Salerno v. Spectrum Med. Grp., P.A.

• Decision Date: 20 August 2019
• Docket Number: Docket: Yor-18-512
• Citation: 215 A.3d 804
• Parties: Ann SALERNO v. SPECTRUM MEDICAL GROUP, P.A.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

215 A.3d 804

Ann SALERNO

v.SPECTRUM MEDICAL GROUP, P.A.

Docket: Yor-18-512

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: June 26, 2019

Decided: August 20, 2019

Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for appellant Spectrum Medical Group, P.A.

Richard R. Regan, Esq., Moncure & Barnicle, Topsham, for appellee Ann Salerno

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

HJELM, J.

[¶1] In December of 2017, Ann Salerno filed a complaint in the Superior Court (York County) against Spectrum Medical Group, P.A., stating a claim for personal injury based on premises liability. In her complaint, Salerno alleged that more than three years earlier she slipped, fell, and sustained injuries in the locker room of a facility "owned and run" by Spectrum. Spectrum moved for the court to dismiss Salerno's complaint on the ground that, in reality, the claim was for medical negligence, which must be brought in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA), 24 M.R.S. §§ 2501 - 2988 (2018). The court (O'Neil, J. ) entered an order denying Spectrum's motion, and Spectrum appeals that order. We agree with Spectrum that this interlocutory appeal falls within an exception to the final judgment rule. Reaching the merits, we affirm the order denying Spectrum's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from Salerno's complaint, which are deemed admitted for purposes of this appeal, see Lawson v. Willis , 2019 ME 36, ¶ 2, 204 A.3d 133, and from the procedural record.

[¶3] In June of 2014, Salerno underwent hip replacement surgery, after which she was required to follow strict precautions to protect her new hip. Two months after the surgery, on August 6, 2014, Salerno went to a facility in Saco owned by Spectrum to engage in water therapy. Although the water therapy itself took place in an area of the premises that was operated by a different entity, Spectrum operated a locker room where Salerno changed from her swimsuit into her street clothes. Because of the surgery, Salerno needed to use a bench to change her clothes. That day, however, the only bench in the locker room was covered by a heavy rubber mat that should have been on the floor in front of a nearby shower stall. The shower stall had a handicapped-accessible seat, which Salerno attempted to use because the bench was not available. While attempting to get to the seat in the shower stall, Salerno slipped, fell, and was injured.

[¶4] More than three years later, on December 11, 2017, Salerno filed a complaint against Spectrum stating a tort claim for premises liability. Spectrum moved to dismiss Salerno's claim, see M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting that the facts alleged in the complaint actually constitute an action for professional negligence as defined by the MHSA, see 24 M.R.S. § 2502(6), and that her claim is therefore controlled by that Act, see id. § 2903(1) (stating "[n]o action for professional negligence may be commenced until the plaintiff has" complied with the requirements of this section). Spectrum further asserted that because the MHSA provides a three-year statute of limitations for "actions for professional negligence," id. § 2902, Salerno's complaint was time-barred.

[¶5] In an order issued in November of 2018, the court denied Spectrum's motion, concluding that Salerno's claim, as alleged, does not arise out of the provision or failure to provide healthcare services within the meaning of the MSHA, see 24 M.R.S. § 2502(6), and therefore Salerno's claim "does not fall under the MHSA and was timely commenced," see 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2018) (stating that "[a]ll civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues ... except as otherwise specially provided"). Spectrum filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the court's denial of its motion to dismiss. See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2018).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶6] Before we can consider the merits of Spectrum's contentions on appeal, we must first address whether those contentions are cognizable at this stage of the case.

A. Interlocutory Appeal

[¶7] "The denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment, and ordinarily we would dismiss the appeal from the denial as an interlocutory appeal." Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc. , 2008 ME 145, ¶ 23, 956 A.2d 110. "A party urging that we reach the merits of an otherwise interlocutory appeal has the burden of demonstrating to us that ... [an] exception[ ] to the final judgment rule justifies our reaching the merits of the appeal." Sanborn v. Sanborn , 2005 ME 95, ¶ 6, 877 A.2d 1075. Spectrum contends that this interlocutory appeal is excepted from the final judgment rule because it falls within the death knell exception.¹

[¶8] The death knell exception to the final judgment rule justifies consideration of issues raised on an interlocutory appeal only if awaiting a final judgment will cause "substantial rights of a party [to] be irreparably lost." Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia , 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 918 (quotation marks omitted). "A right is irreparably lost if the appellant would not have an effective remedy if the interlocutory determination were to be vacated after a final disposition of the entire litigation." Id. (quotation marks omitted). This exception is available "only when the injury to the appellant's claimed right, absent appeal, would be imminent, concrete and irreparable." Id. ¶ 16 (quotation marks omitted); see e.g. , Geary v. Stanley Med. Research Inst. , 2008 ME 9, ¶ 11, 939 A.2d 86 (the denial of summary judgment based on the defense of immunity is immediately reviewable); Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster , 2001 ME 70, ¶ 15, 772 A.2d 842 (the denial of a special motion to dismiss pursuant to anti-SLAPP legislation is immediately reviewable), abrogated in part by Nader v. Me. Democratic Party , 2013 ME 51, ¶ 12 n. 9, 66 A.3d 571 (stating the correct standard of review for a special motion to dismiss); Moffett v. City of Portland , 400 A.2d 340, 343 n.8 (Me. 1979) (the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the disclosure of confidential records is immediately appealable).

[¶9] The determination of whether the death knell exception is applicable to a particular case rests on a fact-specific analysis. See Fiber Materials, Inc. , 2009 ME 71, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 918. We must therefore consider whether the MHSA in particular provides Spectrum with substantial rights and, if so, whether those rights will be irreparably lost if the court's order denying the motion to dismiss is not reviewable until a final judgment is entered.

[¶10] As we have explained, in the mid-1970s the Legislature was faced with "an alleged national crisis in the availability and cost of medical malpractice insurance." Butler v. Killoran , 1998 ME 147, ¶ 9, 714 A.2d 129. As a result, the Legislature enacted the MHSA as "comprehensive tort reform within the health care industry designed to stem rising malpractice insurance costs and ensure the continued availability of malpractice insurance to Maine health care providers and practitioners." Id.

[¶11] Pursuant to the MHSA, a party bringing a claim for medical negligence, in contrast to a conventional tort claim, must comply with a number of distinct procedural requirements. See 24 M.R.S. §§ 2853 - 2858, 2903(1). Most significantly for present purposes, the MHSA requires that, before the claim may be heard by a court, it must be presented to a prelitigation screening panel constituted of a judicial officer, an attorney, and a health care practitioner or provider. Id. §§ 2852(2), 2853, 2903(1)(A)-(B). The purpose of the panel proceeding is to allow the panel members to identify and separate meritorious claims from nonmeritorious claims and encourage the parties to achieve an early resolution of the litigation. Id. §§ 2851(1), 2854; see also Sullivan v. Johnson , 628 A.2d 653, 656 (Me. 1993). Additionally, pursuant to the MHSA, the notice of claim for professional negligence, the proceedings before the panel, and the panel's final determinations are generally confidential.² 24 M.R.S. §§ 2853(1-A), 2857.

[¶12] Spectrum asserts that it will irretrievably lose the rights and protections provided by the MHSA if it is denied appellate review of an order concluding that the claim is not subject to the MHSA. We agree. If a trial court were to erroneously deny a motion to dismiss a claim that the plaintiff has framed as an ordinary tort claim but is actually governed by the MHSA, the defendant would be deprived of "[t]he statutory mechanism for encouraging the settlement, withdrawal or dismissal of claims" for medical negligence. Sullivan , 628 A.2d at 656 ; cf. Morse Bros., Inc. , 2001 ME 70, ¶ 15, 772 A.2d 842 (stating that the anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss is "a statutory creature designed to protect certain defendants from meritless litigation" and that "[p]recluding the moving party from appealing a decision on the motion would result in continued litigation, which is the precise harm that the statute seeks to prevent").

[¶13] The confidential nature of the pre-suit proceedings for a claim governed by the MHSA is also at stake. See 24 M.R.S. §§ 2853(1-A), 2857. In other settings, we have concluded that a court order either requiring or allowing for the release of allegedly confidential information is immediately reviewable because the issue is within the purview of the death knell exception. See Fitch v. Doe , 2005 ME 39, ¶ 10, 869 A.2d 722 (concluding that an order compelling the disclosure of an anonymous internet user's identity is immediately reviewable, and stating that the "denial of the opportunity to appeal would make a later appeal moot, because the information at issue would already have been released"); see also Copp v. Liberty , 2003 ME 43, ¶ 6 n.2, 818 A.2d 1050 ; Moffett , 400 A.2d at 343 n. 8. Because the defendant's right to confidentiality would be irreparably lost if a claim for...