Caballero v. Vig

• Decision Date: 05 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 08-18-00033-CV,08-18-00033-CV
• Parties: Jennifer CABALLERO, Appellant, v. Sanjiv VIG, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

600 S.W.3d 452

Jennifer CABALLERO, Appellant,

v.Sanjiv VIG, Appellee.

No. 08-18-00033-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

February 5, 2020

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT, James D. Lucas, 2316 Montana Ave., El Paso, TX 79903.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE, John P. Mobbs, Attorney at Law, 6350 Escondido Drive, Suite A-14, El Paso, TX 79912.

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, J., and Barajas, Senior Judge, Barajas, Senior Judge, (Sitting by Assignment)

OPINION

JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

This is an appeal from a final divorce decree. The issue before us, however, is not the substance of the decree, but instead whether the judge who decided it should have been recused. Specifically, Appellant Jennifer Caballero ("Wife") challenges the denial of her post-trial motion to recuse El Paso District Court Judge Laura Strathmann, who presided over her divorce from Appellee, Sanjiv Vig ("Husband"). In her recusal motion, Wife claimed that following trial, she obtained court documents which convinced her that Judge Strathmann and Patrick Bramblett, one of the attorneys who represented Husband at trial, were married at the time of trial. While Judge Strathmann and Bramblett had years earlier obtained an annulment decree, Appellant believed that the prior decree was "void." And because Judge Strathmann's marriage to Bramblett never terminated, Wife urged that the judge was therefore required to recuse herself from presiding over the trial. Because we find that Wife lacked standing to challenge the validity of the judge's annulment decree, we affirm the denial of Wife's recusal motion, without considering the validity of the annulment decree itself.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Parties' Divorce Proceedings

Wife initially filed a petition for divorce on September 2, 2014, seeking a divorce from Husband, a division of property, and determination of child custody and child support. Husband initially retained attorney David Hilles and filed a counterpetition for divorce. Prior to trial, the parties were involved in protracted discovery battles, as well as contempt proceedings, most of which involved alleged violations of the temporary orders pertaining to child custody and support issues. Wife believed that throughout these various pretrial proceedings, Judge Strathmann treated her fairly.

On March 24, 2017, approximately two and a half months prior to the parties' trial that began on June 5, 2017, attorney Patrick Bramblett entered his appearance as co-counsel for Husband. Wife admits that she knew prior to trial that Judge Strathmann and Bramblett had previously been married but asserts that she had been told by her own trial counsel and another local attorney that the couple's marriage had previously ended in a "contentious" divorce. Wife did not file a pretrial motion to recuse Judge Strathmann.

Wife, however, claims that she became concerned after Bramblett took the lead role in representing Husband at their trial. She believed that Judge Strathmann's attitude toward her changed during the trial. Wife became even more concerned after trial when she received unfavorable rulings on custody, child support arrearages, and attorney's fees. Because of her concern, Wife obtained the documents filed in the Judge Strathmann-Bramblett divorce proceedings.

Those records showed that the couple had actually obtained an annulment and not a divorce.

Nine days after the trial court issued its "Findings and Orders of Final Divorce" (but before a final divorce decree was signed), Wife filed a motion to recuse Judge Strathmann alleging that the judge and Bramblett were still married and that the judge was therefore required to recuse herself from the proceedings pursuant to Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 18b(b)(8) (a "judge must recuse in any proceeding in which ... the judge or the judge's spouse ... is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.").

B. Wife's Recusal Motion

In support of her motion, Wife attached the record from the district court's file in a case entitled, "In the Matter of the Marriage of Laura K. Strathmann and Patrick D. Bramblett." The record revealed that Judge Strathmann originally filed a petition for divorce on June 29, 2009, alleging that the parties were married on February 19, 2009, but had ceased living together on June 26, 2009. Bramblett thereafter filed a "Counter-Petition to Annul Marriage," alleging that Judge Strathmann had induced him to enter into the marriage as the result of fraud, and that he had not voluntarily cohabited with her since learning of the fraud. In his counter-petition, Bramblett objected to assigning the matter to an associate judge for a trial on the merits.¹ Shortly thereafter, however, Bramblett filed a "Notice of Nonsuit of Counter-Petition to Annul Marriage." Then, Judge Strathmann filed what she labeled as a "Counter Petition to Annul Marriage," in which she alleged:

Petitioner and Respondent entered into the marriage by fraud, neither party fully understood the situational aspects surrounding the other party at the time, and neither party fully disclosed such situational aspects so all relevant facts and circumstances were known by all before the marriage.

Judge Strathmann further alleged that the parties had not "voluntarily cohabitated since learning of the fraud." Following a hearing at which both parties appeared, an associate judge entered a Decree of Annulment, dated August 21, 2009, finding that the "material allegations" in the counter-petition for annulment were "substantially correct and had been proved by full and satisfactory evidence."

Neither Judge Strathmann, nor Bramblett ever challenged the validity of the annulment decree. Wife, however, argued in her recusal motion that the annulment decree was void for two reasons. First, she argued that Judge Strathmann, who filed the operative petition seeking the annulment, did not set forth a valid ground for an annulment in her pleadings. Second, Wife argued that the associate judge who signed the pleadings did not have the authority to do so because Bramblett initially objected to having an associate judge hear the case and never withdrew his objection. Wife therefore argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the annulment decree, thereby rendering it void. And if void, Judge Strathmann and Bramblett were still married at the time of her trial and she should be recused.

Husband filed a response, arguing that the annulment decree was not void as Judge Strathmann's pleadings complied with all the procedural and statutory requirements for obtaining an annulment. In addition, Husband argued that Bramblett's objection to the associate judge was effectively withdrawn when he nonsuited his counter-petition. Husband therefore argued that the associate judge had jurisdiction to enter the final decree and that Wife had therefore not demonstrated that the decree was void.

C. The Recusal Hearing

After Judge Strathmann declined to grant the recusal motion, she forwarded it to the regional presiding judge, who assigned 394th District Court Judge Roy Ferguson to hear the matter.² At the hearing, Wife testified to the series of events that we describe above. Bramblett also testified at the hearing, expressing his contrary opinion that there was no defect in the annulment proceedings that would render the annulment decree void. He also testified that he waived any objection he may have had to the associate judge hearing the matter when he voluntarily appeared before the associate judge at the annulment hearing, and when he subsequently approved and consented to the parties' agreed-upon annulment decree. Bramblett further testified that no one had previously challenged the validity of the annulment decree prior to Wife filing her recusal motion.

Following arguments pertaining solely to the validity of the annulment decree, Judge Ferguson denied the motion. Judge Strathmann thereafter issued a Final Decree of Divorce in Wife and Husband's case on December 1, 2017. This appeal followed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In her appeal, Wife does not challenge any of Judge Strathmann's substantive rulings in the final divorce decree. Instead, in related issues, Wife contends that it was error to deny her recusal motion, contending that Judge Strathmann and Bramblett were still married at the time of her trial, as their annulment decree was void for the following three reasons: (1) Judge Strathmann's counter-petition for annulment did not allege fraud, and instead alleged a "mutual mistake," thereby negating jurisdiction as a mutual mistake cannot be a basis for an annulment; (2) the associate judge who signed the annulment decree lacked authority to sign the decree due to Bramblett's failure to withdraw his objection to having an associate judge hear the matter; and (3) the annulment was based on Judge Strathmann's pleading, which she incorrectly labeled as a "counter-petition" for annulment, when it should have been labeled as a first amended petition.

Husband counters that we should decline to hear the merits of Wife's arguments regarding the validity of the annulment decree as (1) Wife's brief did not contain adequate citations to the record; (2) Wife did not provide the Court with a complete record of the trial proceedings in her divorce; (3) Wife's motion to recuse was not timely filed; and (4) Wife lacks standing to challenge the validity of the judge's annulment decree. Alternatively, Husband contends that even if we were to consider the merits of Wife's arguments, we should conclude that the annulment decree was not void, and that Judge Strathmann and Bramblett were therefore not married at the time of the parties' trial.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A Texas judge may be removed from a case if he or she is (1) constitutionally disqualified, (2) subject to a statutory strike, (3) subject to statutory disqualification, or (4) subject to recusal under rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court. Nairn v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist. , 366...