Burchfield v. State

• Decision Date: 04 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CT-00261-SCT.,2002-CT-00261-SCT.
• Citation: 892 So.2d 191
• Parties: Christopher BURCHFIELD v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

892 So.2d 191

Christopher BURCHFIELD v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2002-CT-00261-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 4, 2004.

Jack R. Jones, III, Southaven, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DICKINSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Methamphetamine, or "crystal meth," is not difficult to manufacture. The ingredients may be extracted from widely-available (and otherwise legal) products such as flashlight batteries and non-prescription sinus and cold medication.¹ This unfortunate fact led our Legislature to enact several laws which, under certain circumstances, criminalize the possession of large quantities of one or more of these ingredients. For instance, the statute in issue in this case states:

It is unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, transfer or distribute two hundred fifty (250) dosage units or fifteen (15) grams in weight (dosage unit and weight as defined in Section 41-29-139) of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the pseudoephedrine or ephedrine will be used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance.

Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-313(2)(c) (Rev.2001).

¶ 2. Additionally, it is not uncommon for law enforcement officials to request that drug stores, grocery stores, and other outlets be on the lookout for, and report, persons purchasing large quantities of products such as Sudafed.

¶ 3. In the case before us today, the defendant was reported by a Walgreens clerk to have purchased a quantity of pills containing pseudoephedrine. He was arrested and convicted of possession of the pseudoephedrine, with knowledge that it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. He now challenges the conviction, asking us to decide several issues, including one of first impression in Mississippi.

FACTS

¶ 4. On May 29, 2001, a Walgreens clerk called officer Brian Bradley² to report that two white males had just purchased a quantity of pseudoephedrine, and were leaving the parking lot in a silver Cadillac with Arkansas license plates, traveling westbound on Goodman Road from Highway 51. Officer Bradley reported the call to dispatch, who reported it to on-duty officers. ¶ 5. Patrol Sergeant Kevin Thomas heard the call and immediately proceeded to Goodman Road, where he spotted the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. While talking with the driver of the Cadillac, officer Thomas noticed a Walgreens bag on the back seat containing two boxes of ephedrine. Officer Thomas requested, and received, permission to search the vehicle, in which he found two different bags of ephedrine, one from Walgreens and the other from Seessels, together containing 864 unit dosages (pills) of ephedrine. One of the bags was located in the trunk.

¶ 6. Officer Bradley then arrived on the scene and questioned Burchfield, who stated that he and his companion were in the area buying pseudoephedrine, or ephedrine, for the purpose of reselling it. Burchfield was arrested and indicted for possession of 250 dosage units of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, with knowledge that it would be used to manufacture a controlled substance.

¶ 7. Burchfield's case came to trial on February 13, 2002. He was convicted and, even though he was a first offender, was sentenced to five years, the maximum for the crime.

¶ 8. Burchfield's appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction. Burchfield v. State, No.2002-KA-00261-COA, 892 So.2d 248, 2004 WL 1244746 (Miss.Ct.App.2004). Burchfield then filed with this Court his petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted in order to clarify an issue of first impression. We now finally decide the case by addressing four of the six issues raised by Burchfield.

ANALYSIS

1. Motion to suppress

¶ 9. Burchfield claims the police lacked probable cause to make the stop and search the vehicle in which he was a passenger. We looked at this precise question recently in Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 826 (Miss.2004), where, speaking thorough Presiding Justice Waller, we stated that

[t]he constitutional requirements for an investigative stop and detention are less stringent than those for an arrest. An investigative stop of a suspect may be made so long as an officer has "a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person he encounters was involved in or is wanted in connection with a felony." Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 114 (Miss.1999). Put another way, the investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to conduct a brief investigative stop if the officer had a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, result in the conclusion that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904-05 (1968).

¶ 10. We also faced almost identical facts in Williamson v. State, 876 So.2d 353 (Miss.2004), wherein we stated:

The United States Supreme Court has held that "there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits `sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.'" Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)).

This Court has also held that "[r]easonable cause for an investigatory stop may be based on an officer's personal observation or on an informant's tip if it bears indicia of reliability." Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 118 (Miss.1999). "Reasonable suspicion is dependent upon the content of the information possessed by the detaining officer as well as its degree of reliability." Id. "Both factors — quantity and quality — are considered in the `totality of the circumstances'"

Williamson v. State, 876 So.2d at 355.

¶ 11. In the case before us today, the police were informed by a Walgreens clerk that two white males in a Cadillac with Arkansas license plates had each purchased a quantity of pills containing pseudoephedrine and were leaving the parking lot, westbound on Goodman Road from Highway 51. Within minutes, officer Thomas spotted two white males in a Cadillac with Arkansas license plates, on Goodman Road. Under these circumstances, we find (as we did in Walker and Williamson) that officer Thomas had a reasonable suspicion which justified an investigatory stop. After the stop, officer Thomas personally observed on the back seat a sack containing packages of pills containing pseudoephedrine. He then obtained permission for the search which yielded the evidence used against Burchfield. The conduct of the Horn Lake police was entirely appropriate and constitutional, and this assignment of error is, therefore, without merit.

2. Expert testimony in crystal methamphetamine production

¶ 12. Officer Johnny Cox was called as an expert to testify about the manufacture of methamphetamine and to explain the ingredients and steps necessary to produce the drug. Burchfield claims this testimony was prejudicial, particularly since he was not on trial for manufacturing the drug. Raising a pretrial objection to the proposed testimony of Officer Cox, Burchfield's counsel stated:

And last, Your Honor, it's my understand that they're going to call Johnny Cox ... as an expert in this meth stuff, and its going to a test — you've got to scientifically accept testimony which is relative for probative value, and we challenge that as not being a scientifically based accepted type of expert witness, which would be probative in this case. So based on the Fry ruling, we ask the Court to exclude that evidence.

The prosecutor responded to the request by stating that Officer Cox would be called "to explain to the jury exactly how the controlled substance Methamphetamine is manufactured and specifically what part of that process the role of Pseudoephedrine, which is the primary agent."

¶ 13. Burchfield's counsel responded by saying, "He's either in possession of it or not, and he was trying to manufacture and make Meth I think would be prejudicial." He then concluded the discussion by stating that the prosecutor had disclosed to him that Cox would be called "basically for that purpose."

¶ 14. It appears that Burchfield's counsel is taking the position that, since Burchfield has not been charged with the manufacture of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, any testimony about the manufacture of the drugs would be unnecessary and would unfairly prejudice Burchfield.

¶ 15. However, one of the elements necessary for the State to prove against Burchfield was that he knew, or reasonably should have known, that the ephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. Officer Cox was properly qualified to provide the testimony. Furthermore, he went no further than was necessary to demonstrate a link between the pseudoephedrine found in the car, Burchfield's statement that he intended to sell the pills, and the manufacture of a controlled substance. This assignment of error has no merit.

3. Use of label to identify the pseudoephedrine

¶ 16. As part of its prima facie case, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the pills found in the back seat and trunk contained pseudoephedrine or ephedrine. Rather than having the pills analyzed by a toxicologist, the State offered the package labels which disclosed the ingredients — one of which was pseudoephedrine. Because Burchfield claims to have objected to this evidence, we find it necessary to track the issue from the pretrial motions to the admission into evidence of the boxes containing the pills.

¶ 17. Prior to trial, Burchfield raised several issues, none of which related to the use of the label to identify the...