California Teachers Assn. v. Ingwerson

• Decision Date: 19 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. B092961,B092961
• Citation: 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 917,46 Cal.App.4th 860
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2621, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 251, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4513, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7132 CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Donald W. INGWERSON et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 917

53 Cal.Rptr.2d 917

46 Cal.App.4th 860, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2621,

110 Ed. Law Rep. 251, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4513,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7132

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Donald W. INGWERSON et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. B092961.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

June 19, 1996.

De Witt W. Clinton, County Counsel, and Peter J. Gutierrez, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Appellants.

Charles R. Gustafson, Los Angeles, Beverly Tucker, Burlingame, Rosalind D. Wolf, Robert E. Lindquist, Santa Fe Springs; Rothner, Segall & Bahan, and Glenn Rothner, Pasadena, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

TURNER, Presiding Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Donald W. Ingwerson, the Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools ("superintendent"), and the Los Angeles County Office of Education ("county"), appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the California and Montebello Teachers Associations (the "unions"). The unions filed a mandate petition to compel the superintendent and the county to develop and adopt a fiscal plan and budget for the Montebello Unified School District ("the district") for the 1994-1995 school year which did not include a reduction in pay or freezing of salary schedule step and column increases for certified employees. The trial court granted the unions' petition. We reverse the judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

On January 30, 1995, the unions filed a mandamus petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, for the benefit of members of the unit of certified employees that they represent as the exclusive representative in the district. The petition sought a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the superintendent and the county to immediately develop and adopt a fiscal plan and budget for the district for the 1994-1995 school year.

The petition alleged the county had the legal duty and responsibility to carry out the orders of the superintendent and to supervise the financial affairs of the public school districts. The district and the unions entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective July 1, 1991, to June 30, 1994, which provided for payment of wages for certified bargaining unit members. On May 9, 1994, the unions and the district entered into negotiations on a successor agreement pursuant to the provisions for meeting and negotiating as set forth in the Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code sections 3540 et seq. During the negotiations, the district proposed a provision which called for "step/column freezes" and a 5.3 percent salary rollback for teachers. After the negotiations reached an impasse on September 7, 1994, the matter was submitted to mediation and factfinding. At the time the petition was heard, the parties were awaiting the decision of the fact finder following a hearing.

The petition further alleged the district was required by Education Code section 42127 and did adopt a budget for the 1994-1995 school year before July 1, 1994. The budget included step/column freezes and a 5.3 percent salary rollback for teachers. By August 10, 1994, the county had reviewed the budget and made its recommendations in writing to the district. The recommendations provided in part: "It is not reasonable nor is it advisable for the district to assume these salary proposals are an accomplished fact. Therefore, until negotiations are concluded, the district must increase its budget to include the full cost of salary expenditures based on current compensation schedules." (Italics in original.) On September 8, 1994, the district adopted a revised budget which failed to include the full cost of salary expenditures based on the current compensation schedules as recommended by the county.

On October 10, 1994, the county sent letters to the district disapproving the September 8, 1994, spending plan, and to the State Department of Education requesting the formation of a budget review committee. The budget review committee issued a report on November 15, 1994. On December 13, 1994, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction disapproved the district's budget. On January 19, 1995, the county stated in writing that a budget would not be imposed on the district until March 1, 1995. The county also stated in writing: "Salary rollbacks must be implemented and the costs of step and column increases eliminated from the budget to the extent that was proposed by the district in its September budget (district estimate = $4.3 million)."

The petition alleged the county and the district were aware of certain terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Under those provisions, the district would be able to unilaterally implement its proposed freeze of step/column movement and a 5.3 percent salary rollback after the fact-finding report was issued if the impasse still existed. The unions asserted the county delayed imposing a budget until after the factfinding report was issued to give the district the opportunity to unilaterally implement the freeze and salary rollback. The unions alleged the county acted arbitrarily and capriciously in providing for the freeze and salary rollbacks without proposing the savings elsewhere in the budget. The unions further alleged the county refused to allow the district to budget any of almost $1 million of Medicare/Medi-Cal reimbursements owing for services. This money could have been paid to the district. However, the petition alleged the county advised other districts they may budget 90 percent of the reimbursements. The county permitted the district to employ new persons for the 1994-1995 school year at a cost of over $900,000.

The county answered the petition and filed points and authorities in opposition. In its response, the county denied, among other things, allegations it advised other school districts they could budget Medicare/Medi-Cal reimbursements due to the uncertainty of when and if they would be received. The county, it was alleged, had no control over the district's decision to hire new employees. In addition, the county argued the petition was moot. The county alleged it had complied with the mandate of the Education Code because: (1) the statutory time limits were out of its hands once the county notified the Superintendent of Public Instruction the September 1994 budget had been disapproved; (2) the county had no authority to develop a plan until it received notification from the Superintendent of Public Instruction the September 1994 budget had been disapproved; and (3) the county worked diligently with the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the governing board of the district in December 1994 and January 1995 to develop and adopt a budget. The county also argued: the unions omitted to name as an indispensable party the governing board of the district which was the sole entity with the authority to cut teacher salaries; the trial judge lacked authority to compel the county to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, specifically to order it to implement a budget which " 'recognize[d] the status quo as to teacher salaries' "; the unions failed to name other indispensable parties; and the unions failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

We will relate the relevant evidence later in the opinion. The trial court granted the petition and this timely appeal followed from the judgment ordering the peremptory writ to issue.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Standard of Review

Our Supreme Court has described the role of the courts and the remedy of mandamus as follows: "Mandamus will lie to compel a public official to perform an official act required by law. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085.) Mandamus will not lie to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise discretion in a particular manner. Mandamus may issue, however, to compel an official both to exercise his [or her] discretion (if he [or she] is required by law to do so) and to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law. [Citations.]" (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610; accord Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 539, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142.) Mandamus will also lie to correct an abuse of discretion by an official acting in an administrative capacity. (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 442, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610; Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 344, fn. 24, 124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609.) The trial court is to presume the decisions of the agency or public official which are subject to traditional mandamus review are correct. (Lee v. Board of Civil Service Comrs. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 103, 108, 270 Cal.Rptr. 47; Cosgrove v. County of Sacramento (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 45, 50-51, 59 Cal.Rptr. 919.)

The issues in this case are whether the county complied with its duty under EDUCATION CODE SECTION 42127.3^{1 2} to adopt a budget for the district and whether the trial court acted within its authority in issuing the peremptory writ. More precisely, the question here is whether the trial court properly determined the county had a ministerial duty to develop and adopt a spending plan which did not recommend or include salary rollbacks and step/column freezes as a means to balance the budget. Citing extensive prior California decisional authority, the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District has held: "[It is a] fundamental proposition ... that the adoption of a budget is a legislative function, and that under the 'separation of powers' principle which is fundamental to our form of government a court is generally without power to interfere in the budgetary process." (County of Butte v. Superior Court (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 693, 698, 222 Cal.Rptr. 429.) Our Supreme Court described that doctrine in the context of judicial review of executive branch decisions in a...