Carlson v. City of Houston
| Decision Date | 18 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-08-01044-CV.,14-08-01044-CV. |
| Parties | James and Elizabeth CARLSON, Jose and Elizabeth Referente, Roger Campodonico, Sergio A. Lopez, Yan Wang and Hui Yao, Daniel and Andrea Seluk, Robert Hutchins, Robert and Kelly Farfan, Bonnie Corbett, Helen Pagola, and Manny Espinola, Appellants, v. CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
William C. Ferebee, Robert G. Miller, Houston, for appellants.
Bertrand L. Pourteau, II, Houston, for appellee.
Panel consists of Justices FROST, BOYCE, and SULLIVAN.
James and Elizabeth Carlson, Jose and Elizabeth Referente, Roger Campodonico, Sergio A. Lopez, Yan Wang, Hui Yao, Daniel and Andrea Seluk, Robert Hutchins, Robert and Kelly Farfan, Bonnie Corbett, Helen Pagola, and Manny Espinola appeal from an order granting the City of Houston's plea to the jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.
Appellants own residential units at Park Memorial, a condominium complex located at 5292 Memorial Drive in Houston. Park Memorial is governed by Park Memorial Condominium Association, Inc.
In 2007, the Association contracted with three professional engineering companies to investigate the structural integrity of some of the buildings constituting the Park Memorial complex. All three reports expressed concerns regarding the structural integrity of certain buildings. Specifically, the reports expressed concerns that wood and steel support beams were deteriorated and corroded in some of the buildings. The reports recommended replacing the beams and removing the stucco covering on other beams for further testing. One report recommended immediate "shoring" of the corroded beams. Another report stated that if the beams were not properly protected from further corrosion, they would "continue to deteriorate and may eventually fail." None of the reports expressed concerns that the buildings were in danger of immediate collapse.
The City learned of concerns regarding the structural integrity of certain Park Memorial buildings in July 2008. The City subsequently contracted with David Collins, a licensed structural engineer, to independently investigate the structural integrity of the Park Memorial buildings. Collins's report also expressed concerns regarding the structural integrity of some of the Park Memorial buildings due to the corroded beams. Collins's report stated in part as follows:
After reviewing Collins's report, the City issued an order on August 15, 2008 directing all Park Memorial residents to vacate all Park Memorial buildings by September 15, 2008.
The City sent a letter to Park Memorial's residents on August 20, 2008 informing them of their right under City of Houston Building Code section 116 to request an administrative hearing to contest the August 15, 2008 order to vacate. Four of the appellants requested an administrative hearing. The City held an administrative hearing on September 9, 2008 and affirmed the August 15, 2008 order to vacate in a letter dated September 10, 2008. On September 11, 2008, the City extended the deadline to vacate the property until October 1, 2008 due to the approach of Hurricane Ike.
Appellants timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari in district court on October 1, 2008 seeking judicial review of the August 15, 2008 order to vacate.1 See Tex. Local Gov't Code Ann. § 214.0012(a) (Vernon 2008) (). Appellants also requested a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction. The district court signed an order on October 1, 2008 granting appellants's request for a temporary restraining order.
The City filed its original answer and plea to the jurisdiction on October 8, 2008. Sean Cody filed a plea in intervention on October 13, 2008. The Association filed a petition in intervention on October 14, 2008. Appellants filed their response to the City's plea to the jurisdiction on October 15, 2008, and a supplemental petition for writ of certiorari on October 17, 2008. The district court denied appellants's request for a temporary injunction in an order signed October 31, 2008, and granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction in an order signed November 7, 2008. Appellants timely appealed and now challenge the district court's order granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction.2
We review the district court's grant of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, we do not consider the merits of the underlying claim; we consider only the plaintiff's pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554-55 (Tex.2000).
A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge the pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 226. The reviewing court must (1) examine the allegations in the pleadings; (2) liberally construe them in the plaintiff's favor; and (3) consider the pleader's intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the district court's jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Id. at 227; Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 555. The standard of review for a jurisdictional plea based on evidence "generally mirrors that of a summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c)." Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. Under this standard, we credit evidence favoring the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See id.
The jurisdictional facts are not in dispute. The issue before us presents a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a pure question of law. See State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex.2006). Therefore, we review the district court's order granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction de novo. See id.
A district court has subject matter jurisdiction to review an administrative order when (1) a statute provides a right of judicial review; or (2) the order adversely affects a vested property right or otherwise violates a constitutional right. Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assoc., 19 S.W.3d 393, 398 (Tex.2000); Stone v. Tex. Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.1967). Appellants argue that the district court had two bases for subject matter jurisdiction to consider their petition for writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of the August 15, 2008 order to vacate. First, they rely on Texas Local Government Code section 214.0012. Second, they contend the August 15, 2008 order to vacate adversely affected a vested property right. The City argues that Texas Local Government Code section 214.0012 does not apply here, and that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the August 15, 2008 order to vacate under any other basis.
Texas Local Government Code section 214.001 permits municipalities to enact ordinances addressing buildings that are "dilapidated, substandard, or unfit for human habitation" and to require occupants to vacate such buildings when they pose "a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare." Tex. Local Gov't Code Ann. § 214.001 (Vernon Supp. 2009).3 In turn, Texas Local Government Code section 214.0012 provides for judicial review of a municipality's administrative order issued under section 214.001:
Any owner, lienholder, or mortgagee of record of property jointly or severally aggrieved by an order of a municipality issued under Section 214.001 may file in district court a verified petition setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, and specifying the grounds of the illegality. The petition must be filed by an owner, lienholder, or mortgagee within 30 calendar days after the respective dates a copy of the final decision of the municipality is personally delivered to them, mailed to them by first class mail with certified return receipt requested, or delivered to them by the United States Postal Service using signature confirmation service, or such decision shall become final as to each of them upon the expiration of each such 30 calendar day period.
Id. § 214.0012(a). Appellants predicate the district court's subject matter jurisdiction on section 214.0012(a).
The City responds that section 214.0012 does not establish a right to judicial review in this case because (1) it applies only to orders issued pursuant to section 214.001; and (2) the August 15, 2008 order to...
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