Bunch v. Division of Employment Sec., WD
| Decision Date | 24 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 965 S.W.2d 874 |
| Parties | John D. BUNCH, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent. 54138. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jeffrey L. Dull, Windsor, for appellant.
Sharon A. Willis, Kansas City, for respondent.
Before ULRICH, C.J., P.J., and SMART and LAURA DENVIR STITH, JJ.
John D. Bunch quit his job as a custodian at Green Ridge School on September 9, 1996. He filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Division of Employment Security on September 12, 1996. A deputy with the division determined that Mr. Bunch left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or his employer. The Appeals Tribunal affirmed the deputy's determination. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") affirmed the decision of the tribunal. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Bunch left his job without good cause attributable to the work or to his employer. The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Bunch was employed by the Pettis County School District R-VIII as a night custodian at Green Ridge School. When Mr. Bunch began his employment, in September 1995, his supervisor was Kathleen Reusch. A new custodial supervisor, Marji McCallister, was in charge during the 1996-1997 school year. There was also a new superintendent of schools, Dr. Larry Weible. At the beginning of the school year, Ms. McCallister provided Mr. Bunch a list of his new duties. One full-time custodian retired the previous year and this custodian's duties were absorbed by the remaining custodians. Ms. McCallister assigned additional areas of custodial responsibility to Mr. Bunch. Mr. Bunch was given the assignment of cleaning six additional rooms in addition to the eight rooms that he had previously been assigned to clean. The time that he had to clean hallways was reduced, as was his break time. The day custodians were also given additional duties. Although the two day custodians were not enthusiastic about being given additional assignments, neither quit nor indicated that they were not able to perform the additional work. None of the custodians had been reprimanded for being unable to complete their tasks.
Mr. Bunch believed that it was not possible for him to clean the rooms in the time allotted and still do a quality job. He was concerned that he would not be able to satisfactorily perform all of the assigned work and that there would be complaints from the teachers. Mr. Bunch discussed his concerns with his immediate supervisor. He also talked with the superintendent. Some of his duties were briefly removed from his schedule.
On September 9, 1996, the superintendent told Mr. Bunch that he would remove three rooms for which Mr. Bunch had custodial responsibility from the schedule. That change then left Mr. Bunch with responsibility for two additional classrooms and the library. Mr. Bunch was cordial, and said he understood, but told the superintendent that he could not perform the assigned duties and would not be returning to work.
After Mr. Bunch resigned, he applied for unemployment compensation benefits. A deputy for the Division of Employment Security determined that Mr. Bunch had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer. Mr. Bunch appealed the decision. The Appeals Tribunal affirmed the deputy's decision, finding:
In the case at hand, the claimant quit rather than speed up and lower his quality standards. Although the employer had made changes in the claimant's working conditions, this Tribunal concludes that these changes were not so substantial as to cause most reasonable and prudent persons, wishing to keep working, to give up the certain wage rewards connected with employment. Any concerns the claimant had regarding future complaints or reprimands were not present at the time he decided to quit. Good faith demanded that the claimant work with the employer on these changes and face any difficulties in the future when and if those difficulties arose. Accordingly, this Tribunal concludes that the claimant voluntarily left his employment on September 9, 1996, without good cause attributable to his work or employer.
Mr. Bunch appealed to the Commission. It affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal and adopted it as the decision of the Commission. One member of the Commission dissented. The dissenting member opined that the major changes in Mr. Bunch's duties constituted good cause to quit.
Mr. Bunch appeals.
Section 288.210, RSMo Supp.1996, provides, in pertinent part:
.... The findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the appellate court shall be confined to questions of law. The court, on appeal, may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the decision of the commission on the following grounds and no other:
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the decision was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the award; or
(4) That there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
This court is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or the Commission's application of law to the facts. Division of Employment Sec. v. Taney County Dist. R-III, 922 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Mo. banc 1996).
In Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 571 (Mo.App.1995), this court outlined the process for review of an award made by the Commission in worker's compensation decisions. In Travelers Equities Sales, Inc. v. Division of Employment Sec., 927 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Mo.App.1996) we held that the Davis standard was applicable to employment security decisions as well. Review is a two-step process. First, an appellate court must determine whether the whole record, viewed in the light most favorable to the decision, contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. Davis, 903 S.W.2d at 571. If it does, the court, in the second step, makes a determination as to whether the decision is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. In this second step, the reviewing ...
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