Brown v. State
Decision Date | 24 September 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 3D10–3264.,3D10–3264. |
Parties | Omar Ricardo BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Brian L. Ellison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS and LAGOA, JJ.
Omar Ricardo Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and his subsequent conviction. Because we find that the trial court erred in its denial of Brown's motion to suppress, we vacate the judgment and sentence and remand with directions that the motion be granted.
Brown was charged under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, with armed robbery of the Beachcomber Jewelry Store located in Key West, Florida. Witnesses of the robbery described one robber wearing a beanie hat with blue gloves. Another robber was seen using a heavy object to break three glass cases containing jewelry. The getaway vehicle was described as a red vehicle.
Around the time of the robbery, Brown's former girlfriend, Maria Terrell, reported her white car stolen by Brown. Officer Diaz responded to the call but discontinued the investigation when Terrell advised Officer Diaz that the car was not stolen, and that she did not wish to press charges. This information was then relayed to Officer Zamora and other officers via the police station's radio channel, worn on the officers' person. At the suppression hearing, Officer Zamora testified that he knew that the reportedly stolen vehicle had been returned and no longer required further investigation. Officers Zamora and Barrios nonetheless headed to Brown's residence after hearing the report of Terrell's stolen white car. Officer Zamora testified that he went to Brown's residence based on a suspicion that the stolen car and the robbery were related. Officer Zamora testified that, upon arrival at Brown's residence, he had no articulable reason, nor probable cause, to believe that Brown had robbed the jewelry store. Officer Barrios also testified that by the time he and Officer Zamora arrived at Brown's house they knew the reported stolen car had been returned.
The entrance to Brown's residence is separated from the community by two fences and is not in a common area accessible to the community. The first fence stands four feet tall at the front of the property, while the second fence, directly behind the first, stands six feet tall and closes off the side yard of the property.
Brown's mailbox is located outside of the first fence. In order to reach Brown's front door, an individual must walk through both gates. On the day in question, the first gate was slightly ajar. Brown testified that he did not expect uninvited individuals to be in his side yard that led to the front door, and photographs of Brown's residence show the existence of several “No Trespassing” signs posted on Brown's outer fence. The officers at the scene, including Officer Zamora, testified that the items subsequently seized could not be seen from outside the fenced area, even if the first gate was slightly ajar.
On the day in question, police officers went through both of Brown's unlocked fences and knocked on Brown's front door in order to discuss Brown's whereabouts. During a conversation with the home's residents, the officers noticed gloves laying on a small table located outside by the front door. The officers then heard Brown enter the residence through a window on the side of the residence and went to investigate. Brown immediately told the police to get off of his property.
When the officers returned to the front door, the gloves had disappeared. Officer Zamora began to look for the gloves near the outside table. During his search, Officer Zamora looked over the table and found a hammer lodged between the fence and the table. The hammer was subsequently seized by the officer prior to obtaining a search warrant.
Hours later, a search warrant was secured and evidence was recovered from Brown's residence linking him to the robbery; the hammer that was obtained prior to the search warrant was not linked to the robbery.
Brown moved to suppress, arguing that the officers entered the curtilage of his residence without probable cause. After the suppression hearing, the trial judge entered a written order denying Brown's Motion. In the order, the trial judge found that the officers' entry into the curtilage of Brown's residence was part of a lawful investigation conducted “in good faith to complete the pending” car theft investigation, that the hammer and gloves were in “plain view” when the officers observed them, and that the warrant, which was based on those observations, was therefore valid. The trial court did not make a legal finding with respect to Brown's privacy rights in the curtilage surrounding his home. Following a jury trial, Brown was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. This appeal followed.
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to an appellate court “clothed with the presumption of correctness.” McNamara v. State, 357 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla.1978) ; see also State v. Triana, 979 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). While appellate courts must give great deference and a presumption of correctness to a trial court's factual findings if the facts are supported by “competent substantial evidence,” the Florida Supreme Court laid out a two-step approach for appellate courts to use when reviewing mixed questions of law and fact that determine constitutional rights: (1) defer to the trial court on questions of historical fact and (2) conduct a de novo review of the “mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.” Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 605–08 (Fla.2001) ; see Wyche v. State, 987 So.2d 23, 25 (Fla.2008) ; State v. Nowak, 1 So.3d 215, 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) ; State v. Lennon, 963 So.2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
On appeal, Brown argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to suppress. Brown contends that suppression was proper as he had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his home and the officers entered the curtilage of his residence without probable cause or any applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement for a search. The State, however, argues that two exceptions to the warrant requirement apply: (1) the officers' entry onto the property and subsequent actions were part of a valid “knock and talk,” and (2) the items seized by the officers fell within the plain view doctrine. We agree with Brown and will address each point separately.
We first turn to a significant threshold issue, which the trial court failed to address: whether the curtilage, the area immediately surrounding Brown's home, constitutes an extension of his home, thereby affording it the same Fourth Amendment protections as the home itself. There are four factors that determine the boundaries of the curtilage:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). Florida v. Jardines, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) ).
Here, it is undisputed that the officers entered the area immediately surrounding and associated with Brown's home, that this area was enclosed by two layers of fencing (each with its own gate), that this area was used as the front and side yard of Brown's residence, and that several “No Trespassing” signs were posted on the outside fence. Pursuant to Jardines, the area entered by the officers was the curtilage of Brown's residence and therefore subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections as Brown's house itself. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1414 ( ).
Because the area entered by the officers constituted Brown's curtilage and is part of the “home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” the next question we must address is whether Brown's privacy right in his home was unlawfully infringed. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ( ). A search violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights only if: (1) a defendant demonstrates that he or she had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched; and (2) a defendant establishes that society would recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable. Lennon, 963 So.2d at 770 (quoting Hicks v. State, 929 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ).
In Fernandez v. State, 63 So.3d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), this Court held that a defendant established his...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Christensen
...the rural access road signifying an intention to deny access to the public in general, including government agents"); Brown v. State , 152 So.3d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that agents' knock-and-talk excursion onto the defendant's curtilage offended the Fourth Amendment be......
-
State v. Yee
...constitutional issues." Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown v. State, 152 So.3d 619, 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).III. Analysis Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution gua......
-
State v. Lohse
...has asserted an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy warning uninvited visitors they are not welcome. See Brown v. State , 152 So.3d 619, 623-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (also noting mailbox located outside gate); Bullock , 901 P.2d at 75-76 (cabin barely visible from road, fores......
-
United States v. Holmes
...brought additional case law to the Court's attention. (Doc. 48; Doc. 52; Doc. 65; Doc. 67; Doc. 71) (referencing Brown v. State , 152 So.3d 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); United States v. Bearden , 780 F.3d 887 (8th Cir.2015); Robinson v. State , 164 So.3d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); and United States......
-
Misdemeanor defense
...area and the owner thus had an expectation of privacy, requiring the government to have a warrant to search there. [ Brown v. State , 152 So. 3d 619, 623-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).] [§§17:103-17:109 Reserved] C. Stops, Detentions, Arrests §17:110 Stop and Frisk A detention is defined as a brief......