Buchanan v. Graham
| Decision Date | 25 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 11 C 3135,11 C 3135 |
| Parties | CALVIN BUCHANAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN GRAHAM, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
This action arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Calvin Buchanan claims deprivations of constitutional rights by acts and omissions committed under color of state law by defendants Craig Hammermeister, John Graham, and unknown officers of the Chicago Police Department. Additionally, plaintiff asserts Illinois state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff also alleges respondeat superior liability on the part of U-Pull-It North, LLC and the application of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102. The Court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1367.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges three federal claims: (I) unlawful seizure; (II) excessive force; and (III) conspiracy. The Complaint alleges four substantive state law claims: (IV) false arrest and imprisonment; (V) assault and battery; (VI) malicious prosecution; and (VII) intentional infliction of emotional distress. There is also an indemnification claim (IX) against the City of Chicago. Additionally, there was a respondeat superior claim (VIII) against U-Pull-It, but, by agreement, U-Pull-It has been dismissed from this action. See Orders dated Nov. 8, 2012 [94], Nov. 20, 2012 [98].
Defendants Hammermeister, Graham, and the City of Chicago have moved for summary judgment. Hammermeister moves as to all claims and Graham as to all claims against him except Count II, for excessive force. Defendants Hammermeister and Graham both assert qualified immunity. Plaintiff does not oppose the dismissal of Count III (conspiracy), nor the dismissal of the unknown Chicago police officers.
On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274 n.1 (2009); Malen v. MTD Prods., Inc.,628 F.3d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 2010); Stokes v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2010). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2010); Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001). The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010). The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Freundt v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 2007 WL 4219417 *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007); O'Brien v. Encotech Constr., 2004 WL 609798 *1 (N.D. Ill. March 23, 2004). Also, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. A & E Oil, Inc., 503 F.3d 588, 594-95 (7th Cir. 2007); Yasak v. Ret. Bd. of Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 357 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2004); Lampley v. Mitcheff, 2010 WL 4362826 *6 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 27, 2010). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:
The party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of production to identify "those portions of thepleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) (citation and internal quotation omitted)). The moving party may discharge this burden by "'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmovant must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "The nonmovant must do more, however, than demonstrate some factual disagreement between the parties; the issue must be 'material.'" Logan, 96 F.3d at 978. "Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute." Id. (citation omitted). In determining whether the nonmovant has identified a "material" issue of fact for trial, we are guided by the applicable substantive law; "[o]nly disputes that could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." McGinn v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Furthermore, a factual dispute is "genuine" for summary judgment purposes only when there is "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Hence, a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the existence of a genuine fact issue is not enough to stave off summary judgment, and "the nonmovant fails to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial 'where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party . . . .'" Logan, 96 F.3d at 978 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)).
Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all genuine factual disputes in favor of plaintiff, the party opposing the motions for summary judgment, the facts assumed to be true for purposes of the summary judgment motions are as follows. On January 18, 2010 at 1:30 p.m., plaintiff was a customer at U-Pull-It seeking to purchase used automotive parts. Customers who come on the premises to self-select auto parts and who bring with them their own auto parts for comparison are required to have their own parts marked by an attendant before looking for parts to purchase.
Plaintiff approached the cashier and placed used parts on the counter for pricing by the cashier. Plaintiff also had on the floor a bag of auto parts which he later stated were his own parts brought to the premises, though the parts had not been marked by an attendant. Defendant Hammermeister is a Chicago police officer who was working as a security guard on the premises. Hammermeister saw plaintiff's bag, removed the contents to the counter, and told plaintiff he was required to pay for the items removed from his bag. Hammermeister testified that he believed plaintiff was trying to steal the auto parts that were in the bag.
An argument began. Plaintiff stated that the parts in the bag were his. Hammermeister told plaintiff he would have to pay for the parts. The parties yelled at each other. At some point, Hammermeister identified himself as a police officer and pointed a weapon at plaintiff. During the argument, saliva collected in and around plaintiff's mouth. Hammermeister told the cashier to call 911, which he did.
There is a dispute as to what, if any, insulting remarks were made by plaintiff about police officers. Hammerstein has testified, and plaintiff denies, that plaintiff spit on him and threatened him. Danny Diaz, manager of the facility, intervened to stop the altercation. He heard plaintiff say that he wasn't afraid of police and that he didn't want to spit at Hammermeister. Diaz saw saliva on plaintiff's face but did not see him spit on Hammermeister. Edwardo Brito, the cashier who was present, testified that he did not see plaintiff spit on Hammermeister.
Hammermeister asked plaintiff for his address, which he supplied. Plaintiff paid for the parts removed from the bag and left the premises in an automobile. Officer Hammermeister noted the license plate number.Hammermeister testified that he did not arrest plaintiff because he did not have back-up.
Police officers responding to the 911 call arrived after plaintiff had already left the premises, approximately 40 minutes after the call had been made. According to a report made by the responding officers, Hammermeister stated plaintiff spit on him while screaming that he had AIDS.
Later in the afternoon, plaintiff returned to U-Pull-It, accompanied by his mother, and demanded a refund for the items for which he had previously paid and was given a refund. Angry words were exchanged between plaintiff and Hammermeister before plaintiff left the site.
At the end of his day at U-Pull-It, Hammermeister went to a police station and reported the incident to defendant Detective John Graham. With the address given by plaintiff to Hammermeister and the physical description provided, Graham generated a photo array and Hammermeister identified plaintiff. Hammermeister signed a complaint charging plaintiff with "Aggravated Battery to a Police Officer." The complaint alleged plaintiff "knowingly spit on the victim (P.O.C. HAMMERMEISTER) a Chicago Police Officer knowing the victim to be a peace officer, causing injury of an insulting or provoking nature." Plaintiff wasarrested by Graham that day. Subsequent to the arrest, Graham obtained the surveillance tape made at U-Pull-It during the encounter and interviewed the cashier and manager.
Plaintiff was taken to a police station where he was interviewed. Plaintiff alleges that, while in custody he was punched and beaten by Graham and unknown officers. Plaintiff requested that he be taken to a hospital. He was transported to Resurrection Hospital where he was treated and released into police custody.
Plaintiff remained in custody for five days. On January...
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