Byrd v. Delasancha
| Decision Date | 27 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-05-01317-CV.,05-05-01317-CV. |
| Citation | 195 S.W.3d 834 |
| Parties | Greta BYRD, Appellant v. Florenciano DELASANCHA, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jason Franklin, Dallas, for appellant.
Eric Wilder McNeil, Dwyer Law Firm, Rockwall, for appellee.
Before Justices WRIGHT, MOSELEY, and LANG.
Greta Byrd appeals the trial court's directed verdict, which instructed the jury to render a verdict in favor of Florenciano Delasancha on her claims of negligence arising out of an automobile collision. In two issues, Byrd argues the trial court erred when it: (1) found that expert medical testimony was required to prove causation in her motor vehicle collision case; and (2) granted Delasancha's motion for a directed verdict. We conclude the trial court erred when it granted Delasancha's motion for a directed verdict. The trial court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Byrd is a security guard for the City of Dallas Independent School District at the administrative building. On Friday, May 20, 2004, Byrd's shift was from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. On May 21, 2004, Byrd drove home from work by her normal route. When Byrd approached the intersection of Marsalis Avenue and Colorado Boulevard her traffic light was green, but when she entered the intersection her car was struck by Delasancha's car and her airbag deployed.
Byrd got out of the car and called 9-1-1 on her cellular telephone. The police arrived and made a report. Also, the paramedics arrived and Byrd told them she was not okay. Byrd had her car towed to her house and rode home with the tow truck driver. Then, Byrd's mother took her to the hospital. The emergency room doctor diagnosed her with soft tissue trauma.
Byrd sued Delasancha for damages she allegedly suffered as a result of Delasancha's negligence in the automobile accident. The lawsuit proceeded to a jury trial. After Byrd rested her case-in-chief, Delasancha moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to establish causation because there was no expert medical testimony to support a finding that Byrd's injuries have a causal relationship with the automobile accident. Byrd responded that a plaintiff's testimony can establish a causal nexus, she testified she did not have the injuries before the accident, but she did have them afterward, and her injuries are documented in the medical records admitted into evidence. The trial court granted Delasancha's motion for a directed verdict.
In issues one and two, Byrd argues the trial court erred when it found that expert medical testimony was required to prove causation in her motor vehicle collision case and granted Delasancha's motion for a directed verdict. Byrd contends Texas law does not require medical expert testimony to establish causation in automobile collision cases and that her lay testimony was legally and factually sufficient to prove causation. Delasancha responds that lay testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to establish causation only in cases involving default judgments and worker's compensation claims. Also, Delasancha responds that the jury was not qualified through general experience and common sense to determine within reasonable medical probability that the automobile collision caused Byrd's injuries and the facts of the case create a probability that Byrd was not injured.
In reviewing the grant of a directed verdict, an appellate court follows the standards for assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809-828 (Tex. 2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Kinder Morgan Operating L.P. "A", 192 S.W.3d 120, 126 (). When reviewing a directed verdict, an appellate court must credit the favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregard the contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; see also Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. filed). An appellate court must determine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on the question presented. See, e.g., Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex.2004); Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1994) (per curiam); Sibai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
A directed verdict is warranted when the evidence is such that no other verdict can be rendered and the moving party is entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment. See Edlund, 842 S.W.2d at 724. A trial court may order a directed verdict in favor of a defendant when: (1) a plaintiff fails to present evidence raising a fact issue essential to the plaintiff's right of recovery; or (2) the plaintiff admits or the evidence conclusively establishes a defense to the plaintiff's cause of action. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex.2000). A trial court may properly direct a verdict if no evidence of probative force raises a fact issue on the material questions in the lawsuit. See Prudential Ins., 29 S.W.3d at 77; Sibai, 986 S.W.2d at 705.
However, it is error for a trial court to direct a verdict when a material issue is raised by the evidence. See Edlund, 842 S.W.2d at 724. If there is any conflicting evidence of probative value on any theory of recovery, a directed verdict is improper and the case must be remanded for the jury to determine that issue. See Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649; Sibai, 986 S.W.2d at 705; Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 815-16 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). If reasonable minds could differ as to the controlling facts, a trial court errs if it grants a directed verdict and refuses to submit the issues to the jury. See Latham v. Castillo, 972 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex.1998); Edlund, 842 S.W.2d at 724.
To establish causation in a personal injury case, a plaintiff must prove the conduct of the defendant caused an event and that this event caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable injuries. See Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex.1984). The causal nexus between the event sued on and the plaintiff's injuries must be shown by competent evidence. See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 732.
Lay testimony is adequate to prove causation if general experience and common sense will enable a lay person to determine the causal relationship between the event and the condition with reasonable probability. See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 733; Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex.1970); Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.1969). In areas of common experience, a jury should generally be entitled to decide causation with or without medical testimony. See Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. La Rochelle, 587 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1979, writ dism'd). Generally, lay testimony establishing a sequence of events which provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event and the condition is sufficient proof of causation. See Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 733. In such cases, lay testimony can provide both legally and factually sufficient evidence to prove the causal relationship. See Blankenship v. Mirick, 984 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied). The fact that the testimony of causation comes from the injured party alone does not prevent it from having probative force if given credit by the jury. See Fid. & Guar. Ins., 587 S.W.2d at 497.
During the jury trial, Byrd stated she did not have the alleged injuries before the automobile accident, but she did have them afterward. She testified she was injured after the accident as follows:
Also, Byrd testified she did not have these injuries or pain in these areas of her body before the accident as follows:
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