Cardellini v. Casey

• Citation: 226 Cal.Rptr. 659,181 Cal.App.3d 389
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 22 May 1986
• Parties: Wayne CARDELLINI and Lorraine A. Cardellini, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Melvin CASEY, et al., Defendants and Respondents. A024542.

Page 659

226 Cal.Rptr. 659

181 Cal.App.3d 389

Wayne CARDELLINI and Lorraine A. Cardellini, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Melvin CASEY, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A024542.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

May 22, 1986.

Richard Gardella, Redwood City, for plaintiffs and appellants

Kahala-Ann Trask Gibson, Menlo Park, for defendant and respondent Casey.

David E. Schricker, City Atty., Dennis C. Beougher, Asst. City Atty., Redwood City, for defendant and respondent City of Redwood City.

KLINE, Presiding Justice.

Appellants Wayne and Lorraine Cardellini appeal from an order transferring this case to the municipal court as a matter outside the jurisdiction of the superior court. The sole issue presented is whether this transfer was proper.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts essential to the jurisdictional question are undisputed. Appellants own two plots of land in the City of Woodside, California, which receive water service from the city of Redwood City. The dispute between the parties arises from a fee of $6,554.63 charged for connection of appellants' newly built home to Redwood City's water supply via a water main constructed by Melvin Casey, a private developer.

In November 1978, the Redwood City Council adopted Resolution Number 8611, which added sections 15(a) and 15(b) to the Rules and Regulations of the City Water Department. Section 15(a) establishes a procedure by which the water department will consider applications for extensions to its water distribution system, built at the applicant's cost. Section 15(b) authorizes the city to enter refunding agreements with applicants who have installed such extensions, to permit the applicants to obtain partial reimbursement from owners of property fronting upon the extensions who subsequently seek to connect to them. Such refunds would be based on engineering and construction costs (determined by the Director of Public Works to be reasonable) and include a sum based on the San Francisco Bay Area cost of construction index. The City would undertake to "make its best efforts to collect a refund for the applicant" but not be responsible for it in the event of a legal challenge; property owners would be required to pay the specified fee to the City as a condition of connection to the water main extension.

After constructing the water main extension at issue in this case, respondent Casey entered an agreement with the city, pursuant to section 15(b) above, which made three lots subject to a refund fee in the event of subsequent connection to the main. Appellants' Lot Number 36 is one of the three specified.

In 1981, construction of appellants' home, partially on each of their Lots Numbers 36 and 53, was completed. In order to receive water service, appellants' property was connected to the water line constructed by Casey, rather than to a pre-existing city water line which appellants claim previously served their property. ¹ Appellants were charged $550 in connection fees under the Redwood City Code, plus an additional fee of $6,554.63 under the agreement between the city and Casey. Appellants paid the latter fee under protest and received water service.

Having tendered the $6,554.63 and made claim upon the city for that amount, appellants brought an action in superior court against the city and Casey, for declaratory relief and damages of $6,554.63. The cause of action for declaratory relief alleged that the Casey agreement arbitrarily assigned costs to only some of the parcels abutting the water main extension; afforded Casey recovery of more than the reasonable cost of the facility; and was unauthorized under the city's governing documents and state law. In this regard, appellants contend that the city charter, section 74, required that procedures for laying of pipes be established by ordinance, rendering a connection fee authorized by resolution invalid; that an ordinance exists which would require a less substantial connection fee than the one charged; that the fee charged violates requirements of state law that municipal utility rates be uniform and nondiscriminatory; and that the Casey agreement is invalid because signed by an official other than one of those designated in the city charter as authorized to bind the city.

The superior court found that no equitable relief was sought in this action and referred the matter to arbitration. Appellants requested a trial de novo (Code Civ.Proc., § 1141.20). After unreported conferences, the case was transferred to municipal court as "a matter outside the jurisdiction of the superior court."

DISCUSSION

A. Declaratory Relief as the Basis for Superior Court Jurisdiction

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in transferring this case to the municipal court because the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief. The municipal court has jurisdiction over equitable actions only as expressly conferred by statute (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Courts, § 201, 202 pp. 228-230); an action for declaratory relief is not one of those enumerated. (Code Civ.Proc., § 86.) Rather, the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that actions for declaratory relief are to be brought in the superior court. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1060.) ²

"A complaint for declaratory relief is legally sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties under a written instrument or with respect to property and requests that the rights and duties of the parties be adjudged by the court.... If these requirements are met and no basis for declining declaratory relief appears, the court should declare the rights of the parties whether or not the facts alleged establish that the plaintiff is entitled to favorable declaration." (Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 947, 148 Cal.Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 [citations omitted].) In order to obtain declaratory relief, " '[T]he controversy must be of a character which admits of specific and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial determination, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, and not suggest, what the parties may or may not do.' " (Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 661, 118 Cal.Rptr. 100; Selby Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111.)

Although the superior court may deny declaratory relief, it may not transfer an action stating a sufficient claim for declaratory relief to the municipal court. (Cook v. Winklepleck (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d Supp. 759, 764, 59 P.2d 463.) If, however, a complaint seeking declaratory and incidental monetary relief shows that declaratory relief is "not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances," the complaint is "in truth [ ] merely one for the consequential relief of damages" (id.) and, if the damages sought are within the municipal court's jurisdictional amount, ³ the case belongs in municipal and not superior court. (Id.)

As a general rule, the superior court has no jurisdiction over an action in which "1. there is a fully matured cause of action for money; 2. the demand is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court; 3. a money judgment for plaintiff or a judgment in defendant's favor will fully and finally resolve the dispute between the parties; and 4. there is no occasion for any declaration concerning their future conduct." (Bachis v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 722, 727, 71 Cal.Rptr. 486.) An exception to this rule exists where a suit for damages would not be as " 'speedy and adequate or as well suited to the plaintiff's needs as declaratory relief.' " (Warren v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 678, 683, 121 Cal.Rptr. 19.) Thus, when the parties maintain a contractual relationship which will continue after resolution of the immediate dispute, and may give rise to additional claims, declaratory relief can help guide their future conduct and avoid multiple lawsuits. (Id., at p. 684, 121 Cal.Rptr. 19; Southern Counties Gas Co. v. Ventura Pipeline Construction Co. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 372, 381, 96 Cal.Rptr. 825.)

In the present case, it appears that "the rights of the complaining party have crystallized into a cause of action for past wrongs," (Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 929, 62 Cal.Rptr. 654), that a money judgment will fully resolve the dispute, and that no continuing relationship exists to justify a declaration of future rights. Appellants are receiving water service; all that remains is to determine the propriety of the $6,554.63 charge under the city's agreement with Casey, resolution and ordinance. Since only one of appellants' lots is mentioned in the Casey agreement, there is no possibility of a future dispute under this agreement. Although there is potential for a future dispute with the city if appellants' second lot is made subject to a different refunding agreement, such an eventuality is clearly speculative and does not therefore present an actual controversy which can be resolved by means of declaratory judgment. (Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 661, 118 Cal.Rptr. 100.)

Although appellants correctly state that the interpretation of charters, statutes and ordinances is an appropriate subject for declaratory relief (Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 637, 12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247), " 'a declaratory judgment may not be rendered in respect to them in disregard of the customary limitations upon the granting of such relief.' " (Zetterberg, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at p. 662, 118 Cal.Rptr. 100, quoting Monahan v. Dept. of Water & Power (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 746, 751, 120 P.2d 730.) Nor is declaratory relief necessary here, since the validity of the challenged...