Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 51477

• Decision Date: 03 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 51477,51477
• Parties: Howard CARDER, Jr., and Howard Carder, Sr., Petitioners, v. The COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS of the State of Oklahoma, and John Maley, Judge of the District Court of Okmulgee County, and Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services of the State of Oklahoma, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 416

595 P.2d 416

Howard CARDER, Jr., and Howard Carder, Sr., Petitioners, v. The COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS of the State of Oklahoma, and John Maley, Judge of the District Court of Okmulgee County and Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services of the State of Oklahoma, Respondents.

No. 51477.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 3, 1978.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1979.

Certiorari Granted to Court of Criminal Appeals to review that Court's judgment in O-77-656, State ex rel., Dept. of Inst., etc. v. Maley, Okl.Cr., 569 P.2d 1020 (1977); that Court's judgment vacated inasmuch as it was issued in excess of its jurisdiction; Order of trial judge, John Maley, dismissing action (J-77-14) ordered reinstated.

James D. Jordan, Okmulgee, for petitioners.

E. Stephen Briggs, Consulting Atty., DISRS, Oklahoma City, Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Robert L. McDonald, Asst., and Jerry Earl Benson, Legal Intern, Oklahoma City, for respondents.

SIMMS, Justice:

It speaks well of our bifurcated civil-criminal appellate system that there has not been a jurisdictional conflict between this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals for more than fifty years. ¹ This scarcity of conflict is a testament to both the clarity of jurisdictional boundaries between the two Courts and the constant willingness of the members of each Court to observe and comply with their jurisdictional restrictions.

Petitioners assert that this action squarely presents us with such a jurisdictional conflict. They contend that over their objections, the Court of Criminal Appeals entertained an original action for mandamus (O-77-656) brought by the Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services (Department) over which that Court did not have jurisdiction, as jurisdiction was properly in this Court. Petitioners argue that the Court of Criminal Appeals' purported determination of that cause, adverse to Petitioners, was beyond its power to render and they seek relief from this Court.

The ultimate question at issue is this: once a child has been declared delinquent, adjudged a ward of the court, and committed to the custody of the Department, does the juvenile court's jurisdiction over that child cease so that the court exceeds its jurisdiction when it enters an order dismissing the juvenile action?

The facts which gave rise to this action are these. On March 3, 1977, based upon allegations of verified petition in case number J-77-14, Honorable John Maley, Judge of the District Court of Okmulgee County, entered an order adjudicating Howard Carder, Jr., a delinquent child and ward of the court, and ordered his temporary custody placed with the Department. On May 12, 1977, Judge Maley entered a further dispositional order leaving the order of March 3, in full force and effect. That adjudication and disposition were not appealed and are not at issue here.

On July 5, 1977, Howard Carder, Sr., father of the child, filed a change of custody motion in J-77-14, requesting the return of his son's custody to him. The substance of that motion was that Howard should be returned home because he had been physically abused and injured at Boley State School for Boys where he had been placed by his custodian, the Department.

The Department then sought a writ of prohibition (P-77-531) from the Court of Criminal Appeals to prevent Judge Maley from holding hearing on the change of custody motion. The Department argued that the Judge had no authority to conduct any further hearings in J-77-14 because under 10 O.S.1971, § 1116(a)(3) and 10 O.S.1971, § 1118, ² the commitment of Howard's custody to the Department deprived the juvenile court of further jurisdiction. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on August 10, 1977, assumed jurisdiction and granted the writ prohibiting further hearing on the change of custody motion. Neither the prohibition action nor the change of custody motion from which it arose are before us but they are mentioned here to show the full history of the instant action.

Thereafter, on September 6, 1977, Judge Maley entered an ex parte order dismissing case number J-77-14 against Howard without prejudice. The Department then brought its action for mandamus (O-77-656) in the Court of Criminal Appeals praying that Judge Maley be directed to vacate his order of dismissal. Department argued that the Judge had no jurisdictional power to enter the order; that under § 1116(a)(3) and § 1118, the court's jurisdiction over Howard terminated when his custody was placed with the Department. Judge Maley responded and cited § 1102 as authority for his continuing jurisdiction over Howard and the juvenile action. Howard Carder, Sr. and Howard Carder, Jr., intervened and challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals to hear the matter, arguing that the Supreme Court was the exclusive proper forum for its resolution.

The Court of Criminal Appeals on September 27, 1977, issued its published order purporting to assume original jurisdiction and granting mandamus against Judge Maley in State, ex rel., Dept. of Inst., etc. v. Maley, Okl.Cr., 569 P.2d 1020 (1977). It was that Court's holding that in issuing the dismissal order, the Judge did exceed his authority, as defined by §§ 1116, 1118, and construed in that Court's prior decision of State v. Jennings, Okl.Cr., 561 P.2d 99 (1977).

Before deciding this action on its merits, we must first address and determine the issues pertaining to This Court's jurisdiction to decide this unusual matter.

I.

There can be no doubt as to the supremacy of the Supreme Court. The Constitution, article 7, section 4, so provides:

"The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until otherwise provided by statute and in the event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and such determination shall be final. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintendent control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law. The Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, in criminal matters and all other appellate courts shall have power to issue, hear and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and such other remedial writs as may be provided by law and may exercise such other and further jurisdiction as may be conferred by statute. * * * "

The Court of Criminal Appeals is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction only in criminal matters.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has no general superintending control over inferior courts; it can issue writs of prohibition and mandamus Only in the exercise or aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is that power and jurisdiction to review and correct those proceedings of inferior courts brought for determination in the manner provided by law. State v. Cole, 4 Okl.Cr. 25, 109 P. 736 (1910); Dancy v. Owens, supra. Therefore, in action where the Court of Criminal Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction, it has no power to issue writs of prohibition and/or mandamus. 20 O.S.1971, §§ 40, 41. See, e. g., Ex Parte McCollum, 90 Okl.Cr. 153, 212 P.2d 161 (1949); State v. Lackey, 97 Okl.Cr. 41, 257 P.2d 849 (1953); Wyatt v. Wolf, Okl.Cr. 324 P.2d 548 (1958); Jerry v. Pardon and Parole Bd., Okl.Cr., 546 P.2d 650 (1976); Scheidt v. Rakestraw, Okl.Cr., 548 P.2d 677 (1976).

The obvious question then, is: could an appeal from the dismissal order have been had in the Court of Criminal Appeals?

The only appellate jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Criminal Appeals in juvenile cases pertains to criminal-related issues and is set forth in § 1123A, as follows:

"Any interested party aggrieved by any order or decree may appeal to the Supreme Court in the same manner as other appeals are taken to the Supreme Court of this state; provided, however, that Appeals taken from a trial court's decision In a proceeding for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency or in a proceeding certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult or denying such certification shall be taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals in the same manner as other appeals are taken to the Court of Criminal Appeals of this state, and provided further that an order either certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult or denying such certification shall be a final order, appealable when entered." (emphasis added)

Judge Maley's order, as Petitioners have correctly argued, did not arise from either an adjudication of delinquency or certification to stand trial as an adult. Certification was not sought and Howard Carder did not appeal his adjudication. The only issue of this action concerns the inherent and statutory power of the juvenile court to retain its jurisdiction over children it has adjudicated delinquent and wards of the court.

It is clear that this post-dispositional order of dismissal could not have been appealed by either party to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Having no appellate jurisdiction over the juvenile division of the District Court in such matters, the relationship of superior and inferior did not exist between that Court and the District Court in O-77-656 and the Court of Criminal Appeals had no authority to exercise in its issuance of the writ of prohibition.

The Supreme Court is the exclusive proper forum for determination of these issues. Okla.Const., Art. 7, sec. 4; § 1123; 12 O.S.1971, Ch. 15, App. 2, Rule 1.10(a)(5).

Having determined that the Court of Criminal Appeals did exceed its jurisdictional limitations in issuing the writ of mandamus in O-77-656, we must decide how to resolve this exceptional situation.

In addition to the serious questions raised by the parties...