Brown v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 23 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. A99A1352.,A99A1352. |
Citation | 519 S.E.2d 726,239 Ga. App. 251 |
Parties | BROWN v. OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James B. Drew, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.
McPhail & Associates, Jon B. McPhail, Atlanta, Linda H. Ambrose, for appellee.
In this declaratory judgment action, Louise Brown appeals from the grant of summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty) on her claim for bad faith penalties and insurance proceeds resulting from coverage damage to her residence and personal belongings caused by an act of vandalism. As the policy excludes damage caused intentionally by an insured, we affirm.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga.App. 459(1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (1997).
Viewed in this light, the evidence shows that Brown and her husband, Johnny Mack Brown, were named insureds on a homeowners policy issued by Ohio Casualty, policy number DHO 0840 529. The policy contained an "intentional loss exclusion" which provided in relevant part:
(1) We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.... (h) Intentional loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act committed: (1) by or at the direction of an "insured"; and (2) with the intent to cause a loss.
The Browns had marital difficulties and separated. In May 1995, the Browns entered into a separation agreement in which Johnny Mack Brown agreed to quitclaim his interest in the property at 737 Miquel Drive to Louise Brown. Louise Brown agreed to assume all indebtedness for the home and agreed to make the monthly mortgage payments. Johnny Mack Brown executed a quitclaim deed in May, but it was not filed with the county.
On October 21, 1995, Johnny Mack Brown broke into the insured home and inflicted damage to the residence and to some of Brown's personal property. At the time of the loss, the Browns were not divorced. Both Brown and Johnny Mack Brown were still on the deed to the insured residence. Additionally, both Brown and Johnny Mack Brown were still jointly and severally liable on the mortgage.1
On October 24, 1995 the Browns were divorced. On October 30, 1995 the quitclaim deed was filed in DeKalb County by which Johnny Mack Brown relinquished his title to the insured property to Brown.
After the loss, Brown made a claim on the homeowners policy issued by Ohio Casualty. Ohio Casualty filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to determine whether the intentional loss exclusion barred coverage of the claim.2 Brown counterclaimed for bad faith penalties pursuant to OCGA § 33-4-6.
1. Brown argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Ohio Casualty on her claim for bad faith penalties brought pursuant to OCGA § 33-4-6. As an initial matter, we note that Brown has failed to identify in the notice of appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Ohio Casualty in the bad faith claim. See OCGA § 5-6-37 ( ). However, as Brown has listed the judgment in her enumerations of error and argued the matter in her briefs, we will consider her appeal on this matter. OCGA § 5-6-48(f).3
An insurance company is liable for penalties under OCGA § 33-4-6 when it fails to pay a covered loss within 60 days after a demand for payment has been made and there has been a finding that the refusal to pay was in bad faith. The purpose of the section is to penalize insurers that delay payments without good cause. As the section imposes a penalty, it is strictly construed; consequently, a proper demand for payment is essential to recovery. In this sense, a demand for payment must be made when immediate payment is in order.
( Citations omitted.) Howell v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co., 214 Ga.App. 536, 537(1), 448 S.E.2d 275 (1994).
Brown failed to make a demand for payment prior to filing suit. "[A] failure to wait at least 60 days between making demand and filing suit constitutes an absolute bar to recovery of a bad-faith penalty and attorney fees under this statute." Blue Cross & Blue Shield &c. v. Merrell, 170 Ga.App. 86, 87, 316 S.E.2d 548 (1984). Brown argues that she submitted a claim for the loss; however, Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Norris, 219 Ga. 573, 575, 134 S.E.2d 774 (1964). The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Ohio Casualty on Brown's bad faith claim.
2. Brown argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Ohio Casualty on her coverage claim contending that genuine issues of material facts remain to be decided. Brown argues first that her husband was not an insured on the policy. This argument is meritless as Johnny Mack Brown is a named insured on the policy.
(Punctuation omitted.) Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Gibson, 226 Ga.App. 152, 154(1), 485 S.E.2d 576 (1997).
Despite relinquishing title to the property to Brown, Johnny Mack...
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