Butler v. Killoran, X-R

• Citation: 714 A.2d 129
• Decision Date: 15 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. C,X-R,C
• Parties: Walter K. BUTLER, III v. Paul J. KILLORAN, M.D.; Pen-Bayay Associates; and Penobscot Bay Medical Center. um-97-311.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Page 129

714 A.2d 129

1998 ME 147

Walter K. BUTLER, III v. Paul J. KILLORAN, M.D.; Pen-Bay X-Ray Associates; and Penobscot Bay Medical Center.

No. Cum-97-311.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Dec. 2, 1997.

Decided June 15, 1998.

David D. Gregory (orally), John A. McArdle, III, Campbell & McArdle, P.A., Portland, for plaintiff.

David L. Herzer, Jr. (orally), David C. Norman, Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, Portland, for Killoran and Pen-Bay X-Ray Assoc.

Carrie A. Green (orally), Daniel Rapaport, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, L.L.C., Portland, for Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and SAUFLEY, JJ.

LIPEZ, Justice.

¶1 Walter K. Butler, III, the personal representative of the estate of Martha Butler, appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Calkins, J.) granting the Defendants' motions for a summary judgment on Butler's notice of claim for wrongful death arising from medical malpractice. Butler argues that the court erred by applying the three-year statute of limitations for professional negligence pursuant to the Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2985 (1990 & Pamph.1997) to determine that his cause of action was time-barred, and that the court should have applied the two-year statute of limitations pursuant to Maine's Wrongful Death Act, 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-804 (1998), to find that his cause of action was timely. We affirm the judgment.

I.

¶2 On September 18, 1996, Walter K. Butler, III, the personal representative of the estate of Martha Butler, filed a notice of claim ¹ against Paul Killoran, M.D., Pen-Bay X-Ray Associates, and Penobscot Bay Medical Center seeking relief pursuant to 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-804, Maine's wrongful death statute. In pertinent part, the notice of claim alleged that on August 7, 1992, the Defendants caused an MRI to be performed on Martha's brain; that they negligently failed to detect on the MRI film an otherwise treatable brain aneurysm; and that the aneurysm burst on October 8, 1994, resulting in Martha's death two days later on October 10, 1994.

¶3 The Defendants filed motions for a summary judgment, arguing that the Health Security Act's three year limitations period, running from the date of the Defendants' alleged negligence in 1992, had expired before Butler commenced his cause of action in 1996. ² Butler opposed the motions, arguing that the Wrongful Death Act's two-year limitations period, running from the date of Martha's death in 1994, controlled his cause of action. The court granted a summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Butler's cause of action was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for professional negligence claims pursuant to section 2902 of the Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S.A. §§ 2501-2985. This appeal followed.

II.

¶4 The issue before us is whether a cause of action for wrongful death arising from professional negligence must be commenced within the statute of limitations set forth in Maine's Wrongful Death Act (WDA), 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-804, ³ or within the statute of limitations set forth in the Health Security Act (HSA), 24 M.R.S.A. § 2902. Pursuant to the WDA, a plaintiff must commence the action for wrongful death within two years after the decedent's death. See 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-804(b). Thus, if the WDA's statute of limitations is applied to Butler's claim, his cause of action is timely. Pursuant to the HSA, however, "actions for professional negligence" must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. See 24 M.R.S.A. § 2902. An "action for professional negligence" is defined in section 2502 as

any action for damages for injury or death against any health care provider, its agents or employees, or health care practitioner, his agents or employees, whether based upon tort or breach of contract or otherwise, arising out of the provision or failure to provide health care services.

Id. § 2502(6). For the purposes of section 2902, a cause of action accrues on the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury. See id. § 2902. Thus, if the HSA's three-year limitations period is applied to Butler's claim, his cause of action is time-barred.

¶5 In reviewing the grant of a motion for a summary judgment, we examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine whether the court committed an error of law. See Community Telecommunications Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 684 A.2d 424, 426 (Me.1996) (citing Enerquin Air, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 670 A.2d 926, 928 (Me.1996)). The meaning and construction of statutory language presents a question of law. See id.

¶6 We begin by examining the language of section 2502's definition of an "action for professional negligence" to determine whether the Legislature intended that phrase to encompass actions for wrongful death arising from professional negligence. See Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564, 567 (Me.1979) (in seeking to determine legislative intent, we must look first to the language of the statute itself). Section 2502's broad language, particularly its inclusion of the words "or death" and "or otherwise," provides strong evidence of the Legislature's intention that the HSA fully occupy the field of claims brought against health care providers and practitioners "for damages for injury or death ... arising out of the provision or failure to provide health care services." 24 M.R.S.A. § 2502(6); see Dutil v. Burns, 674 A.2d 910, 911 (Me.1996); Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me.1994). Indeed, we have previously recognized the broad scope of section 2502's definition of an action for professional negligence, and have found the HSA's procedural requirements and limitations period to be applicable in a wide variety of contexts. ⁴ See, e.g., Brand v. Seider, 1997 ME 176, 697 A.2d 846 (patient's claim against psychologist for breach of confidentiality is subject to HSA's procedural requirements); Dutil, 674 A.2d 910 (strict liability and breach of warranty claims brought against health care providers are subject to the HSA's procedural requirements and limitations period), Musk, 647 A.2d 1198 (claim for failed sterilization is subject to HSA's limitations period); Thayer v. Jackson Brook Inst., 584 A.2d 653 (Me.1991) (claim brought by plaintiff who was attacked while visiting patient care facility is subject to HSA's limitations period). ⁵

¶7 Despite the breadth of section 2502's definition of an "action for professional negligence" subject to the provisions of the HSA, Butler argues for the limited applicability of the HSA's statute of limitations in the context of actions for wrongful death arising from professional negligence. Specifically, he contends that the HSA's statute of limitations is applicable only for the narrow purpose of determining whether the decedent had an unexpired cause of action for professional negligence at the time of her death, which is a necessary precondition to a personal representative's subsequent wrongful death action. See Ogden v. Berry, 572 A.2d 1082, 1083 (Me.1990) (where decedent's cause of action for professional negligence had expired before his death, personal representative had no cause of action for wrongful death). If that precondition is met, he argues, an independent cause of action for wrongful death arises in the personal representative, controlled exclusively by the WDA's limitation period.

¶8 To support his theory of the limited applicability of section 2902, Butler invokes the principle of statutory construction that a court should not read a statute to conflict with another when an alternative, reasonable interpretation yields harmony. See Pinkham v. Morrill, 622 A.2d 90, 95 (Me.1993). A ruling that the HSA's limitations period applies only to the threshold question of whether the decedent possessed a timely cause of action for professional negligence at the time of her death would give meaning to both the HSA's and the WDA's limitations periods in the context of an action for wrongful death arising from professional negligence.

¶9 The principle of "harmonious" statutory construction cannot contravene the intent of the Legislature in adopting one of the statutes that creates the conflict. See Soucy v. Board of Trustees of Maine State Retirement System, 456 A.2d 1279, 1281 (Me.1983) (fundamental rules of statutory construction prohibit interpreting statute in manner inconsistent with legislative intent). The legislative history of the HSA is well documented. In response to an alleged national crisis in the availability and cost of medical malpractice insurance, the Legislature created in 1975 the Commission to Revise the Laws Relating to Medical and Hospital Malpractice Insurance, an entity more commonly known as the Pomeroy Commission. The Commission was charged with the task of preparing "a proposal to insure the availability of medical and hospital malpractice insurance ... and to develop a more equitable system of relief for malpractice claims." See P. & S.L.1975, ch. 73, § 1. In its final report to the Legislature, the Commission confirmed that malpractice insurance rates in Maine had escalated in recent years, and it proposed comprehensive tort reform within the health care industry designed to stem rising malpractice insurance costs and ensure the continued availability of malpractice insurance to Maine health care providers and practitioners. See Commission to Revise the Laws Relating to Medical and Hospital Malpractice Insurance, Report to the 108th Legislature xv-xxiii (Jan. 22, 1977). The Commission's recommendations, including a proposal to shorten the statute of limitations for actions arising out of patient care, formed the basis of the Health Security Act, which was enacted in 1977 and amended in 1985. ⁶ See P.L.1977, ch. 492; P.L.1985, ch. 804.

¶10 The application of the WDA's statute of limitations to wrongful death actions arising from...