Canon v. Justice Court for Lake Valley Jud. Dist. of El Dorado County

• Decision Date: 25 June 1964
• Citation: 393 P.2d 428,61 Cal.2d 446,39 Cal.Rptr. 228
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 393 P.2d 428 George CANON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The JUSTICE COURT FOR the LAKE VALLEY JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF EL DORADO COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Sac. 7547

Page 228

39 Cal.Rptr. 228

61 Cal.2d 446, 393 P.2d 428

George CANON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The JUSTICE COURT FOR the LAKE VALLEY JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF EL DORADO COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Sac. 7547.

Supreme Court of California

June 25, 1964.

Kingston & Carman, Ralph E. Kingston and Lynn Carman, Placerville, for plaintiff and appellant.

George Franklyn Duke, Michael L. Ohleyer and Marshall W. Krause, San Francisco, amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Charles A. Barrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., James Ganulin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Dist. Atty., and George H. Dufort, Deputy Dist. Atty., for defendant and respondent and real party in interest and respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

By complaint filed in the justice court, appellant was charged with violating Elections Code section 12047. ¹ That court overruled appellant's demurrer and denied his motion to dismiss, which urged, on various grounds, that appellant was constitutionally protected from prosecution under this statute. He then sought a writ of prohibition in superior court, attacking the jurisdiction of the justice court to try him under the statute. The superior court denied his petition. We hold that the writ must be granted because the statute is unconstitutionally discriminatory. Prohibition, in this case, is a proper remedy. It is well settled that when the claimed infirmity appears on the face of the statute, prohibition is an appropriate means to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The writ provides a speedy procedure by which the accused may be protected from prosecution under a statute which does not state a public offense. The courts, zealous to protect constitutional rights, have recognized the propriety of the use of the writ for this purpose. (Whitney v. Municipal Court, 58 Cal.2d 907, 27 Cal.Rptr. 16, 377 P.2d 80; Lambert v. Municipal Court, 53 Cal.2d 690, 3 Cal.Rptr. 168, 349 P.2d 984; see also Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal.App.2d 38, 46, 324 P.2d 990.) Where the statute is attacked on First Amendment grounds the court is not limited in its examination to the application of the statute involved in the particular case, but may consider other possible applications of the statute. (Fort v. Civil Service Commission, 61 Cal.2d 331, 38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; see generally Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 1208.)

There are certain challenges to this statute that are unsound. Thus the claim that section 12047 is unconstitutionally vague is without merit. The language of the section is understandable to people of ordinary intelligence and gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed. It defines "* * * boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law * * *. That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense * * *." (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-492, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1313, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498; see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67.)

Appellant next contends that the complaint is constitutionally defective in that it did not apprise him of the name of the victim of his alleged attack. While this might be a ground for forcing the prosecution to amend the complaint, it is not a ground for dismissal, under California policy with respect to criminal pleadings. (See Pen.Code, § 956; People v. Olf, 195 Cal.App.2d 97, 107, 15 Cal.Rptr. 390; Witkin, Cal.Criminal Procedure (1963) § 197, p. 185.) The complaint is not so defective as to deny appellant due process, particularly in light of the broad scope of discovery in criminal cases in this state. (See generally Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228.)

One of appellant's main contentions is that section 12047 infringes on freedom of speech as guaranteed by the federal ² and state ³ Constitutions. This contention, too, is unsound. It is our view that under the principles set forth in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559, and other recent cases, discussed below, enforcement of section 12047 does not unconstitutionally interfere with freedom of speech.

Section 12047 appears among the penal provisions of division 8 of the Elections Code, which is concerned with 'Election Campaigns.' It is one of several sections designed 'to insure the fair and honest conduct of election campaigns,' ⁴ and to effectuate the mandate of our Constitution that 'The privilege of free suffrage shall be supported by laws regulating elections and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.' (Cal.Const., art XX, § 11.) The statute does not prohibit the communication of ideas, not does it attempt to regulate the content of expression. It forbids only anonymity, on pain of conviction of a misdemeanor, with respect to a limited range of expression, to wit, those writings 'designed to injure or defeat any candidate for nomination or election to any public office by reflecting upon his personal character or political action, * * *.' Thus the statute impinges upon full freedom of expression only during a limited period of time, for there can be candidates only during the period preceding an election. ⁵ More importantly, the section applies only to attacks on candidates, not to writings which are a communication of views about issues. ⁶ (Compare Elections Code section 12049, ⁷ a similarly worded section requiring identification of the source of campaign matter respecting ballot measures.)

The purpose of the statute is clear. It requires identification so that (1) the electorate may be better able to evaluate campaign material by examination of the competence and credibility of its source, (2) irresponsible attacks will be deterred, (3) candidates may be better able to refute or rebut charges so that elections will be the expression of the will of an undeceived, well-informed public. ⁸ It is clear that the integrity of elections, essential to the very preservation of a free society, is a matter 'in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern.' (Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., supra, 372 U.S. 539, 546, 83 S.Ct. 889, 894.) It was not the aim of the Legislature to hinder the communication of ideas, and there is nothing to indicate that the disclosure requirement, under the circumstances of present-day California politics, would in fact substantially inhibit expression, even in the limited area to which the statute is applicable. It was intended to deter the scurrilous hit and run smear attacks which are all too common in the course of political campaigns. ⁹ The primary concern is not for the candidate, however, although it is clearly in the public interest to create conditions conducive to the encouragement of good citizens to seek public office. The chief harm is that suffered by all the people when, as a result of the public having been misinformed and misled, the election is not the expression of the true public will. It is clear that this is an important problem today, as it was in 1901 when the section's statutory predecessor was passed. ¹⁰

Other states, confronted with similar problems, have likewise enacted statutes designed to protect the integrity of elections. 'Thirty-six States have statutes prohibiting the anonymous distribution of materials relating to elections.' (Talley v. California, supra, 362 U.S. 60, 70, fn. 2, 80 S.Ct. 536, 542 (dissenting opinion); see Note, Constitutionality of corrupt practices acts, 69 A.L.R. 377.)

Congress, too, has found this type of legislation necessary. Section 612 of title 18 of the United States Code provides for a fine of not more that $1,000 and/or imprisonment of not longer than one year for the anonymous publication of a 'statement relating to or concerning any person who has publicly declared his intention to seek the office of President, or Vice President of the United States, or Senator or Representative * * *.' In a prosecution under this section, the defendant, relying on Talley, sought the dismissal of the indictment. The court held that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. (United States v. Scott (D.C.N.D.1961) 195 F.Supp. 440, 443.) The statute was enacted, said the court, 'So that the electorate would be informed and make its own appraisal of the reason or reasons why a particular candidate was being supported or opposed by an individual or groups.' The court stressed that such disclosure enables voters to use their ballots more intelligently. It is to be noted that the federal statute is not limited in any manner as to the type of statement made. ¹¹

Having considered the language and purpose of the statute, we now pass to a discussion of its effect. It is undisputed that by requiring disclosure it is likely to have some inhibitory effect. This, in itself, however, does not invalidate the statute. Not only have numerous federal disclosure statutes in various contexts been upheld, but analysis of the recent cases in which anonymity was protected indicates that anonymity is not an absolute. (See generally, Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 Yale L.J. 1084.) 'In a number of situations in which secrecy or the concealment of associations has been regarded as a threat to public safety and to the effective, free functioning of our national institutions Congress has met the threat by requiring registration or disclosure.' (Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, supra, 367 U.S. 1, 97, ...