Cameron T., In re
| Decision Date | 06 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | CA-JV-97-0030,Nos. 1,1,CA-JV,s. 1 |
| Parties | 255 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 47 In re CAMERON T. In re FELIPE S. In re THOMAS S. 97-0033 and 1 97-0051. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
At the general election of November 5, 1996, Arizona voters passed ballot proposition 102 ("Prop.102"), the Juvenile Justice Initiative. It repealed former Arizona Constitution Article 6, Section 15 ("former Section 15") and adopted new Article 4, Part 2, Section 22 ("Section 22") and Article 6, Section 15 ("new Section 15"). These constitutional changes became effective on December 6, 1996, when the Governor proclaimed their adoption under Arizona Constitution Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(13). 1 See State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan, 104 Ariz. 193, 196, 450 P.2d 383, 386 (1969).
These appeals present a single issue: whether Prop. 102 stripped the juvenile court of legal authority to waive its jurisdiction and transfer for adult prosecution any juvenile accused of committing a crime from December 6, 1996, through July 20, 1997, the day before legislation implementing Prop. 102 became effective. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 220. We hold that the juvenile court had such authority and thus affirm the transfer orders.
The state filed delinquency petitions in the juvenile court against appellants, charging each with offenses that did not constitute "murder," "forcible sexual assault," or "armed robbery." 2 By petition filed December 13, 1996, sixteen-year-old appellant Cameron T. was charged with committing attempted armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault on December 11, 1996. The December 21, 1996, petition filed against sixteen-year-old Felipe S. charged him with illegally possessing a shotgun on December 20, 1996. In a petition filed January 14, 1997, seventeen-year-old appellant Thomas S. was charged with residential burglary committed on January 13, 1997.
The state filed motions under Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court ("ARPJC" or "Rules") 12 through 14, to transfer these juveniles for adult prosecution on the pending charges. The juveniles sought to dismiss the motions. They reasoned that the repeal of former Section 15 withdrew the juvenile court's only legal authority to waive its exclusive jurisdiction over children accused of crimes and thus to allow the state to prosecute them as adults. According to appellants, Section 22(1) now provided that all juveniles accused of unlawful conduct (other than certain designated offenses) were to be "prosecuted as provided by law," meaning under statutory law. Appellants also contended that under new Section 15, the jurisdiction and authority of Arizona courts in all matters affecting juveniles were now to be "as provided by the legislature or the people by initiative or referendum." Appellants maintained that the two new constitutional provisions, read together, restricted the juvenile court's jurisdiction and legal authority to that provided by statute alone. Because no statute authorized the court to transfer juveniles for adult prosecution until July 1997, well after the dates of the charged offenses, appellants claimed that the juvenile court lacked legal authority to grant the state's motions to transfer.
The juvenile court denied each appellant's motion to dismiss the state's transfer motion. In each case the juvenile court then conducted a hearing and in each case granted the state's motion. It is from these transfer orders that the juveniles appeal. See ARPJC 24(a) and 25(a). We have jurisdiction. Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 8-236.
From December 9, 1960, through December 5, 1996, former Section 15 provided:
The superior court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings and matters affecting dependent, neglected, incorrigible or delinquent children, or children accused of crime, under the age of eighteen years. The judges shall hold examinations in chambers for all such children concerning whom proceedings are brought, in advance of any criminal prosecution of such children, and may, in their discretion, suspend criminal prosecution of such children. The powers of the judges to control such children shall be as provided by law.
Several Arizona decisions have referred to this provision as the source of the superior court's authority to transfer juveniles for prosecution as adults. See, e.g., State v. Jiminez, 109 Ariz. 305, 306, 509 P.2d 198, 199 (1973); Romley v. Superior Ct., 174 Ariz. 126, 128, 847 P.2d 627, 629 (App.1993).
When Prop. 102 became law on December 6, 1996, former Section 15 was revised to read:
The jurisdiction and authority of the courts of this state in all proceedings and matters affecting juveniles shall be as provided by the legislature or the people by initiative or referendum.
(Emphasis added.) Also effective December 6, 1996, Section 22 provides in relevant part:
In order to preserve and protect the right of the people to justice and public safety, and to ensure fairness and accountability when juveniles engage in unlawful conduct, the legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum, shall have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws regarding all proceedings and matters affecting such juveniles. The following rights, duties, and powers shall govern such proceedings and matters:
(1) Juveniles 15 years of age or older accused of murder, forcible sexual assault, armed robbery or other violent felony offenses as defined by statute shall be prosecuted as adults. Juveniles 15 years of age or older who are chronic felony offenders as defined by statute shall be prosecuted as adults. Upon conviction all such juveniles shall be subject to the same laws as adults, except as specifically provided by statute and by article 22, section 16 of this constitution. All other juveniles accused of unlawful conduct shall be prosecuted as provided by law. Every juvenile convicted of or found responsible for unlawful conduct shall make prompt restitution to any victims of such conduct for their injury or loss.
(Emphasis added.)
The supreme court first implemented the juvenile court's transfer authority through ARPJC 12, 13, and 14, effective April 15, 1970, and still in effect as amended. See also ARPJC 14.1 ("Transfer Deferral"). Like all other court rules, ARPJC 12, 13, and 14 were promulgated under the supreme court's exclusive power to "make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court." See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(5); see also State v. Blazak, 105 Ariz. 216, 217, 462 P.2d 84, 85 (1969); State v. Jackson, 184 Ariz. 296, 298, 908 P.2d 1081, 1083 (App.1995).
Rules of court cannot create or extinguish substantive rights, but they can fix the procedural methods by which such rights are to be asserted and enforced. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986); Roddy v. County of Maricopa, 184 Ariz. 625, 627, 911 P.2d 631, 633 (App.1996); A.R.S. § 12-109(A) ().
Appellants contend that Rules 12 through 14, mere procedural rules, do not authorize the juvenile court to order that a juvenile accused of a crime be prosecuted as an adult. They argue that former Section 15 provided the sole substantive legal basis for that authority, and its repeal left a void that could be filled only by new legislation under Section 22(1). Absent such legislation, appellants conclude that existing legislation granting exclusive original jurisdiction to the juvenile court over juveniles accused of crimes dictates that they can be prosecuted only in the juvenile system. See A.R.S. § 8-202(A) and (E) (Supp.1996); A.R.S. § 8-221 (1989); A.R.S. § 8-222 (1989); see generally A.R.S. §§ 8-201 through -251; 8-271 through -367 (1989 and Supp.1996). We disagree.
Appellants' analysis overlooks an obvious and determinative fact: the consequence of their construction would contravene the intent of the electorate in adopting Prop. 102. The overall intent of Prop. 102 was to make possible faster, more effective, and in some cases more stringent responses to juvenile crime. For example, the analysis of Prop. 102 provided by the Legislative Council in the 1996 Publicity Pamphlet informed prospective voters, in part:
Proposition 102 would amend the Constitution by repealing Article VI, section 15 and by allowing the Legislature to limit the power of the courts to suspend the prosecution of a juvenile and by limiting the jurisdiction of the courts to those juvenile matters that are provided by the Legislature or the people. The Supreme Court and Superior Court would continue to have jurisdiction over juveniles, including dependent juveniles, pursuant to other existing laws unless those laws are amended by the Legislature or the people at some future time.
See Ward v. Stevens, 86 Ariz. 222, 228-29, 344 P.2d 491, 495 (1959) (); A.R.S. § 19-124(B) and (C) (). Precluding the juvenile court under all circumstances from making discretionary transfers for adult prosecution for juvenile crimes committed between December 6, 1996, and July 21, 1997, would defeat the electorate's purpose in adopting Prop. 102.
Rules 12, 13, and 14 provide a detailed and self-contained procedural system governing the grounds on which the juvenile court may rely to decide whether to...
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