Bruner v. GC-GW, INC.

• Decision Date: 30 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1D03-3775.,1D03-3775.
• Citation: 880 So.2d 1244
• Parties: James W. BRUNER, Appellant, v. GC-GW, INC., d/b/a Jackson-Cook, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

880 So.2d 1244

James W. BRUNER, Appellant, v. GC-GW, INC., d/b/a Jackson-Cook, Appellee.

No. 1D03-3775.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

August 30, 2004.

Scott T. Manion; Vernon T. Grizzard; Albert Thorburn, Tallahassee; Mark L. Zientz, of the Law Office of Mark L. Zientz, P.A., for Florida Worker's Advocates, Miami; Richard E. Johnson, for National Employment Lawyers Association, Florida Chapter, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Michael C. Rayboun, of Whibbs & Whibbs, P.A., Pensacola; Mary Ann Stiles, of Stiles, Taylor & Grace, P.A., for Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., Atlanta, for Appellee.

LEWIS, J.

Appellant, James W. Bruner, seeks review of the trial court's Final Summary Judgment in which the court found that section 440.205, Florida Statutes, does not provide for a civil cause of action for an employee who is discharged by his or her employer for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer. Appellant first argues that the plain language of section 440.205 provides for such a cause of action. In his second argument, appellant argues that, if section 440.205 is ambiguous with respect to the issue on appeal, legislative intent and public policy support such a cause of action. Concluding that section 440.205 provides for a civil cause of action when an employer discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer, we reverse the Final Summary Judgment and remand for further proceedings.

As set forth in the trial court's Final Summary Judgment, appellant sustained a compensable workers' compensation injury while employed with Ceco Corporation, his previous employer. Appellant subsequently became employed with appellee, GC-GW, Inc., d/b/a Jackson-Cook. However, shortly after hiring appellant, appellee discharged him because he was a "W/C Risk" due to his having filed a workers' compensation claim against Ceco Corporation.¹ Appellant subsequently filed suit against appellee pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes, alleging that appellee wrongfully discharged him based upon his previous workers' compensation claim. After filing its answer, appellee filed a motion for final summary judgment, asserting that section 440.205 does not provide for such a cause of action. In its Final Summary Judgment, the trial court agreed with appellee that appellant had no right of action against appellee pursuant to section 440.205. In noting that this is a case of first impression in Florida, the trial court found that appellee, as the subsequent employer, had done nothing to hinder, thwart, or prohibit appellant from obtaining benefits flowing from his previous compensable injury. According to the court, appellant's interpretation of section 440.205 belied the historical and primary purpose of chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and its effort to insure that employers and carriers comply with their responsibility to provide compensation to workers injured on the job. The court granted appellee's motion for final summary judgment, finding that there was no legislative evidence or case authority to support appellant's expansive interpretation. Appellant subsequently moved for rehearing as to the Final Summary Judgment and provided the trial court with five cases from foreign jurisdictions that addressed the issue at hand. In its Order on Rehearing, the court found that none of the cases were binding precedent and that an important public policy would be advanced by a ruling for either party. In noting that it was constrained from recognizing or creating a new cause of action, the court denied appellant's motion for rehearing. This appeal followed.

Pursuant to section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2000), "No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law." The supreme court has held that this statute, which the Legislature enacted in 1979, "creates a statutory cause of action for a wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim...." Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof'l Adm'rs, 427 So.2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1983). According to the court, "because the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a duty and because the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication every particular power necessary to insure the performance of that duty." Id. at 184; see also Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.1990)

(holding that an employer who violates section 440.205 commits an intentional tort, thereby exposing itself to liability for damages for emotional distress because "[s]ection 440.205 reflects the public policy that an employee shall not be discharged for filing or threatening to file a workers' compensation claim").

It is well established that the construction of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo. Dixon v. City of Jacksonville, 774 So.2d 763, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Legislative intent is the polestar that guides this Court's statutory construction analysis. See State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 110 (Fla.2002)

(citation omitted). In construing a statute, this Court must look to the statute's plain language. See Fla. Dep't of Educ. v. Cooper, 858 So.2d 394, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Jackson County Hosp. Corp. v. Aldrich, 835 So.2d 318, 328-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); see also State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001) (noting that legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of a statute). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Cooper, 858 So.2d at 395 (citations omitted). Where a statute is ambiguous, courts may then resort to the rules of statutory construction. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003). A statute that is in derogation of the common law must be construed narrowly. Superior Brands, Inc. v. Rogers, 646 So.2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). However, remedial statutes should be liberally construed in favor of granting access to the remedy provided by the Legislature. Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 565-66 (Fla. 2000) (holding that any ambiguities in paragraph 448.103(1)(c), a section of the Whistleblowers Act which was remedial in nature, should be liberally construed in favor of granting access to the remedy provided by the Legislature); see also Broward v. Jacksonville Med. Ctr., 690 So.2d 589, 591 (Fla.1997) ("Florida's workers' compensation laws are remedial in nature....").

Appellee would have us construe section 440.205 as providing for a civil cause of action only as to an employer against whom a workers' compensation claim is filed. However, to read the statute in such a way, especially given the language, "no employer," would be to add restrictive language to the statute, which is something that we are not at liberty to do. See Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999)

("We are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature."). We, therefore, conclude that section 440.205, which is clear and unambiguous, provides for a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer.

We note, however, that even if we were to find section 440.205 ambiguous with respect to the issue at hand, legislative intent and public policy would still lead us to the same result. In support of its argument that the intent of chapter 440 supports its interpretation of section 440.205, appellee contends that section 440.105(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2000), reveals the limitations of section 440.205. Section 440.105(2)(a)2., which the Legislature enacted in 1993, declares it unlawful for an employer to knowingly "[d]ischarge or refuse to hire an employee or job applicant because the employee or applicant has filed a claim for benefits under this chapter."² As appellee contends, the language "refusal to hire" clearly anticipates a claim filed against a previous employer. According to appellee, the Legislature's choice of language in section 440.105(2)(a)2. indicates that the Legislature knows how to deal with employers who discharge an employee for having filed a past claim or employers who refuse to hire a job applicant for having filed a past claim. Appellee concludes then that, because the Legislature did not amend section 440.205 at the time it enacted section 440.105(2)(a)2., the Legislature did not intend for there to be a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer. We do not find appellee's argument persuasive.

Had this case presented the issue of whether a civil cause of action exists against an employer who refuses to hire a job applicant for having filed a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer, appellee's argument would have merit. However, that is not the issue presented here. Furthermore, simply because the Legislature did not provide for a civil cause of action for refusal to hire in this context does not mean that the Legislature did not intend for there to be a civil cause of action against an employer who discharges an employee for having filed a past workers' compensation claim.

We find that section 440.205 is not only intended to punish employers who discharge an employee for having filed a workers' compensation claim but is also intended to insure that employees do not have to fear reprisal from their employers when they file a workers' compensation claim. Interpreting section 440.205 as appellee would have us do would have a chilling effect on an employee's decision to file a meritorious workers' compensation claim for fear of being discharged from a subsequent position merely because...