Swoap v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 12 December 1973
• Citation: 10 Cal.3d 490,111 Cal.Rptr. 136,516 P.2d 840
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 516 P.2d 840 David B. SWOAP, as Director, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; Bieuky DYKSTRA et al., Real Parties in Interest. Sac. 7948.

Page 136

111 Cal.Rptr. 136

10 Cal.3d 490, 516 P.2d 840

David B. SWOAP, as Director, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent Bieuky DYKSTRA et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Sac. 7948.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 12, 1973.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., and John Fourt, Deputy Atty. Gen., for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Peter D. Coppelman, Fred J. Hiestand, San Francisco, John F. Moulds III, and Blackmon, Isenberg, Moulds & Blicker, Sacramento, for real parties in interest.

Jan T. Chilton, Berkeley, as amicus curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

We are again called upon to determine whether an adult child of a recipient of aid to the aged under the Old Age Security Law (Welf. & Inst.Code, div. 9, pt. 3, ch. 3, § 12000 et seq.) ¹ may constitutionally be required to reimburse the state. We addressed ourselves to this question in County of San Mateo v. Boss (1971) 3 Cal.3d 962, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654. We there held that under the particular facts of that case, the adult son of that recipient could not constitutionally be compelled to make reimbursement according to the relatives' responsibility statutes. (§§ 12100, 12101.) As we explain in detail Infra, we left open the question whether section 206 of the Civil Code provided a rational basis for upholding relatives' responsibility against the challenge that such statutes examined in the light of certain decisions of this court arbitrarily charged welfare costs to one class in society and thereby denied equal protection of the laws. We now undertake to answer that question.

Two recipients of aid to the aged, Ila Huntley and Bieuky Dykstra, and their adult children, Howard Huntley and Julius Dykstra, brought a class action seeking to enjoin state officials from requiring adult children to reimburse the state, pursuant to sections 12100 and 12101, for aid to the aged extended to their parents.

Plaintiff Howard Huntley is the 60-year-old son of 88-year-old widow Ila Huntley, who is the recipient of aid to the aged. Huntley, alleges in the complaint that he and his 67-year-old wife ahd a net monthly income of $656.25; that they are trying to save money for their imminent retirement; that the San Joaquin County Welfare Department ordered him, effective October 1, 1971, to pay the department $70 per month for the support of his mother; and that he could not provide for his own family and at the same time pay such a large sum.

Plaintiff Julius Dykstra is the son of 78-year-old widow, Bieuky Dykstra, who is the recipient of aid to the aged. Dykstra alleges that the same welfare department demanded that he pay $75 per month for the support of his mother; that he works as a truck driver and does not have $75 per month left after paying his own family bills, including $180 a month for child support and $145 a month for rent.

On October 14, 1971 the Superior Court of Sacramento County issued a statewide temporary restraining order, enjoining defendants from '(e)nforcing against plaintiffs Julius Dykstra and Howard Huntley, and the class of persons similarly situated, and plaintiffs Bieuky Dykstra and Ila Huntley, and the class of persons similarly situated, the provisions of W & I Code, §§ 12100 and 12101, as amended, and Civil Code, § 206, as amended.' Defendants seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the Sacramento Superior Court from enforcing its restraining order on the ground that, since sections 12100 ² and 12101, ³ and Civil Code section 206 ⁴ are valid, the court had no jurisdiction to enjoin defendants from administering these statutes. (Code Civ.Proc., § 526.)

Under the Old Age Security Law public assistance is extended to aged needy persons. Pursuant to section 12101 the adult children of such recipients are required to contribute to the recipient's support according to a fixed schedule. As a result of the enactment of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 (Stats.1971, ch. 578, § 33), the relatives' contribution scale was revised sharply upwards. ⁵ Section 12100 provides that the county granting aid to the aged may proceed against an adult child of a recipient to collect the amount due under section 12101.

In County of San Mateo v. Boss, Supra, 3 Cal.3d 962, 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654 we were of the opinion that the constitutionality of the relatives' responsibility statutes (§§ 12100, 12101) should be determined in the light of the principles announced by us in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720. ⁶ In Kirchner we held that liability could not be imposed (pursuant to former § 6650, now § 7275) on an adult child for the care, support and maintenance of her mentally ill parent in a state institution. We rested our opinion in Kirchner largely upon Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22, where we had declared former section 6650 unconstitutional insofar as it purported to impose liability upon a father for the cost of the care, maintenance and support in a mental institution of his insane son charged with murder. We reasoned in Hawley as follows: 'Tne enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration and treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions--subject of course, to the constitutional guaranties-- who would endanger themselves or others if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should (subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate) be borne by the state.' (Id. at pp. 255--256, 28 Cal.Rptr. at p. 723, 379 P.2d at p. 27.)

Confronted in Kirchner with an attack on the constitutionality of the same statute (former § 6650) challenged in Hawley, this court then declared: 'Whether the commitment is incidental to an alleged violation of a penal statute, as in Hawley, or is essentially a civil commitment as in the instant case, the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be Arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause.' (Id. 60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. at p. 490, 388 P.2d at p. 722; italics added.)

Two years after Kirchner in In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790, the Court of Appeal was faced with the contention that former section 5260 (now § 6715), insofar as it purported to make a parent financially responsible for the care, maintenance and support received by his or her mentally retarded child in a state institution, was unconstitutional for the same reasons for which former section 6650 was declared unconstitutional in Kirchner. The court framed the issue before it as follows: 'If Kirchner stands for the proposition that when the state, in the exercise of its promotion of the general welfare, commits a person either for the protection of society or for his protection or rehabilitation, or any combination thereof, it cannot thereafter seek reimbursement except from such person or his estate, that case then is determinative of the matter in issue. (Fn. omitted.) On the other hand, if Kirchner is limited to its facts and does not preclude the state from seeking reimbursement from those otherwise legally responsible for the care, support and maintenance of the person treated, (fn. omitted) inquiry must be directed to a determination of whether or not respondent is responsible for the support of her adult daughter; and, if so, whether the state has properly provided for the enforcement of any obligation arising from the responsibility.' (Id. at p. 407, 48 Cal.Rptr. at p. 794.)

The Dudley court concluded that Kirchner 'does not expressly . . . restrict the right to recoupment to the inmate, or his estate, but states that the cost may not Arbitrarily be charged to one class of persons. Such an arbitrary charge results when liability is imposed on a daughter because of a blood relationship alone without regard for the means of the parent patient . . . (or on) a relative who except for the arbitrary statute was in no other manner liable for support of the patient.' (Italics added.) (Id. at pp. 411--412, 48 Cal.Rptr. at p. 797.) The court observed that in Kirchner the inmate mother had adequate funds to pay for her own care and maintenance, that therefore the daughter was not legally responsible for the care and maintenance furnished the mother by the state, since the mother was not a 'poor person,' and that therein lay the arbitrariness found by the Kirchner court.

The Court of Appeal concluded that where the relative, prior to the commitment, was otherwise legally responsible for the care, maintenance and support of the patient, it was not arbitrary to select that class of persons to pay a reasonable contribution to the state for the cost of the state supporting and caring for the patient. Rejecting the contention that the Principle of section 206 of the Civil Code could not be relied upon to support the constitutionality of the relatives' responsibility statute (former § 5260) then under review, the Dudley court relied on our opinion in County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394, 296 P.2d 329, an action against the adult daughter of a poor person to recover a portion of the amount paid as aid to the needy aged under the Old Age Security Law. (Now § 12000 et seq.)

Adverting to our holding in Simmons that recovery by public agencies from responsible relatives was completely covered by the Welfare and Institutions Code and was not derived from section 206 of the Civil Code, the Dudley court declared: 'The problem...