Elam v. Waynesville R-VI School Dist. of Pulaski County
| Decision Date | 28 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | R-VI,No. 13374,13374 |
| Citation | 676 S.W.2d 880 |
| Parties | 20 Ed. Law Rep. 999 William (Bill) ELAM, Oliver Tex Edwards, Robert Thornsberry, Bradley Watkins, on behalf of themselves and all other teachers in the WaynesvilleSchool District similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WAYNESVILLESCHOOL DISTRICT OF PULASKI COUNTY, Missouri: Paul Shultz, Larry Bench, C.A. Anderson, Kenneth Foster, Jim Bales and William C. Morgan, as members of the Board of Education of said School District, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
John W. Inglish, James W. Riner, Inglish & Riner, P.C., Jefferson City, for plaintiffs-appellants.
W.H. Thomas, Jr., Routh, Thomas & Birdsong, P.C., Rolla, for defendants-respondents.
In this class action the plaintiffs-teachers asked the circuit court to declare invalid the action of the Waynesville R-VI School District terminating longevity salary increments to teachers who do not reside in the District or on Fort Leonard Wood. The class consists of teachers of the District with the following common characteristics. Each was first employed before July 1, 1970. Each had been continuously employed to the time of trial. Each, on July 1, 1970, resided outside the District and had done so continuously to the time of trial. Each had, until the school year of 1980-81, been paid longevity increments in accordance with the salary schedule provisions hereafter outlined.
Upon making extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law the circuit court upheld that termination. Only a statement of ultimate facts supported by the evidence is necessary for disposition of the issues presented by the plaintiffs.
The District is a six-director District. § 162.211. By a resolution of March 13, 1967, a salary schedule for 1967-68 was approved with an increment of $125 for each five years service in the system. By a resolution of March 23, 1970, Contract Appendix A (Contract Clauses), B (Salary Schedule) and C for 1970-71 were approved. Among the Rules and Regulations in Appendix A was a provision that teachers employed for the first time after the 1969-70 school year "must live in the school district to be eligible" for the increment. The salary schedule contained a provision to the same effect. Beginning in 1971 the increment was changed to $150 for each four years of service.
On April 13, 1981, on behalf of the District, a letter of intent was mailed to and received by each teacher. The letter, among other things, advised each teacher his indefinite contract would be modified by a new salary schedule to be adopted at a later date. It further stated the teacher should return an attached letter by April 30, 1981, to indicate acceptance of employment for 1981-82. It also stated Contract Appendix A, B and C would continue to be a part of the indefinite contract.
By resolution adopted May 18, 1981, the District modified the previous salary schedule by an increase of "10 percent on total salary." A separate resolution modified the District's policy to provide that if personnel live out of the District they would not be eligible for the longevity salary increments. It was stipulated that beginning July 1, 1967, through June 30, 1981, the longevity salary increment provisions were a part of the salary schedules annually adopted. When adopted, those salary schedules became a part of the indefinite contract.
By two copies of a letter dated May 19, 1981, the District advised each teacher of the change in regard to the salary increments. The teacher was asked to provide information on the copy concerning his place of residence for the past five years and return it to the personnel office. Within a few days each teacher received a form entitled "Indefinite Contract Modification for Permanent Teachers." The form as completed provided that the indefinite contract between the named teacher and the District was modified in two particulars. The first provided the date of beginning and number of days of the next term. The second designated the annual compensation for the next term. That compensation was as provided by the resolution of May 18, 1981. For the plaintiff, it was determined by the salary schedule for 1980-81, plus 10 percent but with no longevity increments.
All of the members of the class executed and returned the Indefinite Contract Modification. Two teachers testified they initially returned that form with comments thereon protesting the termination of the longevity increments. When they were told the documents in that form were unacceptable, they executed and returned the Indefinite Contract Modification without alteration. In at least two instances, it was returned with a separate letter containing such a protest.
Six teachers testified. They stated they returned the executed modification because they understood they had to have on file with the District a current written contract. A copy of the Contract Clauses approved July 1, 1980 so provided. Three of those six testified they were familiar with the teacher tenure law. They were aware that unless a different schedule was adopted by April 15, their employment continued under the salary schedule of the preceding school year. Each of the six testified that he or she was aware of the termination of longevity increments, that the Indefinite Contract Modification provided for an annual salary based on the new salary schedule, and that such salary was higher than the prior year, but did not include longevity increments. They were paid the salary so provided. Counsel for the class stipulated each member would testify substantially on each issue as did those who appeared. By resolution adopted April 15, 1982, the residency requirement was adopted for the year 1982-83.
As stated, the trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. Its judgment was that the action of the District in so restricting the longevity increments was valid. It further adjudged that such termination was effective for 1981-82 and 1982-83. The plaintiffs do not contend any finding of fact is not supported by the evidence. They do contend the trial court erred in its conclusions of law. Those findings and conclusions will not be fully or separately stated. They will be noted as necessary in the consideration of the plaintiffs' points of alleged error.
The soundness of the plaintiffs' first point is basic to six of their seven points. That basic proposition as stated in their first point is:
The lower court erred in finding that the incentive increments which plaintiffs had earned by past employment within the district and for which they had been paid in the past were not vested but were subject to adoption or rejection each year by the district because a contract existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant which required defendant to pay the incentive increments for so long as plaintiffs were employed or until the contract was modified by mutual consent.
In support of this point they argue in terms of contract, an offer by the District, accepted by the plaintiffs. They concede, "Defendant could withdraw its offer as to future increments whenever it desired." Appellants' Brief page 21. But, they argue, Appellants' Brief page 19.
Section 162.261 in part provides: "The government and control of a six-director school district ... is vested in a board of education." Section 171.011 in part provides: "The school board of each school district in the state may make all needful rules and regulations for the organization, grading and government in the school district." See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189 (Mo.App.1980). It is well recognized, "[t]hese broad powers include the matter of tenure (employment and termination of employment, and the fixing of compensation) subject to the guidelines of the statute and to due process of law considerations, and subject also that in the exercise of its powers a board may not act in an unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or unlawful manner." School Dist. of Kansas City v. Clymer, 554 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo.App.1977). Also see Meloy v. Reorganized School Dist., Etc., 631 S.W.2d 933 (Mo.App.1982); Parkway School Dist. v. Provaznik, 617 S.W.2d 489 (Mo.App.1981).
Section 168.106 in part provides: "The contract between a school district and a permanent teacher shall be known as an indefinite contract ... ." Section 168.108 requires that "[e]very indefinite contract shall contain the following provisions in substantially" the form set forth in that section. The pertinent part of § 168.110 provides a district may modify an indefinite contract annually on or before the 15th day of April by "[f]ixing the amount of annual compensation for the following school year as provided by the salary schedule adopted by the board of education applicable to all teachers." Section 168.112 provides an indefinite contract may be modified at any time by the mutual consent of the parties thereto.
Contract clauses adopted by the District in March, 1970 and July, 1982, pertaining to the salary schedules, are in evidence. What is apparently a part of such contract clauses approved in July, 1980 is also in evidence. It is not clear if those contract clauses are merely representative of annual clauses, or if the earlier clauses remained in effect until modified or replaced by subsequently adopted clauses. By implication, the parties indicate the latter to be true.
It is significant that the contract clauses adopted in 1970 and the contract clauses adopted in 1980 contain paragraphs to the following effect. ...
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