Bryant v. Swoap

• Citation: 121 Cal.Rptr. 867,48 Cal.App.3d 431
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 23 May 1975
• Parties: Donald W. BRYANT and Erma Bryant, Respondents, v. David SWOAP, Director of the Department of Benefit Payments, etc., Appellant. Civ. 13950.

Page 867

121 Cal.Rptr. 867

48 Cal.App.3d 431

Donald W. BRYANT and Erma Bryant, Respondents, v. David SWOAP, Director of the Department of Benefit Payments, etc., Appellant.

Civ. 13950.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

May 23, 1975.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward M. Belasco and Patric Hooper, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellant

William D. Schuetz, Riverside, for respondents.

OPINION

KAUFMAN, Associate Justice.

The Director of the California Department of Benefit Payments (hereafter 'Department') appeals from a peremptory writ of mandate directing Department to pay Donald W. Bryant and Erma Bryant (hereafter 'the Bryants') Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereafter 'AFDC') benefits.

The facts are not in dispute. The Bryants' daughter, Darlene, was born in October 1955. She was married in April 1971, at age 15. She separated from her husband and returned to her parents' home on January 26, 1972; she received a final decree of dissolution in August 1972. At all times pertinent to this appeal, she has remained home with her parents. Both of the Bryants are unemployed. The Bryants were receiving AFDC funds owing to Darlene's presence in their home. The Riverside County Department of Public Welfare terminated the Bryants' AFDC aid, effective December 31, 1972, after concluding Darlene was not eligible for benefits. The Bryants pursued administrative remedies but Department ultimately sustained the county's action. The Bryants then brought this action for writ of mandate to set aside Department's decision. The trial court granted the writ and ordered Department to make payments commencing with that due on January 1, 1973. ¹ Department appeals.

Department determined Darlene was ineligible for AFDC benefits based solely on Eligibility and Assistance Standards Regulation 42--101.3, ² which reads in pertinent part: 'A child is eligible on the basis of age until his 18th birthday Only if he is unmarried.' (Emphasis added.) In one sense, Darlene is 'unmarried.' This is, she is not presently married. Department, however, takes the position that 'unmarried' means 'never married.' Conceding Darlene is otherwise AFDC eligible, Department denied her benefits on the sole ground that she had been married and divorced.

Recipient eligibility for AFDC fnds is determined by criteria established by federal law. A state is not obligated to participate in an AFDC program, but if it does, it is required to conform to federal statutory and regulatory requirements. A state may not impose additional eligibility criteria to disqualify those who would otherwise be eligible for AFDC funds under federal standards. Such additional eligibility criteria violate the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution and are void. (See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502, 505, 30 L.Ed.2d 448, 453; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118; County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730, 738--739, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953, appeal dismissed 406 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 1762, 32 L.Ed.2d 112.)

Department has not brought to our attention any federal requirement that the child be 'unmarried.' The Bryants assert in essence that since there is no explicit federal requirement that the child be 'unmarried,' then Department's eligibility requirement is automatically void. However, Burns v. Alcala, --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975), invalidates this argument: 'Several . . . courts . . . have read (prior Supreme Court cases) to establish a special rule of construction applicable to Social Security Act provisions governing AFDC eligibility. They have held that persons who are arguably included in the federal eligibility standard must be deemed eligible unless the Act or its legislative history clearly exhibits an intent to exclude them from coverage, in effect creating a presumption of coverage when the statute is ambiguous. . . . This departure from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation is not supported by the Court's prior decisions. (These prior cases) establish only that once the federal standard of eligibility is defined, a participating State may not deny aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a clear indication that Congress meant the coverage to be optional. The method of analysis used to define the federal standard of eligibility is no different from that used in solving any other problem of statutory construction.' (At pp. ---, ---, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1184.)

42 U.S.C. section 606 prescribes which children are eligible for AFDC aid. ³ The portion of that section relevant herein is the requirement that the child be 'deprived of parental support or care . . ..'

Department summarizes its argument as follows:

'(1) (A) dependent child, in the context of AFDC nomenclature, under both federal and state law, is one who has been deprived of parental support or care. (2) The parent referred to in the expression 'deprived of parental support or care' is the parent who has the legal obligation to support the child. (3) Once an individual is married, her parents no longer have the legal duty to support her. Thus a married daughter cannot be the basis in a household for an award of AFDC. (4) The legal duty to support does not return to the parents upon the dissolution of the marriage and subsequent removal of the previously married person to the parental household. (5) As a result, such an individual is not 'deprived of parental support or care.' (6) Consequently, a state regulation which treats a divorced minor the same as a married minor is not violative of federal or state law on its face or as applied.'

Department derives its argument from the fact that the general duty of parental child support ceases upon the emancipation of the minor child. (Codorniz v. Codorniz, 34 Cal.2d 811, 817, 215 P.2d 32.) Marriage of a minor child results in emancipation. (Civ.Code, § 204(2).) Such emancipation is complete and does terminate a parent's general duty to support a child. (Kamper v. Waldon, 17 Cal.2d 718, 112 P.2d 1.)

The threshold question is whether such state law has any impact on AFDC eligibility, since the usual rule is that eligibility is determined solely according to federal standards. State law does have an effect, nevertheless, because there is no federal common law or domestic relations law. For example, King v. Smith, Supra, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, considered whether a paramour was a 'parent' for AFDC eligibility purposes. ⁴ The Supreme Court held that Congress meant the term 'parent' to refer to individuals with a legal duty to support the child. Since the paramour had no such duty under Alabama law, he was not a 'parent.' Therefore, the Court held Alabama could not deny aid based on the paramour's occasional presence in the home. Thus California law governing a parent's legal obligation to support his child, or the lack thereof, may affect the validity of the regulation here in question.

Department's argument pivots on its assertion that AFDC aid is conditioned upon the parent's duty to support the child. Put succinctly, Department urges that a child may not be deprived of something it has no right to have. This argument has a certain logic and some consistency with the wording of 42 U.S.C. section 606. (See fn. 3, Ante.) It is also consistent with language in King v. Smith, Supra, and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 603, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 1935, 32 L.Ed.2d 352, 356. ⁵

Yet giving Department's argument full effect, Arguendo, we must consider whether parents of a married and divorced minor child might still have a legal duty of parental support. If such a duty exists, and the child meets all other criteria, she would be eligible for AFDC benefits under Department's reading of applicable federal law. The question would then become whether Department's regulation excludes that child. An affirmative answer to this latter question would render Department's 'unmarried' criterion void.

Under California law the typical duty of parental support, as noted above, terminates with the marriage of the minor child. California, however, imposes an additional duty of parental support. Civil Code, section 206, which defines certain reciprocal support duties of parents and children, imposes upon parents the duty to support their needy children unable to provide for themselves by work. ⁶ This duty, unlike the general duty of support, persists even if the child is emancipated or reaches the age of majority. (See Codorniz v. Codorniz, Supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 817, 215 P.2d 32.) This code section traces back to the Elizabethan poor law and has a legal heritage of almost 400 years. (Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 490, 502--503, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840.) It has been part of California law since the original adoption of the Civil Code in 1872.

Department's regulation makes no distinction between married and divorced children within and without the purview of Civil Code, section 206. Instead, Department construes 'unmarried' to mean 'never married.' Therefore, the regulation excludes children who (1) are married and divorced, (2) have a right to parental support under Civil Code, section 206, and (3) are otherwise AFDC eligible.

Department attempts to sidestep Civil Code, section 206 by focusing on the portion of that section limiting the parents' duty of support 'to the extent of their ability.' Department argues: (1) the duty of support is Conditioned on an ability to pay; (2) application for AFDC assistance demonstrates a lack of ability to pay; and (3) therefore Civil Code, section 206 is inapplicable herein. This argument is specious.

First, the phrase 'to the extent of their ability' refers to the extent of the duty, not to its existence--what must be done to discharge the obligation, not whether the obligation arises in the first instance. Discussing the companion duty of...