Brown v. State

Decision Date30 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. S97A0433,S97A0433
Citation486 S.E.2d 178,268 Ga. 154
Parties, 97 FCDR 2341 BROWN v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Robert L. Chandler, Cheryl H. Kelley, Thompson, Fox, Chandler, Homans & Hicks, Gainesville, for William James Brown.

Darrell E. Wilson, Chief Asst. Dist. Atty., Albert F. Taylor, Jr., Dist. Atty., Dahlonega, for the State.

HINES, Justice.

James William Brown is under indictment for malice murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Jeff Clark. The State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any reference to allegations that Clark molested Brown's five-year-old daughter. Brown moved to deny the motion, and filed notice of his intention to use such evidence as grounds supporting his sole defense of justification pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21(a). 1 Brown contends that he was justified in using deadly force against Clark to prevent the commission of the forcible felony of child molestation against his daughter. The trial court granted the State's motion, ruling that the crime of child molestation, without a showing of use or threat of physical force, does not constitute a forcible felony, and, therefore, the defense of justification is unavailable to Brown as a matter of law. The trial court certified its ruling for immediate review, and we granted Brown's interlocutory appeal application to consider whether the act of child molestation, 2 in and of itself, constitutes a forcible felony for the purposes of OCGA § 16-3-21(a).

OCGA § 16-1-3(6), defines a forcible felony as "any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any person." The State argues that in order for child molestation to qualify as a forcible felony an independent showing of use or threat of physical force is required. The argument fails.

Child molestation is, by its very nature, a crime involving a forcible and violent act. See Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746(2), 353 S.E.2d 342 (1987); Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 631(2), 352 S.E.2d 382 (1987); Luke v. State, 222 Ga.App. 203(1), 474 S.E.2d 49 (1996); Huggins v. State, 192 Ga.App. 820(1), 386 S.E.2d 703 (1989). Because children do not have the capacity to give consent to or resist a sexual act directed at them, such acts "are, in law, forcible and against the will" of a child. Cooper v. State, supra; Luke v. State, supra. Thus, we find that for the purpose of establishing the defense of justification pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21(a), child molestation constitutes a forcible felony. However, this does not relieve Brown of the burden set forth in Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407(3), 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991), for admission of the alleged acts of violence by the victim. See Laster v. State, 268 Ga. 172, 486 S.E.2d 153 (1997).

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

1 OCGA § 16-3-21(a) provides:

A person is justified in ... using...

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18 cases
  • State v. Collins
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 26, 1998
    ...his teenage stepdaughter was forcible, as a matter of law, based on her age and his position of authority in the family. Finally, in Brown v. State,9 we rejected the state's contention that child molestation was not a forcible felony. Quoting our decision in Cooper, we stated: "Because chil......
  • Collins v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1997
    ...on a five-year-old child. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746, 353 S.E.2d 342 (1987), involves incest and sodomy. In Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 486 S.E.2d 178 (1997), the defendant was charged with malice murder and asserted justification in using deadly force to prevent the molestation of h......
  • Gibbins v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 3, 1997
    ...State, 256 Ga. 746, 747, 353 S.E.2d 342. This position is given added weight by our Supreme Court's recent decision in Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 155, 486 S.E.2d 178, that "[c]hild molestation is, by its very nature, a crime involving a forcible and violent act. See Richardson v. State, [......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1999
    ...an interlocutory appeal, however, we held that child molestation is, by its very nature, a forcible and violent crime. Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 486 S.E.2d 178 (1997). Therefore, we reversed and held that Brown should be given an opportunity to show that Clarkson's alleged acts were admi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Criminal Law - Franklin J. Hogue and Laura D. Hogue
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 51-1, September 1999
    • Invalid date
    ...172. Id. See Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 631, 352 S.E.2d 382 (1987); Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746, 353 S.E.2d 342 (1987); Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 486 S.E.2d 178 (1997). Cooper was overruled on November 1, 1999 by Brewer v. State, No. S99G0864, 1999 WL 983007, at *2 (Ga. Nov. 1, 1999).......

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