Butler v. State
| Decision Date | 11 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. S–15–0001.,S–15–0001. |
| Citation | 2015 WY 119,358 P.3d 1259 |
| Parties | John Wayne BUTLER, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Assistant Attorney General.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE* , DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.
[¶ 1] A jury convicted John Wayne Butler of one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. He appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to incarceration instead of probation, and the district court considered inappropriate factors in its sentencing decision. We affirm.
[¶ 2] 1. Was there sufficient evidence presented to sustain Mr. Butler's conviction?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Butler probation and sentenced him to serve time in prison?
3. Did the district court commit plain error by considering inappropriate factors in its sentencing decision?
[¶ 3] In June 2010, Mr. Butler drove his fifteen-year-old niece, H.H., to an eye doctor appointment. H.H. testified that she and Mr. Butler arrived at the appointment and “[c]hatted for a bit” while they waited in the car. Mr. Butler asked “if he could show [her] something,” and she replied “yes.” Mr. Butler began massaging H.H.'s breasts and touching her vaginal area over her pants. Telling her to relax, Mr. Butler put his hand under H.H.'s jeans and “inside of [her] genitals.” Mr. Butler asked her “if it felt good” and told her “he'd like to teach [her] some more things later” before she left the car to go to her appointment. After H.H.'s appointment, Mr. Butler drove her home. H.H. did not report the abuse until February 2014, explaining that she “was embarrassed” and scared of her uncle.
[¶ 4] Mr. Butler was charged with second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and following a jury trial, he was found guilty of the charged crime. At sentencing, the district court judge referenced his judicial experience stating, “I've done this now for a very long time[,]” and after reviewing the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) “very carefully[,]” the judge expressed his belief “experientially” that the PSI's finding of a low risk of re-offense was “wrong.” The district court considered community placement options as well as probation, but agreed with the PSI's recommendation that Mr. Butler was “not an appropriate candidate” for either, and sentenced Mr. Butler to a period of seven to fifteen years incarceration. Mr. Butler timely filed his notice of appeal.
[¶ 5] After the State rested its case at trial, Mr. Butler moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. The district court denied Mr. Butler's motion, finding that the State had met its burden. Mr. Butler then proceeded to present evidence to the jury, thereby waiving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion on appeal. Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 55, 346 P.3d 909, 926 (Wyo.2015) (); Hawes v. State, 2014 WY 127, ¶ 8, 335 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo.2014) (same). Mr. Butler failed to make a similar motion at the close of evidence or when the jury returned its verdict, precluding our review of the district court's decision denying Mr. Butler's motion for judgment of acquittal. Bruce, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 55, 346 P.3d at 926 ; Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo.2000) ().
[¶ 6] Though Mr. Butler waived his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, he has not waived his right to raise the issue of insufficient evidence on appeal. Hawes, 2014 WY 127, ¶ 8, 335 P.3d at 1076. Our standard of review in such cases states:
In addressing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. When considering a claim of the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence with the assumption that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.
Mendoza v. State, 2007 WY 26, ¶ 3, 151 P.3d 1112, 1113 (Wyo.2007) (citing Perritt v. State, 2005 WY 121, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 181, 186 (Wyo.2005) ). Our analysis of Mr. Butler's argument also requires us to engage in an interpretation of statutory language, which we do de novo. Qwest Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 2007 WY 97, ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 495, 497 (Wyo.2007).
[¶ 7] The thrust of Mr. Butler's argument on appeal focuses on statutory construction.1 When interpreting a statute, “[o]ur paramount consideration is the legislature's intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.” Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Attorney General, 2009 WY 143, ¶ 14, 221 P.3d 306, 312 (Wyo.2009). Mr. Butler argues that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he occupied a position of authority over the victim or that he asserted that authority as is required for a conviction under the statute.
[¶ 8] Mr. Butler was convicted under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–315(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2015), which states in pertinent part:
[¶ 9] “Position of authority” is statutorily defined as:
[T]hat position occupied by a parent, guardian, relative, household member, teacher, employer, custodian or any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence over a person[.]
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–301(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2015). The evidence elicited at trial demonstrated that Mr. Butler is H.H.'s uncle by marriage, and Mr. Butler does not dispute this fact. “Relative” is defined as: “A person connected with another by blood or affinity; a person who is kin with another.” Black's Law Dictionary 1315 (8th ed.2004). Because Mr. Butler is connected with H.H. by affinity, he qualifies as a relative to H.H., and therefore occupies a position of authority in relation to H.H. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–315(a)(iv).
[¶ 10] Mr. Butler contends that despite establishing his position as H.H.'s “relative,” the State had the additional burden of proving that he used this position to exercise significant influence and cause H.H. to submit to a sexual assault. This argument is misplaced. In interpreting the statutory definition of “position of authority,” we have repeatedly distinguished the enumerated categories from the catchall category. Rogers v. State, 2015 WY 48, ¶ 15, 346 P.3d 934, 938 (Wyo.2015) ; Solis v. State, 2013 WY 152, ¶¶ 27–32, 315 P.3d 622, 629–30 (Wyo.2013) ; Baldes v. State, 2012 WY 67, ¶ 9, 276 P.3d 386, 388 (Wyo.2012) ; Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Wyo.1987). The enumerated categories encompass parents, guardians, relatives, household members, teachers, employers, and custodians. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–301(a)(iv). The catchall category includes “any other person who, by reason of his position, is able to exercise significant influence over a person[.]” Id. If an actor falls within one of the enumerated categories, the State need not prove that he was able to exercise significant influence over the victim. Instead, that additional element is only required to be established by the State if the actor qualifies under the catchall category. The reason for the distinction lies in the fact that an individual who falls within one of the enumerated categories is already in a position of significant influence based on implicit social norms. Faubion v. State, 2010 WY 79, ¶ 17, 233 P.3d 926, 930 (Wyo.2010) . Mr. Butler was tried and convicted based on his position as H.H.'s “relative,” one of the enumerated categories. Thus, the State was not required to demonstrate that he was able to exercise significant influence over H.H.
[¶ 11] The State established that Mr. Butler occupied a position of authority in relation to H.H., which is all that was required under the statute. A rational jury could have determined that this essential element of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Butler's conviction.
[¶ 12] “[W]hen the district court's imposition of a criminal sentence is within the limits set...
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