Brown v. Labor & Indus. Relations Commission

• Decision Date: 27 December 1978
• Docket Number: Nos. KCD,s. KCD
• Citation: 577 S.W.2d 90
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: Carolyn BROWN, Petitioner-Respondent, v. LABOR & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION of Missouri and Division of Employment Security, Respondents-Appellants. and Rosetta OSBORNE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, Division of Employment Security, State of Missouri and Barnes Hospital, Respondents-Respondents. 29432, KCD 29727.

Page 90

577 S.W.2d 90

Carolyn BROWN, Petitioner-Respondent, v. LABOR & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION of Missouri and Division of Employment Security, Respondents-Appellants. and Rosetta OSBORNE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, Division of

Employment Security, State of Missouri and Barnes

Hospital, Respondents-Respondents.

Nos. KCD 29432, KCD 29727.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District.

Dec. 27, 1978.

Motion for Rehearings and/or Transfer Denied Jan. 31, 1979.

Application to Transfer Denied March 13, 1979.

Sharon A. Willis, Kansas City, for Division of Employment Security in No. KCD 29432.

Rick V. Morris, Jefferson City, for Division of Employment Security in both cases.

Stanley J. Eichner, The Legal Aid Society of the City and County of St. Louis, St. Louis, for Osborne.

Thomas J. McGrath, Jeffrey B. Rosen, Miller, Simmons, Moore & Jung, P. C., Kansas City, for Brown.

John F. Gillespie, Jefferson City, for Division of Employment Security in No. KCD 29727.

Charles B. Fain, Jefferson City, for Labor and Ind. Relations Commission.

Harvey Tessler, Goldstein, Tessler, Brown & Geigermann, P. C., Clayton, for Barnes Hospital.

Before SHANGLER, P. J., SWOFFORD, C. J., and WASSERSTROM, J.

SHANGLER, Presiding Judge.

These appeals present the same question of statutory meaning which, in each case, determines whether the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission to deny unemployment compensation benefits was contrary to the Employment Security Law (Chapter 288, RSMo 1969). The appeals were argued contemporaneously, although separately, and are consolidated for opinion.

The facts are that each claimant, Brown and Osborne, held a part-time employment concurrently with a full-time employment, that each voluntarily left the part-time employment and was thereafter terminated from the full-time employment. ¹ Thereupon, each made claim for unemployment compensation benefits for the involuntary termination against the account of the full-time employer only, and each claim was denied by the Division of Employment Security on the same ground: that "the claimant had left her (part-time) work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work or to her employer." The part-time employer only, in each case, made protest to the claim but only part-time employer Barnes (claimant Brown) is a party on appeal.

The decision of the Division in each case was denied review by the Commission (which thereby was deemed to adopt the findings of the Appeals Referee of the Division for purposes of judicial review. § 288.200.1, RSMo 1969). Each claimant took an appeal to a circuit court with disparate results. The court with review of the Brown claim determined the Commission decision to deny benefits misconceived § 288.050 and was contrary to law. The court with review of the Osborne claim affirmed the Commission decision to deny benefits as in accordance with law and as based upon competent and substantial evidence.

The decision of the Commission to deny benefits rests on essential § 288.050:

1. (A) claimant shall be disqualified for . . . benefits until after he has earned wages equal to ten times his weekly benefit amount if the deputy finds

(1) That he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer ² except that he shall not be disqualified

(a) If the deputy finds he quit such work for the purpose of accepting a more remunerative job which he did accept and earn some wages therein; or

(b) If he quit temporary work to return to his regular employer.

It is the contention of the Commission that § 288.050 clearly expresses that a claimant who has left Work voluntarily without good cause becomes disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits. It is the premise of the Commission, therefore, that Work within § 288.050 and the matrix of the full Employment Security Law means Any endeavor for pay, part-time or full-time, so that a voluntary separation for Any concurrent employment without good cause disqualifies for benefits and does not restore eligibility until the claimant has earned wages equal to ten times the weekly benefit. The claimants contend, rather, that Work within the statute means All employments, and since both continued to be employed after quittance from the part-time jobs, they remained eligible for benefits upon involuntary termination of the full-time employments in which they continued. In a word, the claimants understand the statute to mean that one who voluntarily leaves a part-time job, yet remains fully employed otherwise, has not Left his work.

We frame the issue for our decision: Does one who works concurrently at part-time and full-time employments and leaves the part-time employment without good cause thereby become disqualified for employment benefits upon involuntary termination of the full-time employment?

The Employment Security Law does not directly address this question. There are intimations within the provisions of this intricate enactment and the judicial comments upon it that concurrent employments are not a contemplated subject matter of the law. The Employment Security Law declares the public policy that (§ 288.020)

Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state resulting in a public calamity. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the state, for compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.

This law shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security both by increasing opportunities for jobs through the maintenance of a system of public employment offices and by providing for the payment of compensation to individuals in respect to their unemployment.

The manifold purposes declared by the Employment Security Act are, among others, to relieve against economic distress from involuntary unemployment and to facilitate reemployment. The enactment does not aid idlers or those who are not honestly open to the opportunity of the labor market. Golden v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 524 S.W.2d 34, 36(1-6) (Mo.App.1975). A person who leaves a part-time employment, but continues in a concurrent regular full-time employment, however, neither faces economic distress nor needs reemployment. These purposes of the law, given effect by the corollary of § 288.040.1(1) & (2) that a claimant for unemployment benefits shall be Available for work and earnestly seek work, have no relevance to a person who diligently maintains concurrent employments and then, for personal reason, gives up the fragmentary employment but remains fully employed.

The term Unemployment as used in the Employment Security Law means Lack of employment (A. J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184(5) (1941)), a condition which results from the failure of industry to provide employment (Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77, 81(7-10) (1944)). The public policy which girds the Employment Security Law that benefits shall be for Persons unemployed through no fault of their own (§ 288.020.2), therefore, is not infringed by a quittance, voluntary or involuntary, from a part-time employment to retain a full-time employment done without design to give up wage rewards for compensated unemployment. Belle St. Bank v. Ind. Com'n Div. of Emp. Sec., 547 S.W.2d 841, 846(4) (Mo.App.1977).

The fallacy of the Commission decisions is that they accord the Good cause condition of § 288.050 a relevancy to the claims of Brown and Osborne which the purposes of the Employment Security Law do not intend. This enactment promotes the general welfare by a scheme of benefits which operates to restore and maintain a minimum level of earnings. § 288.060; Swafford v. Industrial Commission, 462 S.W.2d 147, 151(2-5) (Mo.App.1970). The benefits issue when an insured worker is Totally unemployed or only Partially unemployed. Sections 288.030.23(a) & (b). In either case, the question is simply whether the earnings fall below a statutory minimum for want of employment. A worker in regular full employment (by self-evident definition) is neither partially or totally unemployed and so does not qualify for benefits under the enactment while the full employment persists. Section 288.040. Thus, the Good cause of § 288.050 absolutely disqualifies for benefits when the voluntary separation from work results in unemployment but not, as of course, when the relinquishment of work does not result in unemployment. The decisions of the Commission to deny benefits for the involuntary unemployment of the claimants, therefore, contradict the dominant public policy of the enactment that the fund set apart by law for the purpose be Used for the persons unemployed through no fault of their own. ³ Section 288.020.1. This preponderant rationale, by the direction of the enactment, is to be given a liberal construction. Section 288.020.2. The disqualification provision that a claimant who leaves work voluntarily without good cause (§ 288.050), cognately, requires a strict construction. Citizens Bank of Shelbyville v. Industrial Commission, 428 S.W.2d 895, 897(4-6) (Mo.App.1968).

The claimants assert only against the full-time employers who do not contest payment of benefits. The part-time employers, Stix, Baer & Fuller and Barnes Hospital, nevertheless protest. The claimants contend that the part-time employers have no interest or status to litigate and so the benefits should issue as a matter of law from the full-time employers. The procedure of the Commission, however, allows a claimant no initiative as between employers. By the agency practice,...