Bunker R-III School Dist. v. Hodge, R-III

• Decision Date: 11 March 1986
• Docket Number: R-I,R-III,R-9,No. 14093,14093
• Citation: 709 S.W.2d 884
• Parties: 32 Ed. Law Rep. 852 BUNKERSCHOOL DISTRICT, Mountain View-Birch TreeSchool District, and WinonaSchool District, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. J.D. HODGE, Reber Keeling, and Jerry Dailey, Judges of the Shannon County, Missouri, Court, Donald D. Searcy, Treasurer of Shannon County, Missouri, Mae Ruth Meade, County Clerk of Shannon County, Missouri, EminenceSchool District, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 884

709 S.W.2d 884

32 Ed. Law Rep. 852

BUNKER R-III SCHOOL DISTRICT, Mountain View-Birch Tree R-9 School District, and Winona R-III School District Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. J.D. HODGE, Reber Keeling, and Jerry Dailey, Judges of the Shannon County, Missouri, Court, Donald D. Searcy, Treasurer of Shannon County, Missouri, Mae Ruth Meade, County Clerk of Shannon County, Missouri, Eminence R-I School District Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14093.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Three.

March 11, 1986.

Motion for Rehearing and to Transfer

Denied April 1, 1986.

Application to Transfer Denied

May 13, 1986.

Bonnie G. Keaton, Eminence, David R. Orzel, Farmington, for defendants-appellants.

Lindal D. Hackworth, Piedmont, for plaintiffs-respondents.

MAUS, Judge.

On August 12, 1982, the County Court of Shannon County entered an order apportioning and distributing "national forest reserve funds" among four school districts. Three of those districts brought this action against the county court to declare the apportionment invalid and enjoin the distribution of those funds. The first trial court denied the relief sought. Upon appeal the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for joinder of an additional school district. Bunker R-III School Dist. v. Hodge, 666 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.App.1984). Upon remand there was a change of judge. The cause was submitted upon the record of the previous trial and the second trial court granted the relief sought. The county court and the additional school district appeal.

A detailed preliminary statement of the facts is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal. A thorough and complete statement of the applicable statutes and the facts may be found in Eminence R-1 School Dist. v. Hodge, 635 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.1982) and Bunker R-III School Dist. v. Hodge, supra. For a sketch of the pertinent facts, liberal use has been made of the latter opinion with grateful acknowledgment to Judge Crow.

Section 12.070, RSMo 1978, governs the distribution of the national forest reserve funds. Those funds received by the state are distributed to the counties in the proportion that the area of the forest in each county bears to the total area of the forest in the state. That statute directs that in each county those funds shall be expended as follows: 75 percent for the public schools and 25 percent for roads in the county. It more specifically states "[t]he funds shall be used to aid in maintaining the schools and roads of those school districts that lie or are situated partly or wholly within or adjacent to the national forest in the county." § 12.070.

Three school districts in Shannon County lie partly within the Mark Twain National Forest: Bunker R-III ("Bunker"), Mountain View-Birch Tree R-9 ("Mountain View"), and Winona R-III ("Winona"). Another Shannon County school district, Eminence R-1 ("Eminence"), lies adjacent to the Mark Twain National Forest, but no part of the Eminence district lies within the Forest.

For the year in question, the county court determined 15 percent of the funds were from sale of timber and 85 percent from mineral activity. The timber funds were distributed under an "acreage" formula. Those funds were allocated upon the ratio of the number of forest acres in the school district to the total number of forest acres in the county. A judge of the county court testified the timber funds were distributed on that basis to exclude Eminence because only Eminence received $2,800 by reason of the Scenic Riverways allocation.

The mineral funds were allocated under what the witnesses cryptically referred to as "based on valuation, inverse valuation." Without further explanation, it was said that formula had been adopted by the county court four years ago. The details of that formula were not further developed in the evidence. In Bunker it was observed,

plaintiff's brief states that the school district with the highest assessed valuation was used as a reference so that it received one share or unit, and the other districts received that number of shares as was represented by a fraction in which the highest assessed valuation was the numerator and each other district's assessed valuation was the denominator.

Bunker R-III School Dist. v. Hodge, supra, at 22. The respondents' brief on this appeal contains a similar reference in a footnote. As in Bunker, that reference is not challenged. It may be assumed to be correct. However, that reference does not comport with testimony that the formula was prepared to "take care of specifically the Winona School since they had the most acreage, the largest amount of money."

The distribution in the order of August 12, 1982, was:

School Timber Mineral

District Funds Funds Total

------------- ------- -------- --------

Winona $15,570 $79,134 $94,704

Bunker 8,046 11,990 20,036

Mountain View 4,528 19,664 24,192

Eminence 0 48,678 48,678

------- -------- --------

Total $28,144 $159,466 $187,610

As stated, plaintiffs Bunker, Mountain View and Winona by their petition alleged the distribution on the basis of the inverse assessed valuation formula was invalid. The second trial court agreed.

Eminence has filed a motion that this appeal be transferred to the Supreme Court. It asserts jurisdiction is in that court because disposition of this appeal involves the construction of a revenue law within the meaning of Mo. Const. Art. V, § 3, (amended 1982). However, that constitutional provision does not require transfer when the revenue law has been construed and an appeal can be disposed of by the application of that construction. Hermel, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. banc 1978); Browning-Ferris Ind. of Kansas City v. Dance, 671 S.W.2d 801 (Mo.App.1984). The application of the construction of § 12.070 in Eminence, answers the issues presented. Cf. Bunker R-III School Dist. v. Hodge, supra. The motion is denied.

This appeal is marked by the fact one trial court denied and a second trial court granted the relief sought upon the basis of the same record. The first trial court determined it could not find "as a matter of law, that the formula for distribution by the County Court amounted to an abuse or an arbitrary exercise of the County Court's discretion." The second judgment, from which this appeal was taken, was premised upon a finding "the evidence fails to show that the Defendant, Shannon County Court, made a determination of the relative impact of the national forest in each eligible school district." The contrast between those findings demonstrates the legal concepts that are determinative of this appeal. The decisive concepts are the function of the county court in entering the order of August 12, 1982, the scope of the review of that order by the circuit court, and the recognition of the party bearing the burden of proof upon that review. The parties did not proceed upon the basis of those concepts. This is demonstrated by the allegation of the plaintiffs' petition that the order of August 12, 1982, was entered without notice to and the opportunity of any of the plaintiffs to present evidence. It is also illustrated by the presentation of much testimony dealing with what, in the absence of collusion or fraud, are immaterial issues. Such evidence includes the following: who prepared the inverse valuation formula; who was expressly invited to have an input on the order of distribution; and the time at which one of the county judges made up his mind to vote for the distribution in question.

Under the Constitution of 1945, as amended, the county court is not a judicial court. Hedges v. County Court for Ray County, 581 S.W.2d 73 (Mo.App.1979). It is now denominated the County Commission. § 49.010, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984 (effective 1-1-85). In some instances that body may exercise legislative power, but in general it functions as an administrative agency. See State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1984). Where judicial review is not provided by a special statute, statutory judicial review of its action may be provided by § 49.230 (appeal) (amended RSMo Supp.1985 (effective 1-1-85)), § 536.100 (review of contested cases), or § 536.150 (review of non-contested cases). Hedges v. County Court for Ray County, supra. Cf. Rule 100.01.

This action does not fall within the purview of any of those statutes. It is not an appeal from an order of the county court of a quasi-judicial nature affecting private rights as those terms were used in § 49.230. See State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, supra; Hedges v. County Court for Ray County, supra. Nor is the order in question a final decision in a "contested case" subject to review under § 536.100. See City of Richmond Heights v. Bd. of Equalization, 586 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. banc 1979). Nor is it subject to review under § 536.150. It is inconceivable the legislature intended this function of county government to be subject to the de novo type of judicial review provided by § 536.150. See Long v. Bates County Memorial Hosp., 667 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.App.1983); Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 645 S.W.2d 91 (Mo.App.1982). For example, see Cox Chapel Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Atchison Co. Sup. of Sch., 429 S.W.2d 348 (Mo.App.1968). However, it is not necessary to decide if review under § 536.150 is inapplicable for other reasons. It is sufficient to observe, "[t]his section clearly comprehends only decisions involving individual rights and interests." May Department Stores Co. v. State Tax Commission, 308 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Mo.1958). Also see State ex rel. Brentwood School District v. State Tax Commission, 589 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. banc 1979); State ex rel. St. Francois C.S.D. R-III v. Lalumondier, 518 S.W.2d 638 (Mo.1975). The order of August 12, 1982, was not such a decision.

The plaintiffs' assertion of the invalidity of that order is cognizable only as an attack upon the basis of common law principles by an action for a declaratory judgment and injunction. Upon such an attack "the...