Luke v. State
Decision Date | 21 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. A96A0393,A96A0393 |
Citation | 474 S.E.2d 49,222 Ga.App. 203 |
Parties | LUKE v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Susan E. S. Shook, Vidalia, for appellant.
Marcus Luke, pro se.
Richard A. Malone, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Marcus Luke appeals his convictions of two counts of aggravated sodomy, OCGA § 16-6-2, two counts of aggravated child molestation, OCGA § 16-6-4(c), and one count of child molestation OCGA § 16-6-4(a).
Construed to support the jury's verdict, evidence was presented that on October 15, 1994, J.L., Luke's thirteen-year-old nephew, spent the night at Luke's house. J.L. testified that sometime after midnight, he and Luke got into the back seat of Luke's car, and in response to Luke's requests, J.L. and Luke engaged in mutual masturbation. J.L. also testified that Luke performed oral sodomy on him, then instructed J.L. to do the same to him. He testified that Luke also placed his finger in his anus. While J.L. testified that he was not forced to do these acts, he stated that he did not want to do them. J.L. testified that he told Luke he had to go to the bathroom, got out of the car, and ran naked to his own home about a mile away. J.L.'s father testified that J.L. came home around 5:00 a.m., naked, cold, and out of breath and told him about the incident. J.L. testified that Luke had made him "jack him off" approximately three times before.
1. Relying on Hines v. State, 173 Ga.App. 657, 327 S.E.2d 786 (1985), Luke argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for directed verdict of acquittal because the State failed to prove the element of force necessary to convict him of aggravated sodomy. In Hines, relying on Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232, 236 S.E.2d 748 (1977), we reversed defendant's conviction of aggravated sodomy, holding that the State was required to prove the element of force, but not consent, where the victim was nine years old. Hines, 173 Ga. App at 658(2), 327 S.E.2d 786. In Drake, defendant was convicted of forcible rape of his nine-year-old daughter. The Supreme Court differentiated between the "against the will" and "force" elements necessary to prove forcible rape. The Court held that the lack of consent element necessary to prove forcible rape was "automatically shown" by proof that the victim was under the age of consent, but the element of force "must be shown by evidence." 239 Ga. at 233(1), 236 S.E.2d 748.
We are not bound by Hines because one judge on the panel concurred in the judgment only. See Court of Appeals Rule 35(b); Cooper v. State, 180 Ga.App. 37, 38-39(1), 348 S.E.2d 486 (1986), aff'd, 256 Ga. 631, 352 S.E.2d 382 (1987). We are compelled, though, in light of more recent appellate decisions, to examine the holding in Drake that lack of consent, but not force, is established by proof of the victim's age.
(a) We note initially that both the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes require the State to establish that the crimes were committed with force and against the will of the victim. OCGA §§ 16-6-1, 16-6-2. Our courts, however, have defined inconsistently the method of establishing force in rape and sodomy cases. As noted above, in Drake, the Supreme Court held that consent but not force is established by proof of the victim's age. In aggravated sodomy cases, this Court has routinely held that both elements--force, as well as lack of consent--are presumed when sexual acts are performed against children. In Cooper v. State, supra, 180 Ga.App. 37, 348 S.E.2d 486 where the defendant was convicted of aggravated sodomy on a five-year-old victim, we criticized Drake and Hines, 1 stating that 180 Ga.App. at 38(1), 348 S.E.2d 486. We accounted for the inconsistent treatment of the force element in rape and sodomy cases by merely stating that in Cooper we were dealing "with sodomy and its special statutory provisions and not with rape and its statutory scheme." 180 Ga.App. at 39, 348 S.E.2d 486. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding: 256 Ga. 631(2), 352 S.E.2d 382. The Supreme Court cited Drake but did not address the anomalous result that force may be proved by the victim's age in sodomy cases but not in rape cases.
Subsequent cases have relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Cooper and apparently have followed the reasoning set out in this Court's opinion in Cooper that the proof of force in rape cases involving children differs from such proof in sodomy cases against children. Since Cooper, both the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently held that Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746, 747(2), 353 S.E.2d 342 (1987). See also Huggins v. State, 192 Ga.App. 820(1), 386 S.E.2d 703 (1989). Thus, although Drake differentiates between the elements of "force" and "against the will" in forcible rape cases involving children, in sodomy cases involving children, the cases make no such distinction. See Daniel v. State, 194 Ga.App. 495, 497-498(3), 391 S.E.2d 128 (1990).
(b) Our cases have not, however, defined "children." We have not established with clarity the maximum age at which the element of force necessary to prove aggravated sodomy is presumed. We have held that the "against the will" or "lack of consent" element is supplied by proof that the victim is under the age 14 because a victim of that age " 'is incapable of consenting to illicit sexual acts with another.' " Miles v. State, 201 Ga.App. 568, 411 S.E.2d 566 (1991). In Cooper v. State, 180 Ga.App. 37, 348 S.E.2d 486, supra, we adopted 13 as the age below which the element of force is automatically supplied. In reaching this conclusion, we relied upon OCGA § 16-3-1, which sets the age of criminal responsibility at 13. Similarly, in Huggins v. State, supra, we relied on Cooper and stated, "It thus appears that the Supreme Court is of the opinion that an act of sodomy perpetrated upon a child who has not attained the age of 13 constitutes aggravated sodomy because the act done to a child of that age is automatically done with force and against the child's will." 192 Ga.App. at 821(1), 386 S.E.2d 703. See also LaPan v. State, 167 Ga.App. 250, 305 S.E.2d 858 (1983), where we relied on OCGA § 16-3-1 and stated that Id. at 253(2), 305 S.E.2d 858.
Relying on OCGA § 16-3-1 as the measure of the age under which force is presumed yields inconsistent results in this case: Because J.L. was 13 at the time of the incident, his age is not sufficient to establish the element of force. But such proof is sufficient to prove the element of lack of consent. See, e.g., Miles, supra. Nowhere in cases such as Cooper and Huggins, however, is it mandated that thirteen is the age below which the element of force is automatically supplied; those cases use OCGA § 16-3-1 as one standard for determining the age under which force is presumed. That Code section is not dispositive of the issue. Its purpose is not to protect children under the age of 14 from illicit acts of others. Instead, "it simply raises a defense for [children under 13] because of the social desirability of protecting those no more than 12 years of age from the consequences of criminal guilt." K.M.S. v. State of Ga., 129 Ga.App. 683, 685, 200 S.E.2d 916 (1973).
Because the purpose of OCGA § 16-3-1 is not to protect child victims but to protect child perpetrators from the legal consequences of their own wrongdoing, and because its application leads to inconsistent results, we do not believe that OCGA § 16-3-1 should be used to set the age above which force may not be presumed. We are instead persuaded that the appropriate and logical age for such a presumption is the statutory "age of consent," which in this case was 14. 2 Our opinion in Cooper supports this conclusion. As noted above, we stated there that "in one incapable of resisting or of consenting or dissenting there is no predicate in law for the showing of force as a reaction in resisting defendant." 180 Ga.App. at 38, 348 S.E.2d 486. Under this rationale, if one cannot legally consent due to his...
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