Bynum v. City of Oneonta

• Decision Date: 27 February 2015
• Docket Number: 1130305.
• Citation: 175 So.3d 63
• Parties: Glenn BYNUM and Larry Gipson v. CITY OF ONEONTA et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

175 So.3d 63

Glenn BYNUM and Larry Gipson

v.CITY OF ONEONTA et al.

1130305.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 27, 2015.

A. Eric Johnston, Birmingham, for appellants.

Alexander M. Smith, Oneonta, for appellees.

Lorelei Lein, gen. counsel, Alabama League of Municipalities, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama League of Municipalities, in support of the appellees.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Glenn Bynum and Larry Gipson appeal from the trial court's order holding that certain amendments to § 28–2A–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, which statutes involve the sale of alcoholic beverages in a municipality, were not unconstitutional. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

In 1984, the legislature passed Act No. 1984–408, Ala. Acts 1984, codified at § 28–2A–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, which provided a procedure for municipalities having a population of 7,000 or more to hold an election to change the classification of the municipality from “dry” to “wet” or “wet” to “dry” regarding the sale of alcohol within the municipality. In 2009, the legislature passed Act No. 2009–546, Ala. Acts 2009, which amended § 28–2A–1, Ala.Code 1975, to include smaller municipalities, i.e., municipalities having a population of 1,000 or more, except in three counties and which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(a) Any municipality having a population of 1,000 or more, excluding Clay, Randolph, and Blount Counties, may change its classification from dry to wet or wet to dry by a municipal option election....”

(Emphasis added.)

Section 28–2A–3, Ala.Code 1975, was also amended by Act No. 2009–546. It now provides:

“It is hereby declared the intention and the purpose of this article to permit an election by the citizens of certain municipalities to determine the wet or dry status of such municipalities with regard to the sale, distribution, and consumption of alcoholic beverages within the corporate limits of such municipalities; and further that such election shall be provided only in those municipalities which can provide safeguards for the protection of the public welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people. In the furtherance of the protection of the public welfare, health, peace, and morals, the Legislature has determined that a population classification should be established to provide this method of municipal option election only in those municipalities with a population of 1,000 or more people within a county, excluding Clay, Randolph, and Blount Counties, it being the judgment of the Legislature that municipalities with a lesser population would be unable to support and maintain such protection where such municipality is located in a dry county, whereas a municipality of 1,000 or more population would have the resources and ability to support and maintain such safeguards.”

(Emphasis added.)

The 2009 amendments also repealed § 28–2A–4, Ala.Code 1975, which had provided that municipalities with a population of at least 4,000 residents could hold an election to allow alcohol sales if any municipality in the same county with a population of 7,000 or more had voted to allow such sales pursuant to former § 28–2A–3.

In the fall of 2012, Blount County held a referendum pursuant to § 28–2–1, Ala.Code 1975, to determine whether it would remain dry or would allow alcohol sales in the county. Section 28–2–1 provides for the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within counties, and it applies to all 67 counties in Alabama. The referendum failed by 160 votes. The citizens of the City of Oneonta, which is located in Blount County and which has a population of 6,600 as of the last decennial census, voted overwhelmingly for the legal sale and distribution of alcohol in Blount County. Subsequently, the City of Oneonta (hereinafter “the City”), pursuant to § 28–2A–1, as amended, sought to have a municipal election to determine if the City could allow the sale of alcoholic beverages within its municipal limits. On March 7, 2013, Brandon Neal, a resident of the City, filed a complaint challenging the City's right to hold an election under § 28–2A–1 and seeking injunctive relief to prevent the City from spending funds on a “wet” or “dry” election. The City filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking a judgment declaring § 28–2A–1 unconstitutional because, the City argued, the exclusion of Clay, Randolph, and Blount Counties from its provisions was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.¹

On August 20, 2013, Bynum and Gipson, as pastors of churches located in the City, filed a motion to intervene in Neal's action, which the trial court granted. Following a stipulation of certain facts, the trial court entered an order granting the City's declaratory relief and concluding, among other things, that the exclusion of the three counties violated the Equal Protection Clause.² However, the trial court entered an order striking the phrase “excluding Clay, Randolph, and Blount Counties” from § 28–2A–1 and § 28–2A–3, as amended in 2009, and upheld the remainder of Article 1 of Chapter 2A. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Bynum and Gipson appealed.³

Standard of Review

“ ‘This court reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of a statute, because only a question of law is presented.’ Scott Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Ala.2003). Where, as here, the facts of a case are essentially undisputed, this Court must determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard of review.”

Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So.2d 1033, 1034–35 (Ala.2005).

Additionally,

“ ‘[o]ur review of constitutional challenges to legislative enactments is de novo.’ Richards v. Izzi, 819 So.2d 25, 29 n. 3 (Ala.2001). Additionally, acts of the legislature are presumed constitutional. State v. Alabama Mun. Ins. Corp., 730 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala.1998). See also Dobbs v. Shelby County Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So.2d 425, 428 (Ala.1999) (‘In reviewing the constitutionality of a legislative act, this Court will sustain the act “ ‘unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law.’ ” White v. Reynolds Metals Co., 558 So.2d 373, 383 (Ala.1989) (quoting Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944) ).'). We approach the question of the constitutionality of a legislative act ‘ “ ‘with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government.’ ” ' Monroe v. Harco, Inc., 762 So.2d 828, 831 (Ala.2000) (quoting Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 159 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn McAdory, 246 Ala. at 9, 18 So.2d at 815 ).

“Moreover, in order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality, ... the party asserting the unconstitutionality of the Act ... bears the burden ‘to show that [the Act] is not constitutional.’ Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of Montgomery v. Talley, 291 Ala. 307, 310, 280 So.2d 553, 556 (1973).

See also Thorn v. Jefferson County, 375 So.2d 780, 787 (Ala.1979) (‘It is the law, of course, that a party attacking a statute has the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality....’).”

State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Ala.2006).

Discussion

Bynum and Gipson argue that the 2009 amendments to §§ 28–2A–1 and –3 are unconstitutional in that they intentionally excluded municipalities in three counties from the provisions of the amended statutes. They further argue that the trial court erred in severing the “excluding Clay, Randolph, and Blount Counties” language from §§ 28–2A–1 and –3 and that the trial court should have found § 28–2A–1 and § 28–2A–3, as amended, unconstitutional in their entirety instead of merely severing the offending portions. They argue that the legislature knowingly and intentionally violated the Equal Protection Clause when it excluded the three counties from the provisions of the statutes and that severability cannot be used to make §§ 28–2A–1 and –3, as amended, constitutional.

The City agrees that the legislature's exclusion of the three counties was unconstitutional.⁴ However, the City argues that when the unconstitutional language is stricken, the remainder of § 28–2A–1 and § 28–2A–3, as amended in 2009, is enforceable. The City contends that severing the offending language would not undermine the manifest purpose of the 2009 amendments to §§ 28–2A–1 and –3 to allow smaller municipalities the option to allow the sale of alcoholic beverages within their municipal limits.

We agree that the exclusion of the three counties from the provisions of § 28–2A–1 and § 28–2A–3 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156 (Ala.1999) (noting that, although the parties stipulated that part of a statute was unconstitutional, it was not for the parties to determine the proper construction or interpretation of the statute). The State has a legitimate interest in regulating the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within its borders. Krupp Oil Co. v. Yeargan, 665 So.2d 920 (Ala.1995) ; Historic Warehouse, Inc. v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 423 So.2d 211 (Ala.1982). A statute that is rationally related to a legitimate state interest does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Here, the exclusion of the 3 counties from the provisions of §§ 28–2A–1 and –3 is not rationally related to the regulation of alcohol because no basis exists for the distinction between the 3 counties excluded and the 64 counties included by the 2009 amendments to those statutes allowing municipalities with 1,000 or more citizens to conduct an election to permit the sale of alcoholic beverages within their municipal limits.

The pertinent issue before us is whether the trial court erred in severing the offending language from §§ 28–2A–1 and –3, as amended in 2009, and upholding the remainder of Article 1 of Chapter 2A...