Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Children's Hosp.

• Citation: 901 S.W.2d 270
• Decision Date: 23 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 65260,65260
• Parties: 101 Ed. Law Rep. 1234 Daniel J. CALLAHAN, Jr., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CARDINAL GLENNON CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, Defendant, and St. Louis University, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 270

901 S.W.2d 270

101 Ed. Law Rep. 1234

Daniel J. CALLAHAN, Jr., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CARDINAL GLENNON CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, Defendant and St. Louis University, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 65260.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Four.

May 23, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied June 26, 1995.

Application to Transfer Denied

July 25, 1995.

William L. Davis, Robyn Susan Fox, Moser and Marsalek, P.C., St. Louis, for appellant.

William T. Nolan, Devereaux, Stokes & Nolan, P.C., Godfrey P. Padberg, Padberg, McSweeney, Slater & Merz, St. Louis, for respondent.

SIMON, Judge.

Defendant St. Louis University (SLU) appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for an order showing satisfaction of judgment. On appeal, SLU alleges that (1) the trial court erred in denying its motion and in requiring SLU to pay an additional amount because its original payment to plaintiff Daniel J. Callahan, Jr. and plaintiff's settlement with defendant Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital (Cardinal Glennon) fully satisfied the judgment in plaintiff's favor; and (2) its appeal was timely, therefore, it did not waive its right to seek an order showing full satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment. We affirm.

The substantive facts underlying this appeal appear in detail in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 856-58 (Mo. banc 1993) (Callahan I ). In brief, after a jury trial, plaintiff secured a $16,000,000.00 judgment, reduced to $15,710,000.00 as a result of a pretrial settlement between plaintiff and a treating doctor, against defendants, who were found jointly and severally liable for injuries plaintiff suffered due to defendants' negligence. The present appeal stems from a postjudgment settlement between plaintiff and Cardinal Glennon, see id. at 858, whereby Cardinal Glennon paid plaintiff $4,000,000.00 in exchange for a complete release of further liability and partial satisfaction of judgment.

Plaintiff and Cardinal Glennon entered into the settlement while the Callahan I appeal was pending. Pursuant to a remand, the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis conducted a hearing on the settlement on March 26, 1992. SLU sought to participate in the hearing, contending that it had an interest in the settlement and that it should receive copies of the settlement documents. Plaintiff objected to SLU's request, and the trial court sustained the objection. Subsequently, SLU moved to amend the judgment or alternatively for partial satisfaction of judgment ("first motion"), and the trial court denied the motion ("1992 order").

The trial court approved the settlement, and Cardinal Glennon dismissed its appeal. SLU proceeded with its appeal and, on October 26, 1993, our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Callahan I, 863 S.W.2d at 873.

On November 17, 1993, SLU tendered and plaintiff accepted payment of $9,644,648.77, which constituted one-half of the $15,710,000.00 judgment plus interest. SLU moved for an order showing satisfaction of judgment on November 24, 1993, based on its payment to plaintiff and on the settlement between plaintiff and Cardinal Glennon ("second motion"). However, before the second motion was heard, plaintiff filed requests for execution and garnishment against SLU bank accounts, seeking the balance of the $16,000,000.00 total judgment.

SLU's motion was heard on December 2, 1993, before a different trial court, which refused to approve a supersedeas bond to stay execution. On December 15, 1993, the trial court denied SLU's second motion ("1993 order"), and SLU appealed.

Plaintiff has moved to dismiss SLU's appeal, on the ground that it failed to appeal from the 1992 order, "which raised the identical issues of law." We have taken plaintiff's motion with the case, and SLU directs its second point to plaintiff's motion to dismiss. Therefore, for the sake of logical presentation, we shall address its second point.

In its second point, SLU alleges that it did not waive its right to seek an order showing full satisfaction of judgment by failing to appeal from the 1992 order, and that, therefore, it timely filed its appeal from the 1993 order. SLU offers four reasons in support: (1) any appeal earlier than the present one would have been premature; (2) the trial court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction "does not prevent this appeal on the merits"; (3) the issues in the 1993 motion are different from those in the 1992 motion; and (4) plaintiff is estopped from arguing that the trial court had jurisdiction in 1992 because he argued at the hearing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Again, for the sake of logical presentation, we begin by addressing the second and third reasons.

The threshold issue is whether the 1992 order denying SLU's first motion for partial satisfaction of judgment was appealable.

SLU relies on Boillot v. Conyer, 861 S.W.2d 152 (Mo.App.E.D.1993), for the proposition that "[a] determination by a court as to whether or not it has jurisdiction of a matter or issue is not an appealable order, and instead is properly reviewable by an extraordinary writ." However, a careful reading of Boillot reveals that it reaches a different conclusion: "A determination that a court has jurisdiction is not an appealable order and instead is properly reviewable by an extraordinary writ." Id. at 154. Clearly, a determination "whether or not" a court has jurisdiction over a matter is different from a determination that it "has" such jurisdiction. The trial court here, however, concluded that it did not have jurisdiction and, therefore, Boillot is not applicable.

Section 512.020, R.S.Mo.1986, makes appealable "any special order after final judgment in the cause." This phrase encompasses "orders in special proceedings attacking or aiding the enforcement of the judgment after it has become final in the action in which it was rendered." Helton Constr. Co. v. High Point Shopping Ctr., Inc., 838 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Mo.App.S.D.1992) (quoting Wehrs v. Sullivan, 187 S.W. 825, 826-27 (Mo.1916)). Helton, 838 S.W.2d at 91, cites several examples of "any special order after final judgment," including an order reviving a judgment and lien after the judgment creditor obtained a writ of scire facias in accordance with prior Rule 74.36, Moore v. Luna, 626 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Mo.App.1981); a final judgment entered in a garnishment action, Household Fin. Corp. v. Seigel-Robert Plating Co., 483 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Mo.App.1972); and an order overruling a motion to quash an execution, Carrow v. Carrow, 294 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Mo.App.1956). Missouri courts have a long history of permitting appeals from the overruling of motions to quash executions. See, e.g., Slagel v. Murdock, 65 Mo. 522, 524 (1877); Gale v. Michie, 47 Mo. 326, 327 (1871); Bain v. Chrisman, 27 Mo. 293 (1858). More recently, Missouri courts have treated orders overruling motions for partial or complete satisfaction of a judgment as appealable special orders under § 512.020. See, e.g., Helton, 838 S.W.2d at 92; White River Dev. Co. v. Meco Sys., Inc., 837 S.W.2d 327, 331-32 (Mo.App.S.D.1992); Brosnahan v. Brosnahan, 516 S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Mo.App.1974).

At the time of SLU's 1992 motion, the principal claim, plaintiff's action against SLU and Cardinal Glennon, had been already disposed of, and the overruling of SLU's motion for partial satisfaction of judgment was a final and complete disposition of its subject-matter. See Gale, 47 Mo. at 327. Thus, we conclude that the denial of SLU's first motion was appealable.

However, we further conclude that SLU's failure to appeal from the 1992 order does not affect the appealability of the 1993 order. SLU contends that the issues in its second motion were not the same as those in its first motion and, therefore, the appeal should proceed to the merits. SLU's argument is based on the premise that it sought a partial satisfaction of judgment in 1992, whereas its 1993 motion was for complete satisfaction of the judgment. Plaintiff counters that SLU cannot relitigate the issue of whether Cardinal Glennon's $4,000,000.00 payment satisfied its equitable one-half share of the judgment, $7,855,000.00, because it was adjudicated by the denial of SLU's first motion, and the second motion necessarily depends upon the presumption that Cardinal Glennon's share was satisfied.

Traditionally, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) precluded the same parties from relitigating issues that had been adjudicated previously. Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979). Although the concept of collateral estoppel has been extended to allow strangers to the prior suit to estop parties in the prior suit from relitigating previously adjudicated issues, see id. at 719, the traditional view, affecting the same parties as in the prior suit, remains effective. See id. at 719.

Examining the present situation in light of the Oates factors, we conclude that collateral estoppel does not preclude SLU from litigating the issue of whether it was entitled to an order of satisfaction of judgment.

The issues are concededly similar. SLU could not obtain complete satisfaction of the judgment in 1993 unless the court ruled that Cardinal Glennon had satisfied its share of the judgment, which the first trial court adjudicated in its 1992 order. However, as to the second Oates factor, the prior adjudication here was not on the merits. The trial court expressly denied SLU's first motion on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A finding that a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is preliminary, without prejudice, and without res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. See Zahn v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 655 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Mo.App.1983). Therefore, the 1992 order did not affect the validity or appealability of the 1993 order. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is denied.

We turn now to SLU's first point, which addresses the merits of the appeal....