California Grape and Tree Fruit League v. Industrial Welfare Commission

• Decision Date: 09 January 1969
• Citation: 268 Cal.App.2d 692,74 Cal.Rptr. 313
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CALIFORNIA GRAPE & TREE FRUIT LEAGUE, Airdrome Orchards, Castiglione Bros., P. J. Divizich Fruit Corp., Grimm Orchards Co., and Nelson Roper, Plaintiffs, Respondents and Appellants, v. INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION of the State of California and the Division of Industrial Welfare of the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California, Defendants, appellants and Respondents. Civ. 23101.

Page 313

74 Cal.Rptr. 313

268 Cal.App.2d 692

CALIFORNIA GRAPE & TREE FRUIT LEAGUE, Airdrome Orchards, Castiglione Bros., P. J. Divizich Fruit Corp., Grimm Orchards Co., and Nelson Roper, Plaintiffs, Respondents and Appellants, v. INDUSTRIAL WELFARE COMMISSION of the State of California and the Division of Industrial Welfare of the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California, Defendants, appellants and Respondents.

Civ. 23101.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 9, 1969.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., B. Franklin Walker, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for appellants.

Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, by Walter Hoffman and by Clark W. Maser, Livingston, Borregard & Grant, by Lawrence Livingston, San Francisco, for respondents.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

This case concerns the provisions of the Labor Cade ¹ (§§ 1171--1398), relating to minimum wages, hours of labor and working conditions of women and minors. Principally it relates to the required procedure when the Department of Industrial Welfare, after investigation, finds that in any occupation, trade or industry, the wages paid women and minors are inadequate, or the hours or conditions of labor are prejudicial to their health or welfare.

Section 1178 provides in such event that the commission 'shall select a wage board to consider any of such matters.' The wage board must be composed of an equal number of employer and employee representatives in the occupation, trade or industry in question, and a chairman who represents the commission. The wage board is required to consider the matters found by the commission and to 'report and make recommendations' to the commission. The wage board report and recommendations shall include (a) an estimate of an adequate minimum wage, (b) the number of hours of work per day consistent with, and (c) the standard conditions of labor necessary for, the health and welfare of such women and minors in the subject occupation, trade or industry. After receipt of the wage board's report and recommendations and before adopting an order relating to wages, hours or conditions of labor, the commission is required to hold at least two public hearings if the scope of the matter be statewide.

Section 1181 provides that upon the fixing of the time and place for public hearings the commission shall advertise and mail notice thereof in a specified manner.

Section 1182 states, among other things, that after 'the wage board conference and public hearing,' the commission may make a mandatory order fixing such minimum wages, maximum hours and standard conditions of labor for the affected women and minors.

In 1962 the commission, after investigation concluded that, in the industries handling agricultural products after harvest, on and off the farm, the wages paid women and minors were inadequate to furnish the cost of proper living. It also concluded that certain conditions of labor, including the basis for overtime pay, were detrimental to the health, morals and welfare of such employees. The commission thereupon selected a wage board consisting of ten employer representatives, ten employee representatives and a chairman.

The wage board considered the matters referred by the commission. Thereafter, on motion of an employer representative that the minimum wage be set at $1 per hour, the employer representatives voted unanimously 'yes' while the employee representatives voted unanimously 'no.' A motion by an employee representative that the minimum be set at $1.50 per hour resulted in the same stalemate. Employer and employee representative motions relating to overtime pay also reached the same result. On each of the motions the chairman abstained from voting for the stated reason that he did not favor any of them. Thereafter the wage board made its report to the commission. Pointed out in detail were the views of the opposing sides, and the fact that they had been unable to agree. It recited 'The Chairman refrained from voting on either of these motions, believing that neither of them is well fitted to the balanced interests of the employers and employees in the after-harvest industries in California.' No Majority recommendations were made.

The commission, after notice, held public hearings in Fresno, Los Angeles and San Francisco. Thereafter it adopted and issued certain orders affecting women and minors in the after-harvest industries. As material here, they provided for a minimum wage of $1.25 per hour for one year until August 30, 1964, and $1.30 per hour thereafter. The pay for overtime work was fixed at one and one-half times, and under some conditions double, the regular (not minimum) wage. These orders modified existing commission orders relating to minimum wages and premium overtime pay for women and minors in the subject industries.

Plaintiffs below represent the growers, packers and shippers of more than 85 percent of California's fresh deciduous fruits. Collectively we shall refer to them as the 'League.' On behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situated they filed in the superior court a petition for a writ of mandate designed to prevent the enforcement of the above mentioned orders.

After trial the court concluded, among other things: (1) that in the absence of a wage board's majority recommendation the commission lacked power to adopt the orders in question; and (2) that the commission lacked power to adopt orders providing for an immediate minimum wage increase And a further increase to take effect as of a future date. The writ of mandate was granted and judgment was entered in favor of the League directing the commission to set aside the orders at issue. The judgment declared, however, that the notice of public hearings, and the public hearings, satisfied 'due process of law' and the Labor Code requirements; ² and that the commission had power to adopt orders providing for premium rates of pay for overtime work and that such authorization was not limited by Labor Code section 1352.

The commission appeals from the judgment. The League cross-appeals from the portions of the judgment declaring that the notice of the public hearings and the hearings satisfied constitutional and legal standards, and that the commission had power to adopt orders providing for premium rates of pay for overtime.

At the outset of our discussion it might be emphasized that the Legislature by section 1178 has cast upon the Industrial Welfare Commission the duty to ascertain the wages paid, and the hours and conditions of labor and employment of, women and minors, and to investigate their comfort, health, safety and welfare. A legislative mandate is then shown by the provision that the commission fix (§ 1182): '(a) A minimum wage to be paid to women and minors engaged in any occupation, trade, or industry in this State, which shall not be less than a wage adequate to supply the necessary costs of proper living to, and maintain the health and welfare of such women and minors. (b) The maximum hours of work consistent with the health and welfare of women and minors engaged in any occupation, trade, or industry in this State. The hours so fixed shall not be more than the maximum now or hereafter fixed by law. (c) The standard conditions of labor demanded by the health and welfare of the women and minors engaged in any occupation, trade, or industry in this State.'

Remedial statutes such as those under consideration are to be liberally construed. (Viles v. State of California, 66 Cal.2d 24, 31, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818.) They are not construed within narrow limits of the letter of the law, but rather are to be given liberal effect to promote the general object sought to be accomplished. (Van Wagener v. MacFarland, 58 Cal.App. 115, 118--119, 208 P. 345.) It is fundamental that statutes are to be scrutinized in the light of the legislative intent. (McKesson v. Lowery, 51 Cal.2d 660, 662, 335 P.2d 662.) And if possible statutes will be so construed as to avoid absurd applications. (In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 312, 14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305.)

Regulations and orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission are presumed to be Reasonable and lawful. (Lab.Code, § 1200; Kerr's Catering Service v. Department of Industrial Relations, 57 Cal.2d 319, 330, 19 Cal.Rptr. 492, 369 P.2d 20; United Air Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Welfare Com., 211 Cal.App.2d 729, 750, 28 Cal.Rptr. 238.) And it is noted that Labor Code section 1179 provides: 'The commission shall make rules governing * * * the mode of procedure of the wage board, and shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all questions as to the validity of the procedure and of the recommendations thereof.'

In the light of the principles and rules we have outlined we proceed to examine the contentions of the parties on their respective appeals.

Appeal of defendant Industrial Welfare Commission

The commission first contends that the superior court erred in holding that the commission, in the absence of majority recommendations of the wage board, lacked power to adopt the orders in question.

We have discussed the disclosed legislative intent that the commission fulfill its directed duty relating to hours, wages, health, safety and welfare of women and minors employed in this state. Another strong legislative intent is indicated. Before promulgating any pertinent order the commission must have the benefit of the views of interested persons and organizations in the affected occupation, trade or industry. This intent is manifested by the selective method used in appointing wage boards and by the requirement of public hearings after notice to those most likely to be affected by prospective orders of the commission. As stated in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Welfare Com., supra, 211 Cal.App.2d 729, 754, 28 Cal.Rptr. 238, 'the commission should not make or change rules until it has had the advice of those skilled in the particular...