Brown v. Nagelhout
| Decision Date | 15 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. SC10–868.,SC10–868. |
| Citation | 84 So.3d 304 |
| Parties | Willie BROWN, et al., Petitioners, v. Kim J. NAGELHOUT, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Lincoln J. Connolly of Rossman Baumberger, Reboso, Spier and Connolly, PA., Miami, FL, for Petitioners.
Daniel J. Fleming, Jose A. Gutierrez and Honey Dee Kalkins of Melkus, Fleming and Gutierrez, Tampa, FL; and Richard A. Sherman, Sr. of Richard A. Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL; and David B. Goulfine and Harold Davis Lewis, Jr. of Hightower and Partners, Orlando, FL, for Respondents.
In this case, we consider the provisions of Florida law governing the selection of venue based on the residency of defendants. Specifically, we address a limitation placed on the selection of venue—known as the joint residency rule—derived from Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538 (Fla.1957), which held that the selection of venue based on residency was limited to the county of residence shared by the individual defendant and the corporate defendant.
We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So.3d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), which, based on the joint residency rule, affirmed the grant of a motion for a change of venue to the county of residence shared by the individual defendant and one corporate defendant where there was not a county of residence common to all three defendants. The Fourth District's decision expressly and directly conflicts with Aladdin Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Jones, 687 So.2d 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ; Reliable Electrical Distribution Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 382 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) ; and Doonan v. Poole, 114 So.2d 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959), in which the First, Second, and Third District Courts of Appeal concluded that the joint residency rule was inapplicable to cases in which not all of the defendants shared a common county of residence. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Because Enfinger was predicated on a serious misinterpretation of the governing statutes, we resolve the conflict by receding from Enfinger. We conclude that the Florida courts should uniformly apply the plain language of the venue statutes enacted by the Legislature, not the judicially created joint residency rule. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District.
In June 2009, Willie and Brenda Brown filed a complaint in Broward County, Florida, against Kim Nagelhout, Helena Chemical Co., Inc., and CSX Transportation, Inc., alleging multiple causes of action arising from a collision between a truck owned by Helena Chemical and operated by Nagelhout and a train operated by CSX, on which Willie Brown was riding. The collision occurred in Pasco County, Florida. Nagelhout and Helena Chemical subsequently filed a motion to dismiss or to transfer venue from Broward County to Pasco County, and CSX joined in the motion. The trial court granted the motion to transfer venue. Relying on Enfinger, the trial court concluded that because Nagelhout and Helena Chemical both reside in Pasco County, Broward County was not a proper venue in which to litigate the Browns' complaint. Brown, 33 So.3d at 84.
The Browns appealed in the Fourth District, contending that because not all of the defendants to this action share a county of residence, the joint residency rule from Enfinger does not apply. The Fourth District rejected the Browns' argument. The Fourth District interpreted Enfinger to direct that where an individual defendant is sued together with a corporate defendant and the corporate defendant resides in the same county as the individual defendant, venue lies in the common county of residence. Brown, 33 So.3d at 84. Because the trial court found that Nagelhout resides in Pasco County and Helena Chemical has a business residence in Pasco County, the Fourth District concluded that venue lies in Pasco County. The Fourth District stated that it found "no merit to any of the other issues raised by the Browns" and affirmed the trial court's order granting the motion to transfer venue from Broward County to Pasco County. Id.
The Browns petitioned this Court for review, alleging express and direct conflict with Enfinger, Aladdin Insurance Agency, 687 So.2d at 939 (); Reliable Electrical Distribution, 382 So.2d at 1288 (); and Doonan, 114 So.2d at 506 (). This Court granted review.
In the analysis that follows, after examining the governing statutory provisions and explaining the basis for receding from Enfinger, we then turn to the case on review and determine that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a change of venue.
The determination of venue in Florida is governed by a series of statutory provisions set forth in chapter 47, Florida Statutes (2011). Section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2011), provides that "[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located." With respect to corporations, section 47.051, Florida Statutes (2011), provides:
Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. Actions against foreign corporations doing business in this state shall be brought in a county where such corporation has an agent or other representative, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.
Finally, section 47.021, Florida Statutes (2011), provides that "[a]ctions against two or more defendants residing in different counties may be brought in any county in which any defendant resides." Although these provisions were previously numbered as sections 46.02 and 46.04, respectively, the substance of sections 47.021 and 47.051 has been part of Florida law since 1906. See §§ 1384, 1386, Gen.Stat. (1906).
Under this statutory scheme, the plaintiff may select a venue within which to litigate a cause of action based on the residency of the defendants. In the instant case, defendant Nagelhout, an individual, resides in Pasco County. Defendant Helena Chemical, a foreign corporation, has a business residence in Pasco County and a registered agent in Broward County. Defendant CSX has its principal place of business in Duval County, Florida, and its registered agent in Leon County, Florida. While it is not clear from the record whether CSX is a domestic or foreign corporation, the defendants do not claim that CSX has "an office for transaction of its customary business" or "an agent or other representative" in Pasco County. § 47.051, Fla. Stat. Thus, based on the above statutes, the Browns had the option to file suit based on residency in Pasco, Broward, Duval, or Leon counties. In their motion to transfer venue, however, the defendants argued that under Enfinger, venue lay only in Pasco County, where Nagelhout and Helena Chemical share a common county of residence.
A defendant wishing to challenge the plaintiff's selection has "the burden of pleading and proving that the venue is improper." Inverness Coca–Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100, 102 (Fla.1955). "When a trial court is presented with a motion to transfer venue based on the impropriety of the plaintiff's venue selection under section 47.011, the trial court must resolve any relevant factual disputes and then make a legal decision whether the plaintiff's venue selection is legally supportable." McDaniel Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E. Consultants, Inc., 39 So.3d 504, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Resources, Inc., 761 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ). "The trial court's legal conclusions in this regard are reviewed de novo." Id.
In Enfinger, this Court granted a writ of certiorari, quashing a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue. Plaintiff Loudoun Baxley, a resident of Polk County, Florida, filed suit in Duval County against Dan Enfinger and Enfinger's employer, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. Enfinger was a resident of Polk County, and the railroad company, a foreign corporation, had an agent in and did business in both Polk and Duval counties. At that time, section 46.02, Florida Statutes (1955), provided that "[s]uits against two or more defendants residing in different counties ... may be brought in any county ... in which any defendant resides," and section 46.04, Florida Statutes (1955), provided that suits against foreign corporations doing business in this state were to be "commenced in a county ... wherein such company may have an agent or other representative, or where the cause of action accrued." Enfinger, 96 So.2d at 539–40 (quoting §§ 46.02, 46.04, Fla. Stat. (1955) ).1 This Court concluded that "a corporate defendant ‘resides,’ within the meaning of Section 46.02, in the county or counties specified in Section 46.04," and thus, Atlantic Coast Line resided in Polk and Duval Counties. Enfinger, 96 So.2d at 540.
This Court then concluded that because Enfinger and Atlantic Coast Line both resided in Polk County, the individual defendant and the corporate defendant should not be considered to reside in different counties within the meaning of section 46.02. This Court explained:
The applicability of the statute is clear where the venue privileges of the defendants are co-equal and not co-existent in the same county. Here, however both defendants "reside" in Polk County, even though the...
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State v. Poole
...we will abandon a decision that is "unsound in principle." Robertson v. State, 143 So.3d 907, 910 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Nagelhout, 84 So.3d 304, 309 (Fla. 2012)). It is no small matter for one Court to conclude that a predecessor Court has clearly erred. The later Court must approac......
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...beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at all).”); Brown v. Nagelhout, 84 So.3d 304, 309 (Fla.2012) (“Stare decisis does not yield based on a conclusion that a precedent is merely erroneous.”). This does not mean that a co......
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State v. Poole
...will abandon a decision that is "unsound in principle." Robertson v. State , 143 So. 3d 907, 910 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Nagelhout , 84 So. 3d 304, 309 (Fla. 2012) ). It is no small matter for one Court to conclude that a predecessor Court has clearly erred. The later Court must appro......
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...importance of stare decisis in most cases. While the doctrine of stare decisis is "strong," it is "not unwavering." Brown v. Nagelhout , 84 So. 3d 304, 309 (Fla. 2012). This Court in the past has receded from precedents that it deemed clearly erroneous. See , e.g. , Shepard v. State , 259 S......