Buchanan v. State, No. 08-04-00112-CR (TX 3/30/2006)
| Decision Date | 30 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-04-00112-CR.,08-04-00112-CR. |
| Parties | MICHAEL BUCHANAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from the 346th District Court of El Paso County, Texas, (TC# 20030D05546).
Before BARAJAS, C.J., McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.
This is an appeal from unauthorized use of a motor vehicle—enhanced by the allegation of two prior felony convictions. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years to serve in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and also assessed a fine of $10,000. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Robert Branham, a detective with the El Paso Police Department, testified that he interviewed the complaining witness in this case, Sandra Norsworthy. During their meeting, Branham took Norsworthy's written statement. Branham obtained a prosecution statement from Norsworthy. On October 23, 2003, Branham placed the identity of her vehicle, a 1993 Dodge Intrepid, into the NCIC/TCIC system as a stolen vehicle. Branham obtained a warrant for Appellant on October 29, 2003 for the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Inspector Juan Grajeda worked as a Custom's Inspector at the Bridge of the Americas for the Department of Homeland Security. On November 1, 2003, Grajeda came in contact with the Appellant at the Bridge of the Americas. Appellant was the front passenger inside the vehicle, a red Dodge Intrepid. Tomas Mendoza was the driver, and another individual was in the rear seat. Inspector Grajeda verified the identity of the vehicle by running the license plate and VIN numbers. The vehicle came back as NCIC hit stolen. Grajeda questioned the driver about the car. Mendoza, the driver, said the vehicle belonged to the Appellant's stepdaughter. Grajeda verified the Appellant's identity and questioned him about the vehicle. Appellant said the vehicle belonged to his stepdaughter. Appellant was having the car repaired in Juarez. Grajeda requested that Appellant furnish paperwork to establish an actual vehicle repair. Appellant was unable to provide any paperwork concerning repairs to the vehicle. Grajeda transferred the case investigation to the El Paso Police Department.
Officer Eduardo Lara worked for the El Paso Police Department and was assigned to the Central Regional Command Patrol. On November 1, 2003, Officer Lara was dispatched to 3600 East Paisano, the Bridge of the Americas. Appellant, Mendoza, and Woodruff were being detained in a holding cell at the Bridge of the Americas. Officer Lara interviewed Appellant, and he stated that the vehicle belonged to his stepdaughter and that he had borrowed the vehicle. His stepdaughter had let him borrow the vehicle so he could get it fixed. She was having problems with the vehicle. Officer Lara spoke with the driver of the vehicle and concluded that the reason that he was driving the vehicle was because that morning of November 1, Appellant and the other passenger had picked him up at his home. Appellant asked him if he could drive the vehicle because Appellant did not have a driver's license. Lara checked the three men that were in the car for outstanding warrants. Appellant had an outstanding warrant from the El Paso Police Department for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Lara took Appellant in front of a judge for his formal warnings. After that, Lara went ahead and booked Appellant into the County Jail. The other two individuals in the vehicle had been released at the scene.
The complainant, Sandra Norsworthy, lived at 5509 Husky, El Paso, Texas. Norsworthy lived with her two sisters, three nephews, and three children. Norsworthy lived in the same house for five years. Norsworthy worked at the Big 8 Food Store as a stocker. Appellant is Norsworthy's stepfather. Appellant had spent the night at Norsworthy's home during the previous three- to four-week period. Norsworthy allowed Appellant to stay over the night of October 18 into October 19. On October 18, 2003, Norsworthy lent her vehicle to her friend Jesus. Norsworthy said she knew that Jesus had returned the vehicle because she saw it in the driveway when she went to take a shower on the morning of October 19, 2003. Norsworthy could not find the keys to her vehicle. Norsworthy's friend Lorena took her to work. At one in the afternoon, Norsworthy's ex-husband picked her up from work. Norsworthy arrived about 1:30 p.m. Norsworthy's car was gone. Norsworthy called the police at approximately 10:30 p.m. on October 19, 2003 to file a stolen car report.
During four weeks leading up to October 19, Norsworthy lent her vehicle to the Appellant about five to six times. On many of those occasions, she had her niece go with him because she did not trust Appellant enough to let him have the car all day. Appellant had always asked for permission before using her car, and he had returned the vehicle to a proper location. On the morning of October 19, Norsworthy testified that she did not give Appellant consent to take the vehicle. Until October 19, 2003, Appellant never took a car belonging to Norsworthy for more than two hours and had always asked for Norsworthy's permission before taking the car. He had fixed a borrowed car on two of these occasions.
After the police recovered the vehicle, Norsworthy picked it up from the police impound lot. Appellant's belongings were inside the back of the car. Norsworthy believed that Appellant had been living in the car. In the backseat was a blanket and a pillow. Appellant's belongings were not in the car before October 19, 2003. When Norsworthy obtained her vehicle from the impound lot, the vehicle was blowing smoke away and was shaking a lot. The vehicle appeared to have been damaged in an accident.
Gaby Cuevas testified that she was ten years old. She was the niece of the complainant, Sandra Norsworthy. Appellant was her stepgrandfather. Gaby lived with Norsworthy in October 2003. She slept in the living room on October 18, 2003. Appellant also slept in the living room on October 18, 2003. During the early morning of October 19, 2003, Gaby was awakened by a man named Jesus knocking on the door. Jesus and Appellant spoke to each other. Gaby went back to bed. When she awoke, Appellant was sitting on the couch. Norsworthy's vehicle was still in front of the house but Norsworthy had left for work. Gaby saw Appellant go to Norsworthy's car with a bag. She asked him where he was going to go. He said he "was going to take the car to Sandra's job." No one else was awake at that time. Appellant drove off in the car.
Officer Julia Arrieta, with the El Paso Police Department, was on duty on October 19, 2003. The dispatcher sent her to Norsworthy's dwelling regarding an unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Officer Arrieta spoke with Norsworthy and her niece, Gaby, and determined that a crime had been committed. Norsworthy denied that she lent the vehicle to Appellant. She said she never gave him permission to take the vehicle. Gaby also told Arrieta that Appellant said he was going to take the car to Norsworthy at her workplace. Arrieta wrote a report and fowarded it to the detectives.
In Issue No. One, Appellant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction. He specifically challenges the State's proof that he intentionally and knowingly operated the vehicle without Sandra Norsworthy's consent. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we are constrained to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense, as alleged in the application paragraph of the charge to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). More particularly, sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Our role is not to ascertain whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990); Dwyer v. State, 836 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd). We do not resolve any conflict in fact, weigh any evidence or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, and thus, the fact-finding results of a criminal jury trial are given great deference. Menchaca v. State, 901 S.W.2d 640, 650-52 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd); Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Leyva v. State, 840 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd); Bennett v. State, 831 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.). Instead, our only duty is to determine if both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 421-22. In so doing, we resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 843 (quoting Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). The trier of fact, not the appellate court, is free to accept or reject...
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