King v. State

Decision Date08 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. C1-96-2337,C1-96-2337
Citation562 N.W.2d 791
PartiesScott Nolan KING, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Postconviction court properly denied petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing when petitioner failed to present any disputed facts and all of petitioner's claims either were waived when petitioner failed to object at trial, were raised and decided in previous direct appeal, or were insufficient to entitle petitioner to relief.

Linda M. Freyer, Asst. Henn. County Atty., Minneapolis, for Respondent.

Scott Nolan King, pro se.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

OPINION

BLATZ, Justice.

Appellant Scott Nolan King was convicted of first-degree murder on December 18, 1992 and his conviction was affirmed by this court on March 11, 1994. During his trial, the state submitted expert evidence that DNA in King's blood matched DNA found in semen samples taken from the victim's body. The district court did not hold a Frye hearing and King's counsel did not object to the admission of DNA evidence. On July 31, 1996, King filed a petition for postconviction relief contending that the district court erred in not holding a Frye hearing, that King's trial counsel was ineffective because he did not request a Frye hearing, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective because she did not appeal the Frye issue. The postconviction court denied King's petition in all respects, without holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

Scott Nolan King was convicted of first-degree murder (while attempting to commit first-degree criminal sexual conduct) under Minn.Stat. § 609.185(2) (1996). His conviction was affirmed by this court. State v. King, 513 N.W.2d 245 (Minn.1994).

On or about February 6, 1992, Gwendolyn Lewis was stabbed to death in her Minneapolis apartment. The medical examiner found semen in Lewis's vagina, in her anus, and on her buttocks. Based upon the evidence in his possession, the medical examiner concluded that the evidence was "highly suggestive" that sexual activity occurred after death.

The police received informant information that King had admitted to killing Lewis, causing them to focus on King as a suspect. Based upon the informant information, the police obtained a search warrant authorizing them to remove King's blood for comparison with semen samples found at the murder scene. Police officers executed the warrant on April 2 by bringing King to Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) for removal of a blood sample. En route to HCMC, King told police officers that he knew about DNA typing and was happy to give a blood sample because he did not have sex with Lewis.

When subsequent analysis of King's blood sample showed that the DNA in his blood matched the DNA in semen found in and on Lewis, police officers arrested King on April 22. When a police officer informed King he was under arrest for Lewis's murder, King stated, "I knew it. Just because I f* * *ed her doesn't mean I killed her, does it?"

After arriving at the police station, police officers read King his Miranda rights and interrogated King. King changed his story often during the 3- to 5-hour interrogation. After initially denying that he had sex with Lewis, he admitted that Lewis had consensual sex with him in exchange for crack cocaine. He admitted having vaginal sex with Lewis but denied having anal sex or killing her. During the interrogation, King attempted to implicate several other people in Lewis's murder. The next day, on April 23, King was read his Miranda rights again and was interrogated a second time. At this interrogation, King was confronted with evidence indicating that one of the people he had implicated in Lewis's murder was not in the apartment building on the day of the murder. During this interrogation, King stated, "I done killed this woman," "I guess I did," and "It ain't nobody else." King said he did not know why he killed her, but that he did not rape her and did not remember having sex with her after she was dead.

King was indicted on one count of first-degree murder on June 4, 1992. King was represented by counsel at his jury trial. Before trial, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence and King's trial counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to the state's motion. King's counsel also filed his own motions and memoranda, including motions to suppress King's statements to the police and to suppress DNA evidence on the basis that blood samples taken from King were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled in favor of the state on all of these issues.

DNA evidence was admitted at trial after the state laid a foundation for the evidence. A forensic scientist from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) testified that the DNA profile he obtained from samples of semen found on Lewis's buttocks and in her vagina "match[ed]" the DNA profile from King's blood. The forensic scientist also testified that the probability of a random match was less than 1 in 1 billion.

At trial, the defense's theory of the case was that King had consensual sex with Lewis on February 6, then left the apartment building. King's trial counsel argued that Lewis was seen and heard in the apartment building after King left the building. He contended that King's confession was involuntary because King confessed after a lengthy interrogation and did not give sufficient details of the crime to corroborate his confession. King's counsel argued that when King told two acquaintances that he killed Lewis, he was being sarcastic. He also argued that many of the state's witnesses were crack addicts who had memory problems, so their evidence was suspect.

The jury found King guilty of first-degree murder. The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment.

King was represented by different counsel on the direct appeal from his conviction. His appellate counsel argued that the results of King's blood test should have been suppressed because the affidavit supporting the search warrant contained a misrepresentation, that King's statements to the police should have been suppressed as fruits of an unlawful search, and that the trial court erred in admitting the Spreigl evidence. King filed a pro se brief on appeal, arguing that his conviction should be reversed on six grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. King based his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on King's trial counsel's failure to present testimony from three witnesses, including the doctor who performed Lewis's autopsy. King's pro se brief did not mention the admission of DNA evidence or the lack of a Frye hearing.

On direct appeal, this court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the search warrant was valid, that any error in admitting King's statement to police when the search warrant was executed was harmless, and that the Spreigl evidence was properly admitted. King, 513 N.W.2d at 248-49. In conclusion, this court noted that it had considered King's pro se supplemental brief and had determined that King "received a fair trial and was properly found guilty of first-degree murder." Id. at 249.

King filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking vacation of his sentence or a new trial. King asserted that the trial court erred in admitting DNA evidence without first conducting a Frye hearing. He also asserted that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not request a Frye hearing and because his appellate counsel did not appeal the Frye issue. King requested an evidentiary hearing on his petition. King's petition for postconviction relief was denied in all respects by the same district court judge as had presided over the trial and sentencing. In denying King's petition, the postconviction court found that King did not raise any new or novel claims, that the grounds for relief he presented were known at the time of his appeal, that he had received effective representation at trial and a fair trial, and that he had failed to meet his burden of proving that his appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

I.

King contends that the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction relief.

"A petitioner seeking postconviction relief has the burden of establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, facts which warrant a reopening of the case." State v. Rainer, 502 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn.1993) (citing Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (1996)). This court reviews postconviction proceedings to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the postconviction court's findings and will not overturn the postconviction court's findings absent an abuse of discretion. Hodgson v. State, 540 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn.1995).

A postconviction court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing unless there are material facts in dispute which must be resolved in order to determine the postconviction claim on the merits. Id. In this case, the postconviction court properly denied King an evidentiary hearing because he failed to cite any disputed facts.

II.

King contends that the district court erred in admitting DNA evidence. However, King's trial counsel did not object to the admission of the DNA evidence and did not request a Frye hearing. In fact, King's trial counsel stipulated to the chain of custody of the DNA evidence and King's blood sample. In putting this stipulation on the record, King's trial counsel stated that he had spoken with King about the issue before stipulating to it. The only objection King's trial counsel made to the DNA evidence was when he objected to testimony from the BCA's forensic scientist as to the National Academy of Science's findings regarding the reliability of DNA testing. The district court overruled his objection.

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