Brown v. Rath Packing Co.

• Citation: 257 N.W. 411,219 Iowa 9
• Decision Date: 20 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 42234.,42234.
• Parties: BROWN v. RATH PACKING CO. et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

219 Iowa 9

257 N.W. 411

BROWN

v.RATH PACKING CO. et al.

No. 42234.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 20, 1934.

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; A. B. Lovejoy, Judge.

Claim of the plaintiff against the defendants under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Code 1927, § 1361 et seq.). From a decree of the district court holding that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation, the defendants appeal.

Reversed.

MITCHELL, C. J., dissenting.Swisher, Swisher & Cohrt, of Waterloo, for appellants.

Mears, Jensen & Gwynne, of Waterloo, for appellee.

ALBERT, Justice.

The claimant, Jacob E. Brown, originally filed a claim in the industrial commissioner's office, claiming compensation from the defendants for total disability for an alleged injury caused by heat exhaustion. The matter was tried out before a deputy commissioner as arbitrator, and recovery was denied. On review, the industrial commissioner affirmed the arbitrator's decision, and on appeal to the district court the judgment of the industrial commissioner was reversed.

The general fact situation in substance is as follows: The claimant, Jacob E. Brown, who was about forty-three years of age, had been employed by the Rath Packing Company for a period of nine months. His work was hauling barrels, or tierces, between the cooper shop and the pickle room. In going from one place to the other he passed through a runway about fifty feet long, seven feet wide, and eight feet high. On one side of this runway were located the vats where lard is rendered by a steam-heating process; on the other side was the brick wall of the cold storage building. On July 10, 1930, while engaged in his line of employment, Brown quit work and went home. He testifies that he just about half fainted away, and went all to pieces, about 1:30 o'clock of that day. His arms and legs ached, and “I had a place across my kidneys that bothered me like the dickens. I was tired all the night before that. I was sick to my stomach. I had diarrhea, running off at the bowels, intestinal flu, and everything else, I guess, and I sweat so at nights I couldn't sleep.” The evidence shows that the temperature on that day, outside the building, was about 94 degrees, and the temperature in the runway was somewhat higher, possibly 10 degrees. Brown hauled these barrels on a truck, and passed back and forth through this heated runway from four to six or seven times an hour. His noon hour was from 11:45 to 12:15. About 12 o'clock he felt sick. He continued to work, however, until 1:30, when he went home, as above stated. A chiropractor was called shortly after he went home, who ministered to him until the 7th of August following. This chiropractor did not give evidence in the case. On the above date Dr. Page, his regular physician, attended him, and from then forward.

There is no dispute of the relation of employer and employee, and there is no question of the result of the physical condition of the claimant. The one question raised in the case is whether or not the district court was warranted, under the record, in reversing the decision of the industrial commissioner.

[1][2] We have made many pronouncements in which we have said, in substance, that, where there is conflict as to material matters, the finding of the industrial commissioner as to disputed facts is final and binding on the court. See Smith v. Soldiers' and Sailors' Memorial Hospital, 210 Iowa, 691, 231 N. W. 490;Kyle v. Greene High School, 208 Iowa, 1037, 226 N. W. 71;Daugherty v. Scandia Coal Co., 206 Iowa, 120, 219 N. W. 65; and previous cases cited in the above cases. The trial in the district court is not a trial de novo. Upon the appeal to the district court, the case was submitted on the transcript as certified by the industrial commissioner. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the proximate causal connection between the injury received and the claimant's condition. Guthrie v. Iowa Gas & Electric Co., 200 Iowa, 150, 204 N. W. 225;Sparks v. Consolidated Indiana Coal Co., 195 Iowa, 334, 190 N. W. 593;Smith v. Marshall Ice Co., 204 Iowa, 1348, 217 N. W. 264.

[3] With these rules in mind, we have carefully read the record in this case, and under the same but one conclusion can be reached, and that is that there is a conflict in the testimony on the question of whether or not there was any causal relation between the heated atmosphere in the runway where the claimant worked and his physical condition at the time the hearing was had before the commissioner, and this was a material issue in the case. So long, therefore, as there was a conflict on this question, the commissioner was justified in denying compensation, and the district court was not warranted in reversing the holding of the commissioner.

We do not set the evidence out in extenso because it could not establish a precedent on account of the fact that no two cases are alike on the fact situation, and therefore the record need not be burdened by so setting out the testimony.

Reversed.

EVANS, STEVENS, KINDIG, CLAUSSEN, ANDERSON, and DONEGAN, JJ., concur.

MITCHELL, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I find myself unable to agree with the majority's opinion, and therefore respectfully dissent.

In the majority's opinion they say: “We have carefully read the record in this case, and under the same but one conclusion can be reached, and that is that there is a conflict in the testimony on the question of whether or not there was any causal relation between the heated atmosphere in the runway where the claimant worked and his physical condition at the time the hearing was had before the commissioner, and this was a material issue in the case. So long, therefore, as there was a conflict on this question, the commissioner was justified in denying compensation, and the district court was not warranted in reversing the holding of the commissioner.”

There is of course no question, under the holdings of this court, that, if there is a conflict in the evidence, the findings of fact made by the commissioner are conclusive upon the court. Thus, in Flint v. Eldon, 191 Iowa, 845, at page 848, 183 N. W. 344, 345, the court said:

“Therefore as to disputed facts, which do not go to the jurisdiction, a court is bound by the finding of the Commissioner. * * *

Such findings stand upon the same footing as the finding of a judge or a verdict of a jury.”

Where I disagree with the majority is that I cannot find any conflict in the evidence submitted to the commissioner. And so we must look to the record to ascertain the facts.

The claimant offered as witnesses besides himself three medical men, and the evidence of his wife and two of his fellow workmen. The appellant company offered only the testimony of their own foreman, and he testified in regard to general working conditions. Nowhere in the testimony of the foreman is there conflict with...