Campos v. State

• Citation: 816 N.W.2d 480
• Decision Date: 20 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. A10–1395.,A10–1395.
• Parties: Rene Reyes CAMPOS, Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

816 N.W.2d 480

Rene Reyes CAMPOS, Respondent,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Appellant.

No. A10–1395.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 20, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

The Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), announced a new rule of criminal procedure that is not applicable retroactively to cases on collateral review.

Bruce D. Nestor, De León & Nestor, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Lee W. Barry, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Peter W. Sipkins, Ivan Ludmer, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae The Advocates for Human Rights.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to be informed about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, respondent Rene Reyes Campos argued that Padilla applies retroactively to his conviction. Based on Padilla, Reyes Campos contended that his attorney's failure to warn him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and rendered his plea invalid. The district court determined that Padilla could not be applied to Reyes Campos' collateral attack on his conviction. The court of appeals reversed. Because we conclude that Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure that does not apply to a collateral review of Reyes Campos' conviction, we reverse.

On May 26, 2009, the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court, charging Reyes Campos with felony simple robbery committed for the benefit of a gang pursuant to Minn.Stat. §§ 609.24 and 609.229, subds. 2, 3(a), 4 (2010).¹ Reyes Campos waived his right to a certification hearing, and the district court certified Reyes Campos for prosecution as an adult. Reyes Campos entered a guilty plea in district court on July 10, 2009, to an amended charge of simple robbery in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.24.

At the plea hearing, defense counsel questioned Reyes Campos on the record regarding his understanding of the plea. Defense counsel asked questions regarding Reyes Campos' understanding that he was giving up his trial rights, including his presumption of innocence, right to present a defense, and right to be convicted only by a unanimous jury after the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. But Reyes Campos was not questioned or informed about any immigration consequences of his plea.² Nor was he asked whether he understood the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. SeeMinn. R.Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)( l ) (providing that “[b]efore the judge accepts a guilty plea, the defendant must be sworn and questioned by the judge with the assistance of counsel,” including questioning regarding the defendant's understanding that “[i]f the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, a guilty plea may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization as a United States citizen.”)

The district court accepted Reyes Campos' guilty plea. The court stayed imposition of sentence, placed Reyes Campos on probation for 3 years, and ordered that, as a condition of probation, he serve 365 days in the Hennepin County workhouse, with credit for 50 days already spent in custody.

When he entered his guilty plea, Reyes Campos had just turned 18 years old, and was a legal permanent resident, but not a citizen, of the United States. Reyes Campos' conviction for simple robbery, in conjunction with the 365–day workhouse condition, resulted in Reyes Campos having an “aggravated felony” conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (G) (2006).³ The INA provides that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). In January 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained Reyes Campos, and Reyes Campos has since been deported to Nicaragua, his country of citizenship.

On May 26, 2010, Reyes Campos filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.⁴ Reyes Campos relied in his motion on the United States Supreme Court's March 31, 2010, decision in Padilla, 130 S.Ct. 1473, holding that an attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment by failing to inform a client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Reyes Campos argued that Padilla applied retroactively to his case, and that under Padilla's holding he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. As a result of his counsel's ineffectiveness, Reyes Campos contended that his plea was uninformed and therefore invalid. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that a defendant's guilty plea may be constitutionally invalid if the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty plea not intelligent); State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn.1994) (“When an accused is represented by counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court denied Reyes Campos' motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court ruled that Reyes Campos' counsel had not provided ineffective assistance when he failed to inform Reyes Campos about the immigration consequences of his plea. The court determined that Padilla did not apply retroactively, but had instead announced “a new constitutional rule because it impose[d] a new requirement on counsel under the federal constitution.” The court relied on an earlier decision from our court, Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn.1998), abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, holding that counsel need not warn a client about the collateral deportation consequences of a guilty plea. The district court concluded that Reyes Campos had not proved that a manifest injustice occurred warranting withdrawal of his guilty plea, which was, the court found, accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. SeeMinn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1 (noting that a plea may be withdrawn, even after sentencing, if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice”); see also Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn.1997) (“Manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, and thus the plea may be withdrawn.”). Reyes Campos filed a motion to reconsider, which the court also denied.

The court of appeals reversed. Reyes Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565 (Minn.App.2011). The court ruled that Padilla applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, because Padilla did “not announce a new rule of criminal procedure.” Id. at 569. We granted the State's petition for review.

The primary issue presented in this case is whether the rule announced in Padilla applies retroactively to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on collateral review. Reyes Campos argues that under the Court's holding in Padilla he received ineffective assistance of counsel rendering his plea uninformed and invalid because his attorney failed to inform him about the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The State contends, however, that Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and, as a result, Padilla's holding cannot be applied retroactively to Reyes Campos' conviction, which became final several months before Padilla was decided. Alternatively, the parties raise the issue of whether Reyes Campos should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the district court failed to provide him with the general immigration advisory required by Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)( l ).

We review a district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.05, subd. 1, for an abuse of discretion. See Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Minn.1998). But the question of whether Padilla applies retroactively to Reyes Campos' conviction is a legal one that we review de novo. See State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn.2005).

I.

Reyes Campos argues that Padilla applies retroactively to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on collateral review. To provide context for the analysis of the retroactivity question, we begin with a discussion of the law applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilty plea context raised before Padilla, and then turn to an analysis of Padilla itself. With this background in mind, we then return to the retroactivity question. As set forth below, we conclude that Padilla does not apply retroactively.

A.

Before Padilla, to determine whether a criminal defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, we applied the standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn.1992); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (applying the Strickland standard to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel). Under Strickland, the defendant must show that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052;see also King v. State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn.1997). The defendant must also demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have...