State v. Hunt, 75-951

Decision Date21 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. 75-951,75-951
Citation351 N.E.2d 106,1 O.O.3d 99,47 Ohio St.2d 170
Parties, 1 O.O.3d 99 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HUNT, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Where the accused in a criminal case is found imcompetent to stand trial and is committed to Lima State Hospital pursuant to R.C. 2945.38, such finding is not a final order.

In March 1974, appellant, James Robert Hunt, was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated murder. Appellant is a deafmute and, although capable of communicating rudimentarily by universal sign and finger language, is functionally illiterate.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and was committed by the Court of Common Pleas to Lima State Hospital for a determination of his mental condition and competency to stand trial. Subsequently, appellant was transferred to Columbus State Hospital for a more thorough examination.

At the close of the competency hearing in August 1974, the court found that appellant was unable to stand trial and that he was not sane. Therefore, the court ordered that he be committed to Lima State Hospital until restored to reason or for a period of two years, whichever occurs first. Additionally, the order directed the authorities at Lima to transfer appellant to an institution or school where his communicative skills could be enlarged.

Appellant's appeal of the order was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the basis that no final appealable order had been entered by the trial court.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

Richard G. Ward, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee.

Thomas L. Twyford and David Riebel, Columbus, for appellant.

HERBERT, Justice.

The initial question before us is whether the trial court's order committing appellant to Lima State Hospital was a final order.

In formerly considering the appellate review of a judgment rendered in a sanity or competency hearing under the predecessor of R.C. 2945.38, 1 this court determined that a verdict finding the accused sane was not appealable prior to a conviction. See Inskeep v. State (1880), 35 Ohio St. 482; State v. Hagert (1944), 144 Ohio St. 316, 58 N.E.2d 764. However, because the consequences of a finding of insanity are significantly different from when the accused is found sane and capable of standing trial, our decisions in Inskeep and Hagert are not dispositive of the issue herein.

A split of authority exists in jurisdictions with have considered the question of whether the accused can appeal from a finding of insanity prior to trial. In decisions which have held that such orders are not appealable, the courts have emphasized that a finding of insanity or incompetency is merely preliminary and collateral to the main issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and to allow an appeal would only serve to delay a determination on the criminal charges. 2

On the other hand, some states have determined that these findings are appealable by pointing to the fact that the accused's trial may be delayed indefinitely if he did not receive a speedy review of his condition and remained committed for a long period of time. 3

Although there is merit in the rationale of those decisions which allow an appeal because of a possible long term commitment, those cases did not involve the situation, as in the case at bar, where the court set a limit on the duration of the commitment.

Additionally, R.C. 2945.381 provides safeguards for review of a commitment order by stating, in pertinent part:

'If an accused person is committed to a hospital under section 2945.38 of the Revised Code, and thereafter it comes to the attention of the court by the filing of a certificate of psychiatrist or a licensed clinical psychologist and physician on the staff of the hospital to which the accused was committed, that there is not a substantial probability that the accused will in the foreseeable future possess the requisite mental competency to stand trial and that the accused is a mentally ill or mentally retarded person, the committing court upon receipt of such certificate shall within thirty days conduct a hearing to show cause why the accused should not be released from commitment under section 2945.38 of the Revised Code, and be involuntarily committed pursuant to sections 5122.11 to 5122.16 of the Revised Code if the accused is alleged to be mentally ill, or pursuant to sections 5123.71 to 5123.76 of the Revised Code if the accused is alleged to be mentally retarded, through the probate division of the common pleas court of the county in which the individual was accused.

'Not later than one year after an accused is committed, if no certificate is filed and the accused has not been returned for trial, the head of the hospital to which the accused is committed shall so notify the committing court in writing. Within thirty days of the receipt of such a notice, the committing court shall conduct the hearing required by this section to show cause why the accused should not be released from commitment under section 2945.38 of the Revised Code, and be involuntarily committed pursuant to sections 5122.11 to 5122.16 of the Revised Code if the accused is alleged to be mentally ill, or pursuant to sections 5123.71 to 5123.76 of the Revised Code if the accused is alleged to be mentally retarded, through the probate division of the common pleas court of the county in which the individual was accused.'

As can be seen, R.C. 2945.381 mandates that the mental condition of the accused must be reviewed no later than one year after commitment. Also, R.C. 2945.381 implements the requirements set forth in Burton v. Reshetylo (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 35, 309 N.E.2d 907, that an accused, committed pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38, can be held only for the period of time reasonably necessary to determine whether it is probable that he will attain the mental competency required to stand trial in the foreseeable future, and that he be given the full panoply of civil commitment rights if it is unlikely he will ever attain such competency. By providing for review of the accused's mental condition in the above manner and, in effect, prohibiting indefinite commitments, R.C. 2945.381 effectively deals with those concerns which would support a need for judicial review of a finding of insanity or incompetency under R.C. 2945.38.

The scope of review in a criminal case is delineated by R.C. Chapter 2953 which provides for appeals from 'judgments' or 'final orders.' See R.C. 2953.02, 2953.04 and 2953.05. Generally, the sentence in a criminal case is the judgment. Miller v. Aderhold (1933), 288 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 325, 77 L.Ed. 702; Berman v. United States (1937), 302 U.S. 211, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204; State v. Chamberlain (1964), 177 Ohio St. 104, 202 N.E.2d 695; Columbus v. Stires (1967), 9 Ohio App.2d 315, 224 N.E.2d 369. In the case before us, there has been no imposition of sentence. See State v. Chamberlain, supra. Furthermore, it is our opinion that the findings of a competency hearing, which is preliminary and collateral to a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence, is not a 'final order' as defined in R.C. 2505.02. 4

For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that where the accused in a criminal case is found incompetent to stand trial and is committed to Lima State Hospital pursuant to R.C. 2945.38, such finding is not a final order.

Appellant contends further that the trial court abused its discretion by setting a two-year limit on the length of the commitment.

It can be observed from a reading of R.C. 2945.38, supra, fn. 1, that a court is not specifically empowered to place limits on the duration of a commitment. Nevertheless, the trial judge's actions in this cause must be viewed in light of decisions of this court and the United States Supreme Court which preceded his order.

In Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, the Supreme Court held that Indiana's indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on his lack of capacity to stand trial violated the accused's due process rights, and that one could not be held more than the reasonable time necessary to determine if he will attain that competency in the foreseeable future. Because R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38, 5 in effect, provided for the indefinite commitment of the accused, this court followed the Jackson holding in its syllabus in Burton v. Reshetylo, supra, 38 Ohio St.2d 35.

Faced with that precedent and the fact that R.C. 2945.38 was not then complemented by the review procedures within R.C. 2945.381, the trial judge, by limiting the commitment to two years, obviously attempted to square the mandates of Jackson and Burton with the indefinite commitment aspects of R.C. 2945.38. Thus, under those circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the two-year limit. 6

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

C. WILLIAM O'NEILL, C. J., and J. J. P. CORRIGAN, CELEBREZZE, WILLIAM B. BROWN and PAUL W. BROWN, JJ., concur.

STERN, Justice (dissenting).

As the majority opinion states, appellant is a deaf mute, who is also functionally illiterate and capable of communicating by universal sign and finger language in only a rudimentary fashion. He was indicted for aggravated murder and thereafter committed for examination to determine his mental condition and competency to stand trial. What the majority fails to mention is the result of that examination. The report of Columbus State Hospital stated that:

'* * * (The accused) does not show any obvious existence of psychosis or other mental disorder which would benefit from psychiatric treatment, but he certainly would benefit from continuous education and training in a special school for the deaf.

'It was the opinion of the staff that his ability to fully comprehend the nature and the quality of charges against him are (sic) limited by his...

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