C.T., In Interest of, A90A1692

• Decision Date: 17 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. A90A1692,A90A1692
• Citation: 197 Ga.App. 300,398 S.E.2d 286
• Parties: In the Interest of C.T., a Child.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 286

398 S.E.2d 286

197 Ga.App. 300

In the Interest of C.T., a Child.

No. A90A1692.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Oct. 17, 1990.

Vernon S. Pitts, Avis K. Hornsby, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Lyn K. Armstrong, Joseph J. Drolet, William C. Akins, Richard E. Hicks, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Judge.

This is an appeal by C.T., a child of age 15, from a judgment of disposition of the juvenile court. A petition was filed averring appellant committed armed robbery. Appellant admitted the charge, was adjudicated delinquent, and was held pending disposition pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-37 (designated felony act). Subsequently, C.T. was released for a 90-day trial period in probation status. At the final disposition hearing, the juvenile court judge placed C.T. in the custody of the Division of Youth Services for an initial period of five years, and committed her into restrictive custody for a specified period in a Youth Development Center to be followed by a period of intensive supervision. Held:

1. Appellant asserts the trial court violated appellant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and her right to due process by refusing to allow her attorney final argument. The record reflects appellant did not make any timely objection to the ruling based on constitutional grounds. By failing to raise these constitutional issues at the hearing and by failing to obtain a ruling thereon, appellant has waived them; therefore, these issues are not preserved for appeal. Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 54(2)(b), 389 S.E.2d 320; Allen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 186 Ga.App. 337(2), 367 S.E.2d 120. Moreover, the record reflects that before calling witnesses, appellant's counsel made a lengthy argument setting out in detail why appellant should not be placed in restrictive custody. The court has inherent power to supervise the course of the trial (Johnson v. State, 254 Ga. 591(11), 331 S.E.2d 578) and under the circumstances, did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow appellant further argument after her witnesses had testified. Further, appellant has made no showing on appeal of any new matter which she would have presented had final argument been allowed. Harm as well as error must be shown to authorize reversal. Robinson v. State, 229 Ga. 14, 15(1), 189 S.E.2d 53.

2. Appellant asserts the trial court's disposition is contrary to the weight of the evidence. On appeal the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the findings and judgment. See generally Grant v. State, 195 Ga.App. 463(1), 393 S.E.2d 737; Williams v. Perry, 187 Ga.App. 586(1), 370 S.E.2d 836; In the Interest of C.D.L., 184 Ga.App. 412, 361 S.E.2d 527. An appellate court determines sufficiency of the evidence; it does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. In the Interest of E.P.N., 193 Ga.App. 742, 748, 388 S.E.2d 903.

Appellant made an informed admission both on the record and in writing, concurred in by her natural father who also was present before the referee, that she committed an offense of armed robbery on or about December 6, 1989, as averred in the petition. The record contains a written "Admission by Juvenile" which was duly signed by appellant, her father, and her attorney. This written admission reflects, inter alia, that appellant understands "that this admission or confession is the same as pleading 'guilty' to these charges. I am willing to be found delinquent without hearing the evidence from witnesses and without a trial or formal hearing. I understand that the [c]ourt can make whatever order or disposition it finds necessary in my case and that I might even be placed in an institution for delinquent children." The transcript also reflects that the juvenile was advised, inter alia as follows: "THE COURT: You understand also, that I can make whatever decision, I feel that's best in your interest? I can lock you up here in juvenile court? Or place you on probation? Or could commit you to the State for placement in a training school? Do you understand these things? THE JUVENILE: Yes."

"Where a juvenile is charged with an offense which for an adult would be a crime, the standard of proof in the lower court is 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' " In the Interest of C.D.L., supra, 184 Ga.App. at 412, 361 S.E.2d 527. In a juvenile proceedings, a formal admission of guilt by a juvenile that is on its face knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made is similar in effect to a plea of guilty. Thus, appellant's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent admission of guilt of the crime of armed robbery, as that offense was averred in the petition, was sufficient to meet the requirements of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 for purposes of establishing that appellant was guilty of committing the offense as averred; and as crafted, the "Admission by Juvenile" also constituted in effect an admission in judicio of delinquency.

A designated felony act within the meaning of OCGA § 15-11-37(a)(2)(B) includes, inter alia, "armed robbery, if done by a juvenile 13 or more years of age." Regarding the issue of whether a juvenile should be placed in restrictive custody, OCGA § 15-11-37(b) pertinently provides: "Where a juvenile is found to have committed a designated felony act, the order of disposition ... shall include a finding based on a preponderance of the evidence as to whether, for the purposes of this Code section, the juvenile does or does not require restrictive custody...." (Emphasis supplied.) The evidence of record is sufficient to meet this evidentiary standard of proof.

In addition to the appellant's informed admission of committing the crime of armed robbery, the record establishes she struck the victim in the face while her co-accomplice accosted the victim at pistol point. The victim testified regarding the continuing adverse emotional impact that the offense had upon her. A supervisor of a caseworker section testified that while on probation appellant reported only four or five of the required nine reporting times, but recommended that appellant be committed to the Department of Human Resources under non-restrictive custody. A probation officer had recommended before appellant's trial release on probation that she be committed on a non-restrictive basis. This probation officer also testified that although she believed appellant understood the seriousness of her acts, she did not observe appellant exhibit any "remorseful feelings" when she talked with her. The record further establishes that appellant did not adequately comply with several of the more substantial probation provisions during her trial release, although she did not commit any crimes during that time period. Viewing the record in its totality, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the final disposition order and judgment of the juvenile judge.

3. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact in support of its ruling.

The State argues there is no requirement, pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-37, that the findings of fact contain a reference to each item listed in OCGA § 15-11-37(c), but rather the statute only requires the court consider each item. However, OCGA § 15-11-37(b) expressly provides that the order of disposition shall include a finding whether the juvenile requires restrictive custody, "in connection with which the court shall make specific written findings of fact as to each of the elements set forth in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (c)...