Bugg v. Ledford, (No. 17232.)

• Decision Date: 20 July 1926
• Docket Number: (No. 17232.)
• Citation: 35 Ga.App. 647,134 S.E. 330
• Parties: BUGG. v. LEDFORD.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

35 Ga.App. 647

134 S.E. 330

BUGG.

v.LEDFORD.

(No. 17232.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

July 20, 1926.

(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

Error from City Court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.

Suit by Jettie Ledford against B. L. Bugg, receiver. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Colquitt, Conyers & Smith, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

T. J. Lewis and T. L. Slappy, both of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

BELL, J. [1, 2] 1. "The reasonableness or unreasonableness of a city ordinance regulating the speed of engines or cars on the streets is a question of law for the court, and is not a question for the jury, unless it depends upon the existence of particular fact3 which are disputed. Such an ordinance may be reasonable as applied to one locality, and unreasonable as applied to another." Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500 (7), 16 S. E. 49; Jackson v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 140 Ga. 277 (5), 78 S. E. 1059. "To justify courts in declaring void an ordinance limiting the speed of trains within a city, its unreasonableness, or want of necessity as a police regulation for the protection of life and property, must be clear, manifest, and undoubted." Central R. & Banking Co. v. Brunswick & W. R. Co., 87 Ga. 386 (4), 13 S. E. 520.

2. An ordinance of the city of Atlanta, limiting the speed of trains to six miles per hour within the city, is, upon its face, a valid and reasonable regulation; and where the evidence showed a violation of the ordinance at a public street crossing, with resulting injury or death to a traveler in the street, the mere fact that a strict observance of the ordinance would greatly retard the work of dispatching trains, and of shifting cars in the railroad yards, would be insufficient to raise any question of fact as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the ordinance as applied to the particular locality. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500 (7), 16 S. E. 49; Broyles, Rec, v. Prisock, 97 Ga. 643 (5), 25 S. E. 389; Columbus R. Co. v. Waller, 12 Ga. App. 674 (1), 78 S. E. 52; Western & A. R. Co. v. Watkins, 14 Ga. App. 388 (6), 80 S. E. 916; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Peavler, 134 Ga. 618 (3), 68 S. E. 432; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Bond, 111 Ga. 13 (3), 36 S. E. 299; Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 20 S. Ct. 819, 44 L. Ed. 897. "The financial welfare of the company must yield to the public safety." City of Acworth v. W. & A. R. Co., 159 Ga. 610 (4), 621, 126 S. E. 454, 459.

3. Applying the above rulings, the court did not err in charging the jury that a violation of ordinance would constitute negligence, nor in failing to submit to the jury the question whether the...