California Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira

• Decision Date: 05 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-6124,87-6124
• Citation: 871 F.2d 830
• Parties: CALIFORNIA HOME BRANDS, INC. and Pan Pacific Fisheries, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Danny FERREIRA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 830

871 F.2d 830

1989 A.M.C. 2099

CALIFORNIA HOME BRANDS, INC. and Pan Pacific Fisheries Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Danny FERREIRA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-6124.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 5, 1988 ^*.

Decided March 28, 1989.

Lawrence W. Kaye, Lillick, McHose & Charles, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Irwin M. Zalkin, Law Offices of Irwin M. Zalkin, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Forrest Booth, Kurt Micklow, Daniel J. Crawford, Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft, San Francisco, Cal., for amicus curiae American Tuna Boat Ass'n.

M.E. De Orchis, De Orchis and Partners, Craig V. Resile, New York City, for amicus curiae Maritime Overseas Corp.

Terry A. Bell, Ballay, Braud and Bell, A Professional Law Corp., Belle Chase, La., for amicus curiae Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

Before FARRIS, POOLE and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.

POOLE, Circuit Judge:

California Home Brands, Inc. and Pan Pacific Fisheries (hereafter collectively CHB), shipowners, appeal dismissal of their suit for indemnity and contribution from their seaman-employee, Danny Ferreira, whose negligence allegedly caused the injury of another crewmember. The district court granted Ferreira's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that neither traditional maritime law nor any federal statute authorizes an action by an employer against a seaman-employee for indemnity and contribution for injury to another crewmember, and that public policy does not support recognizing such a claim. We affirm.

FACTS

Manuel Rebelo, a crewmember of the M/V Pan Pacific, allegedly sustained injuries in January 1985 while working on board the vessel. In response to his claim for maintenance and cure, CHB, the owner of the vessel, sued for declaratory relief, denying that it owed any maintenance or payment of cure. Rebelo and his wife counterclaimed for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 688, and unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure under general maritime law.

Danny Ferreira, also an employee of CHB, was "deck boss" of the vessel on which Rebelo's injury allegedly occurred. Manuel Rebelo is the father-in-law of Ferreira and was hired at Ferreira's request. More than a year after CHB initiated the action against Rebelo, it moved for leave to file a third party complaint for indemnification and contribution against Ferreira, alleging that his negligence had caused Rebelo's injury. The motion was denied as untimely.

This action arose when CHB filed a separate suit against Ferreira seeking indemnity and contribution for any liability it might have to Rebelo. By stipulation of the parties, this suit was consolidated with CHB's initial action for declaratory relief and Rebelo's counterclaim. Ferreira moved to dismiss CHB's complaint against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion, holding that CHB's suit against its own employee for indemnity and contribution for the injury of a coemployee was barred as a matter of law. C.H.B. Foods, Inc. v. Rebelo, 662 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.Cal.1987).

We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a final order and judgment of the district court dismissing CHB's action for indemnity and contribution. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether a shipowner-employer who may be liable to an injured seaman-employee under the Jones Act is entitled to seek indemnity and contribution from another of its employees whose negligence allegedly caused the injury. We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. Guillory v. County of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir.1984).

A. Traditional Maritime Law

The district court heard this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(1), which grants district courts original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits. In determining the rights and duties of parties to a maritime action, the court must look to the general rules of maritime law or specific enactments of Congress.

It has long been recognized that principles of maritime law are distinct from the common law, particularly in the area of employment relations. E.g., Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 377, 53 S.Ct. 173, 176, 77 L.Ed. 368 (1932); The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390, 395-96 (S.D.N.Y.1883). As Justice Story wrote:

the maritime law furnishes entirely different doctrines upon [the rights and duties of seamen,] as well as many other subjects, from the common law ... [Seamen] are liable to different rules of discipline and sufferings from landsmen. The policy of the maritime law, for great and wise and benevolent purposes, has built up peculiar rights, privileges, duties, and liabilities in the sea service which do not belong to home pursuits.

Reed v. Canfield, 20 F. 426, 428 (Cir.Ct., D.Mass.1832). Thus, in deciding whether CHB may seek indemnity or contribution from Ferreira, common law doctrines governing land-based employment are not controlling. Instead, we are guided by those peculiar rules specifically evolved in the context of maritime employment.

Traditional maritime law recognized only two claims by a seaman injured in the course of his employment. The Supreme Court summarized these rights of the seaman in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903), after an exhaustive review of English, American and Continental authorities on maritime law. First, a seaman injured while on board a vessel was entitled to "maintenance and cure," and to his wages, at least until the end of the voyage. Id. at 175, 23 S.Ct. at 487. And secondly, a seaman could recover damages for injuries sustained due to the unseaworthiness of the ship. Id. at 175, 23 S.Ct. at 487.

A vessel owner's duty to provide maintenance and cure was implied from the employment contract between the shipowner and the seaman. Although contractual in nature, this duty could not be abrogated by agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Cortes, 287 U.S. at 371, 53 S.Ct. at 174. Similarly, the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship was absolute. Once a seaman proved that his injuries were caused by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel or its equipment, the shipowner was liable regardless of fault. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 42 S.Ct. 475, 66 L.Ed. 927 (1922).

Beyond these two rights of action, however, the seaman could assert no claim against the shipowner for injuries sustained on board. The common law concept of negligence as a basis for tort liability was not extended to employment related injuries at sea. In The City of Alexandria the court stated that

the maritime law makes no account of mere ordinary negligence ... More or less negligence is in fact to be expected, and the rules long established, as regards the relief to be afforded, are irrespective of such negligence, whether by the seaman or others.

The City of Alexandria, 17 F. at 396. In another maritime injury case, Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171 (1918), the Court held that "by virtue of the inherent nature of the seaman's contract, the defendant[-owner]'s negligence and the plaintiff[-seaman]'s contributory negligence were totally immaterial considerations in this case." Id. at 379-80, 38 S.Ct. at 502.

With the concept of negligence irrelevant to liability, the seaman could not recover consequential damages when injured through the negligence of his ship's owner, master or other employees. Beyond maintenance and cure, the vessel owner owed him no compensation for injuries sustained while in the ship's service. To mitigate the harsh effects of the traditional rule, Congress passed the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 688, in 1920, creating a negligence right of action for seamen against their employers.

B. Indemnity for Jones Act Liability

CHB seeks indemnity or contribution from its employee Ferreira for any damages it may have to pay another employee, Rebelo, for his shipboard injuries. Rebelo has asserted three claims against CHB: maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness and negligence under the Jones Act. CHB concedes that a seaman does not owe any duty to his fellow employees to furnish a seaworthy vessel or to provide maintenance and cure. It cannot then asset that Ferreira must indemnify it for these expenses. Thus, the sole basis for CHB's claim for indemnity and contribution from Ferreira is its own possible Jones Act liability to Rebelo.

It is well-settled that the Jones Act created a negligence cause of action only against the employer. See, e.g., Allen v. U.S., 338 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961, 85 S.Ct. 1104, 14 L.Ed.2d 152 (1965). It did not provide the seaman with a right of action against a fellow employee for negligence. Pearson v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 558 (E.D.La.1987); Ivy v. Security Barge Lines Inc., 89 F.R.D. 322 (N.D.Miss.1980). Nevertheless, appellant now argues that in providing the injured seaman with a remedy against his employer, Congress implicitly intended to allow ultimate liability to rest upon another crewmember.

CHB contends that if Congress had intended to protect the seaman from personal liability, the Jones Act would have included an express immunizing provision. It argues that since the Longshoremen and Harborworkers' Compensation Act (LHCA), 33 U.S.C. Secs. 901, et seq., explicitly exempts coworkers from suit by an injured longshoreman, the absence of such a provision in the Jones Act is proof that Congress did not intend a similar protection for the seaman.

However, appellant's argument ignores the substantial differences between the two statutes. The LHCA was intended to be a comprehensive workers' compensation act for...