Burrell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-cv-5127
• Citation: 163 F.Supp.3d 509
• Parties: Larita Burrell, Plaintiff, v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

163 F.Supp.3d 509

Larita Burrell, Plaintiff,

v.United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-5127

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed February 16, 2016

Robert L. Anderson, Jenkins & Anderson, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Scott Piell, Quarles & Brady LLP, William A. Walden, Quarles & Brady, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Robert M. Dow, Jr.

, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment [21]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion [21] is granted.

I. Background

A. Statements of Fact

The Court takes the relevant facts from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a statement of material facts as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue and entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law. The rule permits a movant to file up to 80 separately-numbered statements of undisputed facts. L.R. 56.1(a)

. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment is required to file and serve “a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain * * * a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” L.R. 56.1(b). The opposing party is also entitled to file up to 40 separately-numbered material facts that require the denial of summary judgment, which the movant can then address in a concise response. L.R. 56.1(a), (b).

“Compliance with local rules like Rule 56.1

ensures the facts material to the issues in the case and the evidence supporting such facts are clearly organized and presented for the court's summary judgment determination.” Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 807 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir.2015). The Seventh Circuit “has repeatedly held that the district court is within its discretion to strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary-judgment motions.” Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP , 796 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir.2015) (citing Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir.2009) ). District courts are not obliged to scour the record looking for factual disputes. Id. (citing Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1994) ).

Here, Defendant complied with Local Rule 56.1

by submitting 73 separately-numbered statements of undisputed material fact along with its motion for summary judgment and its memorandum in support of that motion. [See 21–24, 26.] Plaintiff, who has been represented by counsel throughout this litigation, failed to comply with the local rule. Specifically, Plaintiff did not file a supporting memorandum of law, as required by Local Rule 56.1(b)(2).¹ Instead, despite having approximately four months to file its response, Plaintiff ultimately filed (1) a “response to [Defendant's] uncontested facts re: summary judgment,” and (2) a declaration. Plaintiff's response to Defendant's statement of undisputed facts begins by objecting, in a lengthy narrative format, to various allegations in Defendant's statement of facts (i.e. , paragraphs 11, 24, 29, 33, 45, 54–72). [See 40, ¶¶ 1–5.] For the most part, Plaintiff does not include “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, [or] other supporting materials relied upon” in objecting to Defendant's statements, as required by L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)

.² In addition, Plaintiff's objections contain argument and information not responsive to or extraneous to the paragraph to which Plaintiff is responding. Because Plaintiff's responses are improper, Defendant's fact statements (paragraphs 11, 24, 29, 33, 45, 54–72) will be admitted. See, e.g. , Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc. , 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.2003) ); Nehan v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc. , 54 F.Supp.3d 957, 960–61 (N.D.Ill.2014) (“To the extent that [plaintiff] fails to effectively dispute facts properly set forth and supported by [defendant], those facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion.”). Further, because Plaintiff did not object to Defendant's remaining statements (paragraphs 1–10, 12–23, 25–28, 30–32, 34–44, 46–53, and 73), and because Defendant's statements are properly supported by citations to the record, they are also deemed admitted for purposes of this motion.

The remaining portion of Plaintiff's response to Defendant's statement of undisputed facts [see 40, ¶¶ 6–46] appears to be Plaintiff's statement of additional material facts that require denial of summary judgment, per Local Rule 56(b)(3)(C). The Court assumes this based on the fact that many of the paragraphs include citations to Plaintiff's declaration or exhibits attached to that declaration (all but paragraphs 11, 17–18, and 35). However, because Plaintiff must support all alleged facts with admissible evidence, paragraphs 11, 17–18, and 35 are stricken. See L.R. 56.1

; Curtis , 807 F.3d at 219. As to the remaining statements, the Seventh Circuit “do[es] not allow litigants to manufacture material fact questions by affidavit testimony that contradicts prior sworn testimony.” United States v. Funds in Amount of $100,120 , 730 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir.2013). Thus, to show a dispute of material fact, Plaintiff's affidavit testimony must actually contradict a material fact as presented by Defendant while not contradicting Plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony, or must have some independent evidentiary basis besides Plaintiff's affidavit testimony.

While it is not the Court's job to sift through the record to find evidence to support a party's claim, see Davis v. Carter , 452 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir.2006)

, the Court will endeavor to take all of Plaintiff's alleged factual statements into account when assessing Defendant's arguments. Modrowski v. Pigatto , 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir.2013) (making clear that, although district courts have discretion to require strict compliance with Rule 56.1, “[i]t does not follow * * * that district courts cannot exercise their discretion in a more lenient direction: litigants have no right to demand strict enforcement of local rules by district judges”). That being said, the Seventh Circuit is “highly critical of efforts to patch up a party's deposition with his own subsequent affidavit.”

Russell v. Acme–Ev ans Co. , 51 F.3d 64, 67 (7th Cir.1995)

. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff's post-deposition affidavits conflict with deposition testimony in the record, the assertions in the affidavits will be disregarded.³ See Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau , 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. A & E Oil, Inc. , 503 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.2007) ) (“[L]itigants cannot create sham issues of fact with affidavits that contradict their prior depositions.”).

B. Facts

1. Plaintiff's Employment at UPS

Plaintiff began working at UPS in September 2005 at the company's Jefferson Street facility in downtown Chicago. More specifically, Plaintiff worked out of the University Center of the Jefferson Street facility, which is one of the four package centers at that location. In October 2011, Plaintiff became a full time package car driver at that facility—a position that she still holds today. At all times relevant to this motion, Plaintiff has been a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union Local 705, and the collective bargaining agreement between Local 705 and UPS governs the terms of her employment.

The University Center at the Jefferson Street UPS facility handles approximately 80 delivery routes. There are two types of delivery drivers at the facility: (1) permanent drivers, who are assigned a specific delivery route on a permanent basis (i.e. , until he or she surrenders the route or retires), and (2) “swing” drivers, who cover delivery routes when permanent drivers are absent. By choice, Plaintiff has always been a swing driver. Swing drivers obtain routes through a weekly bid process, wherein they bid on and receive routes based on driver seniority. Plaintiff testified that there were always routes available at the University Center for her, given her seniority, to bid for and receive a route.

2. Sexual Harassment

Plaintiff complains of three instances of sexual harassment, all involving her coworker Michael Adams. Mr. Adams began working as a full-time delivery driver at UPS's Jefferson Street facility in 2006. Because he started as a full-time driver before Plaintiff, he was the more senior driver and thus had priority over Plaintiff with respect to driving routes. But Mr. Adams has never held a management position at UPS, and he has never had the authority to change any aspect of Plaintiff's employment (e.g. , hire her, fire her, discipline her, change her pay, determine her work assignments, etc.).

According to Plaintiff, the first instance of harassment occurred in July 2012, when Plaintiff overheard a conversation between Michael Adams and a Supervisor named Larry Davis. Mr. Adams was complaining to Mr. Davis because Plaintiff was assigned to a route that he wanted. Plaintiff describes the conversation as follows:

[Michael Adams] got upset because I was going to do a route that he wanted to do. So he told Larry, you know, Davis, that he's taking me too personal, like, you messing with her or something. * * * [H]e said something about y'all, like we sleeping together.

[24-4, at 33.] In other words, Mr. Adams implied that Plaintiff only got the route in question because she was sleeping with the supervisor. Plaintiff says that after Mr. Adams made this comment, “Larry [Davis] instantly took him to the office with [Manager Ibrahim Hasan]. And [Adams] came back and apologized, so [she] left it alone.” [Id. ]

The second and third instances of harassment...