Camp v. Wabash Railroad Company
Decision Date | 29 April 1902 |
Citation | 68 S.W. 96,94 Mo.App. 272 |
Parties | H. H. CAMP, Respondent, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court.--Hon. Elliott M. Hughes Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Reversed and remanded.
George S. Grover for appellant.
(1) This is a common-law action, and, hence, should not have been tried, as it was, upon the theory that there had been a technical violation of the statute. Nall v Railroad, 97 Mo. 68. (2) The demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained. Yarnell v. Railroad, 113 Mo. 580; Moss v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 89; Henry v Railroad, 76 Mo. 293; Hanlon v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 387; Cohn v. City of Kansas, 108 Mo. 393; Ray v. Poplar Bluffs, 70 Mo.App. 261. (3) The court gave improper instructions at the plaintiff's request. Obert v. Dunn, 140 Mo. 485; Carder v. Primen, 60 Mo.App. 427; Corcoran v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 406; McGowan v. Railroad, 109 Mo. 534; Linn v. Bridge, 78 Mo.App. 118; Hohstadt v. Daggs, 50 Mo.App. 252. (4) The court gave erroneous instructions of its own motion. Hopper v. Hotel Co., 142 Mo. 378. (5) The verdict is so grossly excessive as to imply misconduct on the part of the jury. Chitty v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 64.
Rosenberger & Son and H. W. Johnson for respondent.
(1) Appellant first complains of the sufficiency of plaintiff's petition. The point is not well taken. The allegations of the petition are sufficient to support the action as tried. Nixon v. Railroad, 141 Mo. 425. (2) The law of Missouri is well settled that under a common-law count of negligence, statutory negligence may be shown. Hence, the court committed no error in admitting testimony to show appellant failed to construct a crossing as required by statute, and instruction No. 1 as prayed for by respondent correctly declared the law. Calvert v. Railroad, 34 Mo. 467; Iba v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 469; Minter v. Railroad, 82 Mo. 128; Boone v. Railroad, 20 Mo.App. 232. (3) The question of contributory negligence is one of mixed law and fact and should be determined by the jury, under the guide of proper instructions in the light of all attending circumstances. Fulks v. Railroad, 111 Mo. 335. (4) What an ordinarily prudent man would do under given circumstances must be left for the jury. It can not properly be declared, as a matter of law, that plaintiff failed to exercise care unless the facts exclude any other fair and reasonable inference. Jones v. Bond, 63 Mo. 501; Maus v. City of Springfield, 101 Mo. 613. (5) Plaintiff's instructions placed the case fairly before the jury and are undoubtedly the law, and well supported by the decisions of the appellate courts of the State. R. S. 1899, sec. 1103; Browning v. Railroad, 124 Mo. 55; Tetherow v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 74; Nixon v. Railroad, 141 Mo. 425; Kimes v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 611; Moberly v. Railroad, 17 Mo.App. 578. (6) The estimation of damages is the province of the jury; and where their verdict is supported by substantial evidence, and it has met the approval of the trial judge, the appellate court will not interfere on the ground that it is excessive. George v. Railroad, 145 Mo. 38; Dammann v. St. Louis, 150 Mo. 186; Heart Pence v. Rodgers, 143 Mo. 623; Hollandback v. Railroad, 141 Mo. 97; Cobb v. Railroad, 149 Mo. 609.
--This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, while passing along a public highway on defendant's right of way adjacent to a crossing of the highway over defendant's railway track in Montgomery county, Missouri, near the town of High Hill. The complaint of plaintiff is that the public road there was in a dangerous condition, because of defendant's negligence in the work of raising the grade of the road on the right of way to conform to defendant's elevation of the grade of its track at that place to a level about a foot higher than the former grade.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was driving a wagon along the road on his way homeward from Jonesburg. As he came down the grade from the railway crossing, he was thrown out of his wagon and received serious injuries. He ascribes the mishap to the defective condition of the roadway on the defendant's land constituting the approach to the crossing.
The defendant denies the aforesaid charge of negligence and asserts that plaintiff's want of ordinary care directly contributed to his injury.
The case was tried in the circuit court with the aid of a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for seventeen hundred dollars. Defendant has appealed in the usual way.
The evidence of plaintiff tended to show that that part of the public road which lay upon defendant's right of way and constituted the approach to the said crossing over defendant's track, had in it a deep rut (which several of the witnesses called a "chuck hole") into which plaintiff's wagon ran as he drove down the incline from the tracks, and that owing to said defective condition of the roadway plaintiff's wagon upset and he received the injuries complained of.
The accident occurred between four and five o'clock p. m., October 7, 1899. Plaintiff's team of mules was moving down the incline at a brisk trot when the wagon ran into the rut and threw him out. Defendant claims that plaintiff's management of the team was negligent and that the accident might have been avoided by ordinary care on his part. With this defense is mingled a distinct intimation that plaintiff's conduct was somewhat affected if not inspired by preliminary libations which he is charged to have enjoyed on his visit to Jonesburg that afternoon.
The instructions given by the court at the instance of plaintiff are as follows:
The instructions on behalf of de...
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