Campos v. State
| Decision Date | 30 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 45S03-0804-CR-199.,45S03-0804-CR-199. |
| Citation | 885 N.E.2d 590 |
| Parties | Sergio CAMPOS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Lake County Superior Court, No. 45G01-0507-FA-0035; The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Judge.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 45A03-0605-CR-211.
Kathleen M. Sweeney, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ann L. Goodwin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
This case involves a traffic stop resulting in a vehicle search that uncovered cocaine. We hold that there was no probable cause to conduct the search, so consent was required. Because the officer communicated to the occupants of the car that consent to search was "necessary," the ensuing purported consent was invalid. The search therefore violated both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions, and the seized cocaine may not be admitted in evidence.
A second issue arises because the two occupants of the car were seated in a police cruiser while the search proceeded, and they made incriminating statements which were recorded on the cruiser's video-tape of the stop. The recorded statements are admissible in evidence. Although the statements were an indirect product of an unlawful search, they were freely given and not the result of unlawful interrogation.
On the morning of July 28, 2005, driver Cesar Santiago-Armendariz and passenger Sergio Campos were traveling in a Chevy Malibu on Interstate 80/94 in Lake County, Indiana. Officer Alfred Villarreal of the Lake County Highway Interdiction Unit clocked the vehicle at sixty-nine miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. Villarreal paced the Malibu for about half a mile before pulling it over, parking his patrol car behind it, and activating an in-car video camera that recorded the entire stop. Villarreal approached the driver's side window and asked Santiago for his license and registration. Villarreal noticed that Santiago's hand was "shaking" as Santiago produced his paperwork. Villarreal then asked Santiago to have a seat in the police car. Santiago complied, but Campos remained in the Malibu. At some point, Villarreal reviewed the car's registration and ran a check of the car's license plate.
As Villarreal filled out a warning for the speeding violation, he asked Santiago where he and Campos were coming from, and Santiago said that the two were returning from the airport. Villarreal asked who the passenger was, and Santiago responded that it was his friend, Sergio Campos. Villarreal then asked who owned the car, and Santiago said it belonged to Campos's brother, Daniel. Villarreal asked which airport the two had come from, and Santiago responded that it was "not the big one, but the little one" in Chicago. Santiago repeated that the car belonged to Campos's brother, this time replying affirmatively to Villarreal's question whether the brother's name was Jose Gonzalez, apparently the name obtained from the car's registration.
At this point, Villarreal left the patrol car to question Campos, who had remained in the Malibu's passenger seat. At Villarreal's request, Campos produced some identification. Villarreal asked Campos if the airport they were returning from was "O'Hare, the big one?" Campos replied, "Yeah." In response to questioning, Campos said he and Santiago were coming from the airport where they had just dropped off his mother, who was flying Mexicana Airlines. Villarreal testified that he knew that Mexicana, as an international airline, used only O'Hare, Chicago's largest airport. Campos also said that the car was his brother's and he had permission to use it.
Villarreal then returned to the police car and resumed questioning Santiago. After Villarreal told Santiago that O'Hare was the big airport, Santiago repeated that he and Campos had just returned from the airport in Chicago, but "not the big one." Villarreal testified that he "made a mental note of [Santiago's] moving around in my chair" when asked about the purpose of his trip.
Villarreal ran warrant checks on both Santiago and Campos and determined that the car was not reported stolen. Villarreal then "had" Santiago exit the vehicle, returned Santiago's driver's license and the car registration with a copy of the warning, and told Santiago to "gain some speed" before pulling back out into traffic and to "drive safe." Santiago thanked Villarreal and shook his hand. Villarreal testified that at that point Campos and Santiago were free to go "[i]n their mind."
As soon as Santiago turned to walk back toward the Malibu, Villarreal said, "Excuse me, sir, do you all have anything illegal in the car?" When Santiago replied in the negative, Villarreal asked him for consent to search the car. Santiago asked, "Is it really necessary?" Villarreal responded, "Yes." Santiago then gave a response that is not audible on the video, but, according to Villarreal, was, "Okay."
It appears from the video that Campos could not have heard the exchange between Santiago and Villarreal, and no one claims he did. Villarreal told Santiago to have a seat in the police car and then returned to the Malibu to ask Campos for consent to search the car. Campos told Villarreal to ask Santiago, and Villarreal responded, "Well, he gave me consent." Campos's reply, like Santiago's response to the request for consent, is inaudible on the tape, but Villarreal testified that Campos then said, "Okay." Villarreal asked Campos to join Santiago in the police car. While Villarreal searched the car, Campos and Santiago held a conversation in the police cruiser that was recorded on the video, apparently without their knowledge. The conversation is audible, but is in a mixture of Spanish and English and no translation is in the record. Campos stipulated that the tape contains "damaging admissions" and his brief describes the exchange as the two talking "freely in Spanish making admissions about the drugs."
Villarreal found a brick-shaped package of cocaine in the trunk of the Malibu. Campos was charged with Dealing in Cocaine, a Class A Felony. Campos moved to suppress the cocaine, contending that the search violated both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. He also moved to suppress the recording of his statements to Santiago in the patrol car, contending the recording violated both the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. After a suppression hearing, the trial court denied Campos's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the car, holding that Campos lacked standing to challenge the search, and, alternatively, that Campos had waived his claim to standing by leaving the decision to search to Santiago. The trial court also denied the motion to suppress Campos's statements recorded in the police cruiser on the ground that Campos did not have an expectation of privacy in the cruiser.
Campos was granted leave to file an interlocutory appeal. He argued that he had standing to contest the search of the vehicle, that he was illegally detained by Villarreal, and that Villarreal had violated the Indiana Constitution by failing to advise him of his right to counsel before seeking consent to the search. Campos also challenged the admission of his statements recorded in the police car before a Miranda warning was given. The State responded that Villarreal had reasonable suspicion to detain Campos after the traffic stop had ended; Campos had no standing to contest the vehicle search; Campos waived any claim to standing to contest the search; no Pirtle warning was required because Campos was not in custody when he gave consent; Campos was not subjected to interrogation so no Miranda warning was required; and Campos had no expectation of privacy in the police cruiser. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Campos lacked standing to challenge the search, Villarreal had reasonable suspicion to continue the detention, and the statements made in the police car did not require Miranda warnings. Campos v. State, 867 N.E.2d 676, 681-83 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). Judge May dissented, concluding that the search of the Malibu was unconstitutional both because Campos's delayed detainment constituted a second stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and, although Campos was in custody after Villarreal told Santiago that a search of the car was "necessary," he was not advised of his right to an attorney. Id. at 683-90. We grant transfer by order concurrent with this opinion.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure. Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind.2005). However, we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Id. Thus, we do not reweigh the evidence, but consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006).
Many search and seizure issues are resolved in the same manner under both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions. The search of the Malibu presents some in that category. These are addressed in Part I.A. Part I. B deals with issues unique to Indiana law under article I, section 11.
1. Reasonable Suspicion to Detain A traffic stop is a "seizure" subject to the constraints imposed by both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions. One exception to the warrant requirement for a seizure is an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion. Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer, together with the...
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