Buford v. State
| Decision Date | 05 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-CT-00024-SCT,2019-CT-00024-SCT |
| Parties | Michael Shane BUFORD a/k/a Michael S. Buford a/k/a Michael Buford v. STATE of Mississippi |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES, Jackson, HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD, Jackson
EN BANC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶1. This Court must decide whether a police officer who has obtained consent to search the person of another must obtain additional consent to search a specific, innocuous container found on that person. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant's consent to the search of his person encompassed the search of a smokeless tobacco can found in his pocket. We agree and affirm the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
¶2. In March of 2017, Sybil Brooks hired Jason Sebren to make repairs to a mobile home that she owned, and she allowed Sebren to live in the mobile home in exchange. Allegedly unbeknownst to Brooks, Buford began helping Sebren make the repairs, and he and his wife also moved into the mobile home. Subsequently, Sebren and Brooks had an argument, and Sebren moved out of the mobile home. Brooks stated that, because she did not have any agreement with Buford, the next day she told him to leave the mobile home. That same morning, Brooks also called the Pearl Police Department and stated that people were living in her rental house who did not have permission to be there.
¶3. Four law-enforcement officers were dispatched to the property. Officer Jeannine Easterling, who arrived first, testified that she initially knocked on the mobile-home door.1 When Buford opened the door, she identified herself and told Buford why she was there. Officer Easterling testified that she asked Buford for any documents or proof that he was supposed to be at the home. Buford could not provide documentation. Officers Brad Winningham, Marc Gatlin, and Michael Bankston arrived approximately ten to twenty minutes later.
¶4. Officer Winningham testified that when he arrived, he asked Officer Easterling if Buford had been searched. Officer Easterling replied that he had not. Officer Winningham then asked Buford "did he have any issues with me searching him and he advised he did not." Officer Winningham conducted a search of Buford's person and felt a can of smokeless tobacco. He opened the tobacco can and observed what he believed to be crystal methamphetamine.
¶5. Buford was indicted for the possession of more than two grams but less than ten grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139 (Rev. 2018). Prior to trial, Buford filed a motion to suppress all property and other evidence seized by law enforcement as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. Buford argued that the officers failed to obtain a warrant or consent to search his person and the house where he was residing. Therefore, he contended that the officers conducted an unlawful detention and arrest and argued that all evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.
¶6. During the suppression hearing, Buford testified that Brooks had told him to move out of the mobile home that morning. Buford stated that he told Brooks that he would be out by 5:00 p.m. that day but that Officer Easterling had arrived before he could move out. Buford testified that he told Officer Easterling to get a warrant but that Officer Easterling informed him that she would kick the door in. Buford said that, at that time, he walked to the back bedroom of the mobile home to talk to his wife. Buford's wife stated that Brooks would make him pay for the door if the police kicked it in. Buford testified that he went back into the living room, cracked the door open, and the four police officers "shoved the door in." Buford testified that he never gave the officers consent to search the home or his person.
¶7. The trial court asked Officer Winningham what basis he had to search Buford's person. He responded that he "had consent to search him for anything illegal and he authorized me to do so." The court again asked Officer Winningham what he had asked Buford. Officer Winningham responded, On cross-examination, Officer Winningham stated that he did not specifically ask for consent to search the tobacco can but said that he "asked him did he have any issues with me searching anything on him which would include that." Officer Winningham again testified that he had obtained consent to search The trial court denied Buford's motion to suppress evidence.
¶8. Buford was convicted as charged and sentenced as a subsequent drug offender and as a habitual offender to serve a term of sixteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
¶9. The Court of Appeals found that Buford had consented to the search and that the consent had encompassed the smokeless tobacco can. Buford v. State , No. 2019-KA-00024-COA, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 5793287, at *6 (Miss. App. Sept. 29, 2020). Therefore, it affirmed his conviction. Id. Buford filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court and argued that the trial court and the Court of Appeals had erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence.
¶10. The Constitution of the State of Mississippi protects people "in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search." Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23 ; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution provides greater protections to our citizens than those found within the United States Constitution." Graves v. State , 708 So. 2d 858, 861 (Miss. 1997).
¶11. Unreasonable-search-and-seizure claims require a mixed standard of review. Eaddy v. State , 63 So. 3d 1209, 1212 (Miss. 2011) (citing Dies v. State , 926 So. 2d 910, 917 (Miss. 2006) ). Id. (quoting Dies , 926 So. 2d at 917 ). "In determining whether evidence should be suppressed, a trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal absent a finding the trial court ‘applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.’ " Crawford v. State , 192 So. 3d 905, 923 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Simmons v. State , 805 So. 2d 452, 482 (Miss. 2001) ). "In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we must determine whether the trial court's findings, considering the totality of the circumstances, are supported by substantial credible evidence." Moore v. State , 933 So. 2d 910, 914 (Miss. 2006) (citing Price v. State , 752 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ).
¶12. Buford contends that the Court of Appeals overlooked his argument that his purported consent was given during a period of illegal detainment and, therefore, was ineffective. The Court of Appeals found that, because Buford's account of events was not corroborated and because he had not presented evidence that he was not free to leave the mobile home during questioning, he had not been illegally detained. Buford , ––– So.3d at –––– – ––––, 2020 WL 5793287 at *3-4.
¶13. This Court initially must consider whether a detainment occurred in this case. A person "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so ...." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed. 2d 229 (Miss. 1983) (citing United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 556, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed. 2d 497 (1980) ). "[A] show of official authority such that ‘a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave’ " amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (quoting Mendenhall , 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 ). However, "[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification." Mendenhall , 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870. Thus, the applicable test is whether "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id.
¶14. Buford argues that, "[a]t the time Buford allegedly provided consent, police had far exceeded the permissible scope of the investigatory detention at issue—to investigate Brooks' complaint that Buford was trespassing and should be removed from the trailer." Officer Easterling testified that, when she arrived at the mobile home, she began speaking to Buford at the door and that the two then moved into the living room. She stated that Buford did not ask for a search warrant or tell her not to come into the residence. She explained: Officer Easterling asked Buford if he could produce any documentation to show that he was authorized to be at the mobile home. Buford failed to produce any such documentation.
¶15. Buford asserts that when he could not produce documentation showing that he was authorized to be at the mobile home, Officer Easterling had employed the "least intrusive means" to investigate Brooks's complaint and her...
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