Brown v. State, 95-3308
| Decision Date | 23 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3308,95-3308 |
| Citation | 695 So.2d 1275 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1564 Bobby Lee BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Steven L. Seliger of Garcia and Seliger, Quincy, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Bobby Lee Brown (Brown) on direct appeal seeks review of his convictions and sentences, arguing that he is entitled to be forever discharged under Florida's "speedy trial" rule. We affirm.
A jury found Brown guilty of attempted second-degree murder, armed kidnapping with a firearm, armed robbery with a firearm, and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Brown committed these crimes on September 7, 1994, in Leon County, when he robbed a Burger King, shot one employee in the chest at point-blank range, and took another employee hostage for the duration of a high-speed chase, during which Brown repeatedly put a gun to the hostage's head, and pointed a gun at a pursuing police officer. The trial judge, upwardly departing from the guidelines, sentenced Brown to life sentences for armed kidnapping with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm, and to fifteen-year sentences for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. The judge imposed all sentences concurrently.
We are asked to address only one issue in this case--the application of Florida's speedy trial rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, to the facts. Brown was taken into custody on November 30, 1994. On June 7, 1995, 1 he filed a "Motion To Dismiss" based upon the failure to bring him to trial within 175 days. On June 13, 1995, 2 the case was set for trial on June 19, 1995. On the same day, the prosecutor became acutely ill, requiring emergency surgery which incapacitated her for at least two weeks. Her illness was not an issue and defense counsel stipulated that it was legitimate. Brown's only argument in the trial court was that the State had not been diligent in bringing the case to trial. On June 16, 1995, the trial judge granted the State's motion for an extension of the time period for bringing Brown to trial, based upon a finding that the prosecutor's illness constituted an exceptional circumstance under Rule 3.191(l). Trial was reset for July 17, 1995, and in fact commenced on that date before another judge.
Rule 3.191 contains two time periods relevant to the instant case: the basic 175-day period during which one charged with a felony must be tried, and a 5/10-day recapture window period 3 (recapture window) which is triggered when a defendant invokes the rule.
Brown and the State agree that an "exceptional circumstances" extension is available under the rule. 4 The narrow issue presented for our determination is whether the rule authorizes an extension of the speedy trial time when the extension is made during the recapture window (for a reason which constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" under 3.191(l)), or whether an "exceptional circumstances" extension is valid only when granted before expiration of the basic 175-day period. We conclude that the rule authorizes an "exceptional circumstances" extension in either time period. The instant trial judge therefore properly exercised her discretion in granting an extension based on exceptional circumstances occurring during the recapture window.
We reach this conclusion based upon the plain language of the rule. Subdivision (i) provides in relevant part: "The periods of time established by this rule may be extended provided the period of time sought to be extended has not expired at the time the extension was procured." No remedy is available to a defendant moreover until the court makes "the required inquiry under subdivision (j)"; subdivision (j) also refers to "periods " of time. 5 The extension sought and obtained in the instant case occurred during the recapture window; the recapture window furthermore had not expired when the extension was procured. There are several periods of time provided for in rule 3.191. The recapture window is one of the periods of time established by the rule. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). More importantly, however, the rule by its general language is inclusive of all periods of time provided in the rule and does not in any way limit exceptional circumstances to the basic 175-day time period. The rule does not limit an extension of time to a single period.
Any interpretation other than that based on the plain language of the rule would reach an absurd result. In the instant case, according to Brown's position, an emergency surgery arising in the basic 175-day period would be granted an exceptional-circumstance extension, but an emergency surgery arising during the recapture window would not qualify for an exceptional-circumstance extension. There is no logical reason to restrict emergencies to the basic 175-day period. Neither is there anything sacred about requiring a defendant to be brought to trial before expiration of the recapture period or its equivalent. Indeed, when an exceptional-circumstance extension is granted during the basic 175-day period, it is contemplated by the rule, which contains no arbitrary time limitation, that it may well extend beyond a time equivalent to the recapture period.
Florida adopted its first speedy trial court rule in 1971, In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So.2d 33 (Fla.1971), which contained a basic 180-day time period for bringing a defendant to trial, without a recapture window. The Florida Supreme Court amended the rule in 1984 to provide for the current 5/10 day recapture window. The purpose of the speedy trial rule is self-evident. It was never intended as strategy for dismissal and discharge. This court has said, with respect to the purpose of the rule:
Before the provision [5/10 day recapture window] was added to the rule in 1984, defendants with active cases were sometimes able to secure discharges because prosecutors overlooked speedy trial deadlines. In order to avoid the automatic discharge provision provided for in the pre-1984 rule, the current rule provides a reminder to the prosecutor that speedy trial is about to run. Therefore, the present rule continues to insure that a diligent defendant will be brought to trial within the periods provided in the rule, but it avoids the sometimes draconian remedy of automatic discharge following mere prosecutorial oversight.
State v. Agee, 588 So.2d 600, 604 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), approved, 622 So.2d 473 (Fla.1993). Any interpretation of the current language of the rule limiting an exceptional-circumstance extension to the basic 175-day period and excluding such an extension from the recapture window, serves only to exacerbate the draconian remedy described in Agee and to perpetuate the unintended strategy of dismissal and discharge.
We are mindful of the cases from our sister courts which appear to announce a blanket rule regarding exceptional-circumstances extensions, although on facts different from those in the instant case, or with no discussion of the facts. Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So.2d 196, 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (); Heller v. State, 601 So.2d 642, 642 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (). We certify conflict with those cases and their progeny to the extent that they announce a blanket rule.
We also certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance:
IS AN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE EXTENSION UNDER RULE 3.191(l) 6 VALID, WHEN MADE AND OBTAINED DURING THE 5/10-DAY RECAPTURE WINDOW PROVIDED FOR IN RULE 3.191(p)(3), OR IS IT LIMITED ONLY TO AN EXTENSION MADE AND OBTAINED BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE BASIC 175-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED IN RULE 3.191(a)?
We accordingly affirm Brown's judgments and sentences entered by the trial court.
Appellant maintains that he is entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule on either of two alternative legal theories. The majority only addresses one of those theories--whether the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial may be extended based upon a finding by the trial court that an "exceptional circumstance" has arisen after the 175-day speedy trial period has expired, during the 15-day recapture window. Although I disagree with both the majority's analysis and its conclusion regarding that theory, I would find it unnecessary to address that theory because, in my opinion, appellant is clearly entitled to discharge on his alternative theory--that the trial court abused its discretion when it held that an "exceptional circumstance" had arisen. Accordingly, I dissent.
On June 7, 1995, appellant filed a facially sufficient motion alleging that he was entitled to discharge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 () because, through no fault of his own, he had not been brought to trial, although more than 175 days had passed since his arrest on felony charges. On June 13, fewer than five business days after the motion had been filed, the trial court held the hearing required by rule 3.191(p)(3), and set appellant's trial for June 19, which was within the 10-day window afforded by that subdivision. Subsequently, on June 16, the state filed a motion requesting that the trial be postponed based on the "exceptional circumstance" th...
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Brown v. State
...Appeals, and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent. PER CURIAM. We have for review Brown v. State, 695 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), in which the district court certified conflict with Vallieres v. Grossman, 573 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), and Helle......
- Brown v. State