Bullard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 23 February 1924 |
| Docket Number | 14505. |
| Citation | 122 S.E. 75,31 Ga.App. 641 |
| Parties | BULLARD v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
In this suit against a life insurance company, upon a policy providing that it shall "become null and void and the company will return only the premiums which have been received thereunder," if "the insured within one year from the issue hereof die by his own hand or act whether sane or insane," the evidence upon the issue of self-destruction authorized the verdict for the defendant. New York Life Ins. Co. v. King, 28 Ga.App. 607, 112 S.E. 383. Upon the other issue raised in the plea--as to whether or not the insured in his application for insurance had made a material false representation in stating that he had never had disease of the heart--the evidence likewise though slight, authorized the verdict.
The words "die by his own hand or act," as used in a life insurance policy, are in general synonomous with "voluntary suicide," and convey the idea of intentional self-destruction; but where with such words is coupled the provision "whether sane or insane," it is immaterial whether the insured at the time of the self-destruction was insane, or whether his "mental faculties were so impaired as to destroy his moral responsibility." Jenkins v. Nat. Union, 118 Ga 587, 588, 45 S.E. 449; Campbell v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 20 Ga.App. 281, 283, 93 S.E. 24; 4 Words & Phrases, Second Series, 773, 774.
(a) The defendant insurer having sufficiently pleaded and relied upon the express clause in the policy above quoted, and not upon the Georgia statute providing that "death by suicide releases the insurer from the obligation of his contract." (Civil Code of 1910, § 2500), the rule governing a defense under the statute (see Life Ass'n v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533), that the self-destruction must have been a conscious, voluntary, intentional, and rational act, was not here applicable. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v Durden, 9 Ga.App. 797, 72 S.E. 295. The court did not err in refusing to charge to the effect that the policy would not have been voided "if the insured took strychnine from an insane impulse which he had not the power to resist," so that he did not at the time have the power of volition.
(b) The court correctly charged the jury the law pertinent to the defense by the insurer under the express self-destruction clause of the policy, that it should thereby become void whether the insured was sane or insane, and that the burden was upon the defendant insurer to show that the death was not the result of natural or accidental causes, but that the insured died by his own act or hand from taking strychnine with the intention of destroying his life. The requests of the plaintiff to charge certain principles of law in this connection, so far as correct and pertinent, were covered by the instructions given.
The court did not err in charging the jury that, if the insured "did have a disease of the heart at the time he signed this application for the issuance of this insurance, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover," for the reasons contended for by the plaintiff in error, to wit, that the court thus failed to construe and define the words "heart disease," and that the evidence did not warrant such a charge. The exception as certified by the trial judge recites that the plaintiff in effect admitted during the trial that if the insured, at the time of signing the application, in fact had "heart disease," the representation was of such materiality as would defeat the plaintiff's recovery. "Where there is some evidence to show the existence of a certain state of facts, it is not error for the court to charge in reference thereto simply because the great preponderance of evidence tends to show that the supposed state of facts did not in truth exist." Lyles v. State, 130 Ga. 294 (8), 60 S.E. 578. Holland v. Long, 57 Ga. 37 (3). While there was no direct evidence that the insured had a "disease" of the heart, there was testimony that before applying for the insurance he was in the habit, as he stated on several occasions to one of the witnesses, of taking strychnine "for his heart." From this testimony and other evidence of habitual continued use of this drug, the jury were authorized to infer such an involvement of the organ as warranted the charge. In the absence of a timely written request, it was not error for the court to fail to construe and define the meaning of the term "heart disease." Holmes v. Clisby, 121 Ga. 241, 48 S.E. 934, 104 Am.St.Rep. 103; Forlaw v. Augusta Naval Stores Co., 124 Ga. 261, 52 S.E. 898; Zachary v. Zachary, 141 Ga. 404, 81 S.E. 120; Supreme Conclave v. Wood, 120 Ga. 328, 337, 47 S.E. 940.
The court charged as follows: "If you find that the defendant company has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Ross H. Ogletree made a representation that was not true, why then the plaintiff in this case would not be entitled to recover anything, and you should return a verdict for the defendant." The only exception taken to this excerpt is that it instructed the jury that, if "the insured made any representation that was not true, the plaintiff could not recover, whereas movant contends that even if Ogletree, the insured, made a representation that was not true, before it could avoid the policy it...
To continue reading
Request your trial