedule and a raise was also given to other teachers in the same classification. The question thus reduces itself to this: did the teachers of mentally-retarded pupils in the Hanford Elementary School District during the school years 1956--57 through 1963--64, by contracting annually for a yearly salary based on the current salary classification schedule plus a $200 annual increment or bonus, gain tenure not only as permanent teachers but also in a salary classification which included the $200 bonus? The answer is 'No.'

In San Diego Federation of Teachers, etc. v. Board of Education, 216 Cal.App.2d 758, 762, 31 Cal.Rptr. 146, 148:

'Subject to designated minimum requirements, a city board of education is vested by statute with authority to fix the compensation to be paid to teachers (Ed. Code, §§ 13502--13525), including those who have attained a permanent classification (citation), and in the exercise of that authority may adopt a schedule increasing or decreasing the amount of compensation previously paid, providing (1) it is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable; (2) any allowance therein based upon years of training and experience is uniform and subject to reasonable classification; and (3) it is adopted prior to the beginning of the school year * * *.'

Fidler v. Board of Trustees, 112 Cal.App. 296, 300, 296 P. 912, 914, contains an analysis of the situation and a holding directly contrary to appellant's contention; in the opinion, it is said:

'The contention of the appellant appears to be that, when a teacher in the public schools has once attained the status of a permanent teacher, and his salary as such teacher has been fixed by the board of trustees, such board thereafter shall have no power to reduce the salary; that there is a total lack of statutory authority permitting the school board to reduce the salary of a permanent teacher, and no judicial authority for said board so to do.'

The court went on to point out that section 5.731 of the School Code of California then provided as follows: (Page 301, 296 P. page 914.)

'Boards of school trustees, and city, and city and county boards of education shall have power and it shall be their duty to fix and order paid the compensation of persons in public school service requiring certification qualifications, employed by such boards, unless the same be otherwise prescribed by law.' ¹

The court then stated that appellant in that case contended that analysis of these several sections would show that, while it was the intention of the Legislature to empower boards of trustees to raise and thus to 'fix' the salary of teachers, the power to reduce was withheld by implication, and that there was no other code provision directly or inferentially...