Cable Communications Network, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. C14-91-01395-CV,C14-91-01395-CV
• Citation: 838 S.W.2d 947
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: CABLE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, INC., Appellant, v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Appellee. (14th Dist.)

Page 947

838 S.W.2d 947

CABLE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, INC., Appellant, v. AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. C14-91-01395-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (14th Dist.).

Oct. 8, 1992.

Damon R. Capps, Houston, for appellant.

Bruce A. Rokohl, Katherine D. Hunt, Houston, for appellee.

Before JUNELL, ROBERTSON and DRAUGHN, JJ.

OPINION

DRAUGHN, Justice.

Cable Communications Network ("CCN") appeals from an adverse summary judgment granted on its cross-claim in an interpleader action filed by its insurer, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company ("Aetna"). CCN claimed property damage to certain television equipment under its policy with Aetna. A third party, Dr. Dube, also made a claim for the property damage. In response to the competing claims, Aetna interpled the policy proceeds in the pending suit between the two claimants. CCN cross-claimed, alleging that Aetna by filing the interpleader breached the contract of insurance and various other duties it owed to CCN under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Aetna. CCN appeals. We affirm.

CCN attacks the summary judgment on three grounds, asserting that: 1) all causes of action raised by CCN were not addressed in Aetna's motion for summary judgment; 2) genuine fact issues existed regarding whether Aetna's actions in filing the interpleader were reasonable; and 3) genuine fact issues existed regarding whether Aetna's actions in filing an interpleader constituted bad faith and breach of its insurance contract with CCN. We will discuss each of these grounds in conjunction with the factual and procedural history of the case.

CCN was a successor in interest to 1960 Broadcasting Ltd. which originally leased certain television/broadcasting equipment from Dr. Clarence Dube. The written terms of the lease provided that the lessor, Dr. Dube, would provide insurance for the leased equipment. However, the Aetna policy in issue was obtained by CCN, the named insured, and covered the leased equipment, which was subsequently damaged by a fire at CCN's premises.

Aetna admitted coverage for the damaged equipment, but during its adjustment and investigation of CCN's claim, Aetna learned that Dr. Dube maintained there was an oral modification of the original lease between Dube and CCN's predecessor in interest, 1960 Broadcasting Ltd. This modification provided that CCN's predecessor as lessee would obtain insurance for Dube's benefit. Upon further investigation, Aetna received confirmation of this oral modification by Robert Malloy, the official who signed the original lease with Dube. These facts were asserted by Aetna in its affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment, and no contradictory evidence was offered thereto by CCN.

Dr. Dube formally notified Aetna by letter on February 13, 1987, of his claim to the insurance proceeds and advised that any disbursement of the funds to CCN would be at Aetna's peril. Aetna offered to pay the policy proceeds to CCN and obtain a bond to cover Aetna in the event the Dube claim was valid. Some dispute existed between the parties as to the amount offered by Aetna, whether CCN rejected this offer, and the date on which it was to be paid. In any event, because of the adverse claim by Dube, Aetna ultimately interpled $141,977.30 in the suit already pending between CCN and Dube, and asked the trial court to determine who should receive the funds.

In response to Aetna's interpleader, CCN filed a cross-action against Aetna alleging that Aetna breached its contract of insurance by interpleading the money into the court's registry. CCN also alleged Aetna breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing with its insured, violated Section 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code and violated Sections 17.46(a), 17.46(b), and 17.50 of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. CCN argued that because the insurance policy issued by Aetna expressly named CCN as beneficiary, and the alleged oral modification was not in writing, Aetna was legally obligated to pay the proceeds to CCN, and the failure to do so constituted breach of contract and bad faith.

In its first point of error, CCN claims that the trial court erred in granting Aetna's motion for summary judgment as to CCN's entire claim because the motion failed to address all causes of action, specifically negligence, raised by CCN. However, we find CCN failed to specifically plead negligence in its cross-action and therefore waived it for appellate purposes. A summary judgment respondent must present all issues to the court in the written response, or those issues are waived for appeal. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex.1979). In Clear Creek, the court held that the non-movant must in a written answer or response to the motion, expressly present to the trial court any issues that would defeat movant's right to a summary judgment and failing to do so, may not later assign them as error on appeal. The only exception is an attack on the legal sufficiency of the grounds expressly raised by the movant in his motion for summary judgment, which may be raised on appeal without a written response. Id. at 678-679. While CCN did mention the word "negligent" in its response to the summary judgment motion, there were no pleadings to support it. Standing alone, the mere mention of the word "negligent" without pleadings to support it, is not sufficient to raise this issue.

In its second point of error, CCN asserts that Aetna's summary judgment motion should have been denied because CCN raised fact issues as to whether Aetna's decision to file the interpleader was reasonable. While CCN did not specifically plead this allegation, its pleadings imply that Aetna's action was unreasonable. And, at least insofar as the insurer's right to attorney's fees is concerned, the question is whether its failure to pay one claimant or the other is in good faith based on a reasonable doubt either of fact or law as to which is...